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

Daily Report

Soviet Union

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20 February 1991

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Soviet Union

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Bessmertnykh Expects START Completion in Weeks

PM2002105391 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 20 Feb 91 p 3

[TASS and IAN roundup report: "Treaty Will Be Signed"]

[Text] 19 Feb—The Soviet Union reckons that the preparation of the treaty on USSR and U.S. strategic offensive arms will be completed in the next few weeks, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, USSR foreign minister, told an IAN correspondent.

He rebutted media reports claiming that the disarmament process may grind to a halt, specifically because of problems which have arisen during the exchange of information on conventional arms in Europe.

NATO Gulf Response Casts 'Doubt' on Arms Pacts

PM1902163391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Colonel I. Vladimirov article: "NATO and the Crisis in the Persian Gulf"]

[Text] Combat operations in the Persian Gulf zone are in full swing. The leading NATO countries—the United States, Britain, France, and Italy—are bearing the main burden on the part of the multinational force, which fact cannot fail to give rise to this question: Is war not being waged by the North Atlantic alliance as such? No, the bloc's headquarters maintains, each country is acting on its own. The alliance structures are not involved in the conflict, and the allies are using the NATO machinery exclusively for consultation with a view to assessing the situation in that region.

The facts, however, indicate that from the first days of the conflict the North Atlantic alliance assumed the functions of coordinator of the alliance countries' war preparations in the Persian Gulf zone. An emergency NATO Council session was convened literally a few days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, at which the allies approved the political and economic sanctions against Baghdad and announced the first military measures. These included sending units of the French and British navies and air forces to the Persian Gulf region and substituting West European ships for the ships of the U.S. 6th Fleet which had left for the coasts of the Arabian Peninsula.

At the next stage the main NATO committee responsible for drawing up emergency plans in the civilian sphere came into operation and set about coordinating the transfers of troops and freight to the Persian Gulf region by sea and air. An airlift and a sea bridge from the United States and West Europe to Saudi Arabia functioned without interruption. The distant early warning command and NATO air control joined in reconnaissance activity against Iraq. By the time the "goodwill pause" ended, a NATO mobile force consisting of 18 Belgian Air Force Mirages, 18 FRG Air Force Alpha Jets, and six Italian Air Force RF-104G's had been transferred to Turkey.

A large formation of NATO minesweeping forces permanently stationed in the English Channel zone is currently heading for the East Mediterranean. Before the start of the war in the Persian Gulf it had been conducting an exercise in the North Sea. The ships of this formation will evidently replace the forces of the large strategic NATO combined naval forces formation for "on call" operations which, according to a decision of the bloc's standing Military Planning Sommittee, must be ready in the shortest possible time to participate in combat operations against Iraq. Finally, U.S. aircraft are setting out from the territory of a NATO country—Turkey—on bombing raids against military and industrial targets in Iraq.

It should also be mentioned that the crisis in the Persian Gulf region has provoked renewed activity among NATO advocates of building up the bloc's military might. Thus, under pressure from them, the alliance's military command has already demanded the creation of a combined rapid deployment force. U.S. B-52 strategic bombers have appeared in Europe. True, temporarily, so it is claimed, but no one is naming any specific length of time for their presence there. At the same time additional measures are planned to modernize the armed forces and improve the bloc's military infrastructure in the south of Europe and to give the countries of that region military assistance. It is also a disturbing fact that work on the programs for reducing armed forces and armaments has reportedly been suspended in the NATO committees. In particular the British military command, citing the Persian Gulf crisis, has adopted a decision to temporarily suspend the reduction of its armed forces envisaged in the Vienna agreements on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe.

Unfortunately, it can be stated that this NATO response to the Persian Gulf crisis could quite easily cast into doubt everything positive that has been achieved in the sphere of disarmament on the European continent and in the world.

UN Chief Thanks Moscow for Peace Plan Details

LD2002085391 Moscow TASS in English 0818 GMT 20 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] United Nations February 20 TASS —United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar on Tuesday thanked the Soviet president and government for providing detailed information about the Soviet Gulf war settlement plan.

Earlier, Cuellar received a confidential letter from Mikhail Gorbachev about the initiative.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz's visit to Moscow provides a historic chance to avert a ground war in the Gulf, Cuellar told TASS, saying that a land offensive could have catastrophic consequences.

Nothing prevents attempts to hold talks on a settlement, he said.

The United Nations could play an important role in the post- war period, Cuellar told reporters.

U.N. experts were working on plans for peace-keeping operations in the area, he said.

The international community could quickly deploy U.N. observers and peace-keeping troops to the area. The United Nations could control troop withdrawal, he said.

The United Nations should play an important role in efforts to rebuild Kuwait and Iraq. The U.N. faces serious tasks in ensuring security in the Middle East in the post-war period, he said.

UN Hopes on Moscow Gulf Peace Talks Reported

LD2002081591 Moscow TASS in English 0736 GMT 20 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Kochetkov: "Hopes Pinned on Talks in Moscow"]

[Text] United Nations February 20 TASS—U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar hopes very much that the talks held in Moscow by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz would make it easier to achieve a peaceful settlement to the Gulf crisis on the basis of the U.N. Security Council resolutions, a spokesman of the United Nations secretary general said on Tuesday.

He said that on Monday evening, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations Yuliy Vorontsov handed over to Perez de Cuellar a confidential letter from Mikhail Gorbachev about the Soviet initiative for the settlement of the Gulf crisis. The Soviet ambassador to the United Nations informed Perez de Cuellar in detail about the talks in Moscow.

On Tuesday Perez de Cuellar discussed the situation with the chairman of the U.N. Security Council. He also held a meeting with his assistants to disucuss the United Nations possible role in the Gulf in the period ahead, including the United Nations peacekeeping functions.

Perez de Cuellar had also discussed such possible tasks of the United Nations with the Iraqi President Saddam Husayn before the beginning of military operations against Iraq, as well as recently with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and with representatives of Scandinavian countries.

Answering questions from reporters, the spokesman of the U.N. secretary general refused to comment on the Soviet proposals for the settlement of the crisis. He said that these proposals are of a confidential nature, and that there is a very complex stage at the negotiations at present.

CEMA To Set Up New Cooperation Organization

PM1902155791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 91 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] 17 Feb—Under an accord reached among the CEMA countries the 46th CEMA Session Sitting is being convened in the Hungarian capital, Budapest, 27-28 February.

A meeting of the CEMA countries' heads of government will take place, at which it is intended to sign the founding documents of a new intergovernmental economic cooperation organization.

Soviet Delegation Attends NATO Assembly Session

PM2002113791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1

[From IZVESTIYA, TASS, INTERFAX, POSTFACTUM, and REUTER roundup: "Soviet Legislators Sit in on NATO Committees"]

[Text] There has been a joint session of the North Atlantic Assembly Economic and Scientific and Technical Committees in Brussels. It was attended by a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation and representatives of East European countries as well as by NATO countries' legislators. The session discussed prospects for and problems of the development of economic cooperation between East and West. During the debate it was noted that the level of ties still falls short of the extensive potential that is opening up as a result of the general improvement in the international climate. At the same time there are many areas in which broader cooperation would give both sides very promising results.

United States & Canada

Nishanov, U.S. Officials Discuss Baltics

LD1602054191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1515 GMT 15 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Pershin]

[Text] Moscow, 15 Feb (TASS)—"The internationalization of the events in the Baltic region" is complicating the process of a settlement of the situation in this region, stated Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet. He was meeting in the Kremlin today with a group of U.S. senators and representatives who have just visited Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Rafik Nishanov rejected any attempts at diktat from outside in solving the problems of the Baltic region, stressing that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are a part of the USSR and the country's constitution operates on their territory. The problems of the Baltic republics require patient discussion and in-depth talks, he said.

The chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities recalled that, on the instructions of the USSR president, official delegations have been formed for meetings with the representatives of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. He reported that yesterday letters were sent to the leaders of these republics asking them to form their own official delegations for the talks. "Any questions can be solved given goodwill and respect for one another, and we are on this road," the Soviet legislature noted.

Congressman Steny Hoyer, the head of the U.S. delegation, stated that "by acting together, the USSR and the United States can create a new world order based on a peaceful settlement of disputes." At the same time, he said that the events in Lithuania and Latvia could reflect negatively on Soviet-American relations. This thought was developed by other members of the U.S. legislative delegation who link the future of Soviet-American dialogue with Moscow's reaction to the development of the situation in the Baltics.

Despite the differences in the views of the two parties on the Baltic problem, however, a key point of contact was found on the question of the fact that no major problem in interethnic policy can be solved by means of force. The only way is through talks. The mutual desire of the sides to find a common language for discussing the most delecate subjects is no less valuable.

In a conversation with a TASS correspondent at the end of the meeting in the Kremlin, Steny Hoyer said, among other things, he hopes that the Soviet side will make efforts to settle the situation "by civilized means." "We were very pleased to hear pronouncements about concern for human rights in the Baltics, and that the USSR does not intend to give up its policy of perestroyka and go back to the times of Stalinism," Steny Hoyer noted.

Ambassador Matlock Visit Pacific Fleet Ship

PM1702122591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Feb 91 Second Edition p 3

[Report by Captain First Rank V. Shirokov: "Guests of the Pacific Ocean Sailors"]

[Text] U.S. Ambassador to the USSR J. Matlock, who is in Vladivostok for the opening of the "Design U.S.A." exhibition, has paid a call on Admiral G.A. Khvatov, commander of the Pacific Fleet. The ambassador and the officials accompanying him visited the large ASW ship Petropavlovsk. The guests toured the ship and met the crew.

Northeast Asia

Suspension of ROK-DPRK Premier Talks Regretted

SK1902013091 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 18 Feb 91

[Commentary by (Piotr Chernov); from the "Focus on Asia" Program]

[Text] The DPRK has unilaterally announced the suspension of premier-level talks with the ROK. It said that the reason is the Team Spirit-91 ROK-U.S. joint military exercise conducted in the southern area of the peninsula. In this connection, station commentator (Piotr Chernov) says:

A meeting between representatives from the governments of the two countries was scheduled today, 18 February, to discuss preparations for the fourth round of premier-level talks. Instead of participating in the meeting to discuss the alleviation of tension on the peninsula, however, the DPRK side announced in a statement today that it will not participate in the premier-level talks.

The Pyongyang statement said that all responsibility for this should be assumed by the ROK and U.S. Governments. The preparations for North-South premier-level talks began in February 1989. Since then, a total of eight rounds of preliminary meetings have been held. The premier-level talks began in September last year. The three rounds of premier-level talks, which were held in Seoul and Pyongyang alternately, failed to produce any detailed results, however, because of the differences between the North and the South in their attitude toward pan-national issues.

For example, the DPRK has appealed to the ROK authorities more than a couple of times to cancel the Team Spirit joint military exercise during the period of the mutual contact between the North and the South. Seoul has not listened to the appeal, however. It is natural that the military exercise will not alleviate tension on the pnenisula. The complete discontinuation of mutual contacts between the North and the South because of the military exercise will also not help eliminate confrontation or end the cold war. It will also not expedite the solution to other pressing questions.

Reports Note Primakov's Visit to Japan

Arrives 15 Feb

LD1502121191 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian
1103 GMT 15 Feb 91

[Text] Yevgeniy Primakov, the personal representative of the USSR president, arrived in Tokyo today. The main questions at his meetings with Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama and Prime Minister Kaifu will be the search for ways to settle the crisis in the Persian Gulf, and preparations for Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan, which is planned for April.

Departs 17 Feb

LD1702113291 Moscow TASS in English 1118 GMT 17 Feb 91

[Text] Tokyo February 17 TASS—Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, who paid a two-day visit to Japan after his trip to Baghdad and Tehran, left for Moscow today.

During his stay in Tokyo, Primakov met and talked with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama and other Japanese officials. The talks focused on efforts to settle the Gulf crisis.

Japanese Reportage on Visit

For Japanese reportage on the 3-day visit to Japan by presidential envoy Yevgeniy Primakov, including reports on talks between Primakov and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama, and other government leaders on the war in the Persian Gulf, see the Japanese section of the 15 February East Asia DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Japanese Deputy Minister Holds Peace Treaty Talks

Meets With Bessmertnykh

OW1902122791 Tokyo KYODO in English 1210 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, Feb. 19 KYODO—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh will visit Japan in late March to make final preparations for a three-day visit by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in April, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official said Tuesday. The exact date for Bessmertnykh's first visit to Japan will be set through diplomatic channels, the official said.

Bessmertnykh told Japan's Deputy Foreign Minister Hisashi Owada that he intends to visit Japan to pave the way for the Gorbachev's visit scheduled for April 16-19. Owada, who represented Japan at bilateral negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty, paid a courtesy call on Bessmertnykh at the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The working-level bilateral peace talks ended Monday without major progress.

In the 45-minute talks, Owada urged the Soviet Union to take decisive action on the territorial dispute over four Soviet-held islands off Japan's northernmost main island of Hokkaido.

The Foreign Ministry official quoted Owada as saying, "The actions the Soviet Union would take toward the settlement of the territorial dispute will have a great impact on the process of developing trustworthy relations between the two nations."

In response, Bessmertnykh expressed a strong desire for improved bilateral relations, according to the official who attended the Owada-Bessmertnykh meeting. Bessmertnykh said the Soviet Union and Japan should take advantage of Gorbachev's visit to Japan to improve their relationship. Bessmertnykh, however, suggested the Kremlin is in a difficult position concerning the territorial dispute because of intensifying secessionist movements in the Soviet Union and the rise of hardliners in the domestic political arena, the official said.

Japan has long called for the return of the four islands as a prerequisite for full-fledged diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, including the conclusion of a peace treaty formally ending World War II. The Soviet Union seized the islands—Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and the Habomai Islet group—immediately after the war.

Meets With Rogachev

LD1802162991 Moscow TASS in English 1421 GMT 18 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow February 18 TASS—A permanent working group on the peace treaty between the USSR and Japan met in Moscow today. The Soviet delegation, made up of representatives of the Soviet and Russian Federation Foreign Ministries, was led by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev and the Japanese delegation by Deputy Foreign Minister Hisashi Owada.

Drawing on the results of previous meetings, the sides continued exchanging views on all aspects of the treaty. Note was taken of the coincidence or proximity of views on some issues.

Both sides deemed the discussion useful and substantial. An agreement was reached on carrying on the group's work.

Rogachev and Owada also exchanged views on topical issues of Soviet-Japanese relations from the point of view of the Soviet president's visit to Japan, scheduled for April.

Said 'Failed To Make Headway'

OW1802174191 Tokyo KYODO in English 1446 GMT 18 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, Feb. 18 KYODO—Japan and the Soviet Union on Monday failed to make headway in talks here aimed at ending the northern islands territorial dispute and concluding a bilateral peace treaty, Japanese officials said said.

In the talks, Japan reiterated its demand that the Soviet Union return the islands off Hokkaido in order to sign a peace treaty and establish full ties with Moscow, the officials said.

The Soviets restated their view that the territorial issue should not stand in the way of signing a peace treaty, according to the Japanese officials.

Japan has long called for the return of the islands, which the Soviet Union seized immediately after World War II.

Deputy Vice Minister Hisashi Owada and his Soviet counterpart Igor Rogachev attended the meeting. An official from the Russian Federation also joined in the talks for the first time, the officials said.

The Russian Republic has jurisdiction over Japanese-claimed islands off eastern Hokkaido—Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and the Habomai group. The islands are now populated by tens of thousands of Soviet citizens.

Domestic Complications Cited

OW1902032791 Tokyo KYODO in English 0307 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, Feb. 19 KYODO—A senior Japanese diplomat indicated Monday that domestic problems in the Soviet Union may hold up a breakthrough in the territorial dispute between the two countries prior to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan in mid-April.

Deputy Foreign Minister Hisashi Owada, in Moscow for the seventh session of the Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty Working Committee, told Japanese reporters that ethnic disputes and the resurgence of conservative elements appear to be prevalent in the Soviet Union.

He said this will complicate moves for a solution to differences over four islands to the east of Hokkaido seized by Soviet forces at the end of World War II.

Japanese officials said Owada failed to make progress on the territorial issue in talks with his Soviet counterpart Igor Rogachev earlier Monday.

Owada indicated the Japanese side still believes there is room for a political solution if Gorbachev is prepared to take decisive action on the dispute.

He said the Gorbachev visit offers the prospect of a "major opportunity for a qualitative improvement in Japan-Soviet relations."

Owada said both sides have reached a mutual understanding on the framework and contents of a peace treaty and, with the exception of the disputed territories, have agreed in outline on provisions to be included in the treaty.

"As far as the Japanese side is concerned, we think that winding up the settlement of postwar issues should form the basis of a peace treaty, and a peace treaty which does not address the territorial issue is out of the question." Owada said.

Reports Continue on Mongolian Premier's Visit

Silayev Meeting Viewed

LD1202201691 Moscow TASS in English 1909 GMT 12 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow February 12 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev today met Mongolian Premier D. Byambasuren, who is on a two day official visit here, to discuss Russian-Mongolian cooperation.

Silayev and Byambasuren, at the request of TASS and radio correspondents, commented on Russian-Mongolian relations.

The ongoing political and economic changes in Mongolia and Russia open up new prospects for cooperation on a new basis, including by establishing direct ties between enterprises, organisations and regions, Silayev said.

He stressed that the Russian leadership sought to maintain economic, cultural and other relations and create favorable conditions for active cooperation between manufacturers not only in Russia and Mongolia but also in third countries.

Russia and Mongolia with deep rooted friendship, cooperation and mutual respect have good prospects for cooperation, Silayev said.

Byambasuren agreed with Silayev and said that the talks laid down a firm basis for developing and expanding bilateral cooperation.

He said that Mongolia will do everything possible to invigorate this cooperation.

13 Feb News Conference Reported

LD1302224291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Feb 91

[Report by correspondent V. Lobachenko, including remarks by Mongolian Prime Minister Dashiyn Byambasuren, from a news conference in Moscow on 13 February; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Lobachenko] The news conference summed up the results of the first visit by Mongolia's new prime minsiter to the Soviet Union that ended today. This visit is expected to ease the difficulties that have arisen in our relations and to promote a further development of friendly links between the two countries and peoples.

[Byambasuren] During our visit we signed with Russia a declaration on good-neighborliness and cooperation and concluded an agreement on trade and cooperation. I think these are fundamental documents.

[Unidentified correspondent] There is currently talk of developing and improving Soviet-Mongolian relations. In this connection are quantitative or qualitative changes being proposed?

[Byambasuren] I think both are being proposed. They will be qualitative in respect of the fact that our cooperation, inheriting the positive features of the past, will indeed be further developed in a new sense and will rise to a new level. We proceed on the basis that Mongolian-Soviet cooperation should absorb all the best that exists in international practice and the present day world. These principles are enshrined in the final documents that have been adopted as a result of our visit.

[Lobachenko] Closing the news conference, Comrade Byambasuren noted the importance of his meetings and talks with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov for the further development of Soviet-Mongolian relations. He also expressed full support for the policy of perestroyka in the Soviet Union, which he said had changed the face of the present day world and had to an enormous degree promoted the process of democratization in Mongolia.

New Trade Agreement Noted

PM1502105391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 91 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Conclusion of Visit"]

[Text] D. Byambasuren, prime minister of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR], has been in Moscow for a working visit at the invitation of the USSR Government. He was received by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev.

Talks were held between USSR Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov and D. Byambasuren, in the course of which the examined the state of and outlook for the development of USSR-MPR economic collaboration in conditions of the formation of market mechanisms in the two countries' national economies and of transition to new conditions for settling accounts in reciprocal trade.

The sides agreed that USSR-MPR trade and economic links should be based on the principles of equality and mutual advantage, and taking real potential into account. In this context it was noted that the bilateral collaboration programs need renewing, while while preserving the positive experience built up in economic collaboration.

Questions relating to the settlement of the MPR's debt to the Soviet Union were also discussed, as was the operation of joint Soviet-Mongolian enterprises and USSR construction organizations on Mongolian territory.

Within the framework of the visit, members of the Mongolian government delegation held meetings and talks at USSR ministries and departments. An agreement on USSR-MPR trade and economic cooperation in 1991 was signed.

Joint Ventures Planned

PM1402094791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Feb 91 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Stay in Moscow"]

[Text] The agenda of the working visit to the USSR which D. Byambasuren has just completed was very full. The Mongolian head of government also had talks with USSR Geology Minister G.A. Gabrielyants, when they spoke primarily about clearly defining the volumes and forms of cooperation between the two countries in 1991 with due regard for the new economic management conditions. Questions connected with the creation of small joint ventures to carry out geological prospecting work and to exploit mineral deposits were also discussed.

On the same day D. Byambasuren visited the city of Aleksandrov near Moscow, where he visited the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Mineral Raw Materials Synthesis and familiarized himself with the activity of the collective of this scientific center, which holds a leading place in the sector.

On 12 and 13 February D. Byambasuren will be the guest of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Government.

Bilateral Significance Highlighted

OW1502085991 Ulaanbaatar International Service in English 1200 GMT 13 Feb 91

[Text] The first in the 70 years (?working) visit of Mongolia's Prime Minister Dashiyn Byambasuren to the Russian Federation ended on February 13th. The talks with the head of the Russian Government were an extremely significant event in bilateral relations. It was the first ever bilateral [words indistinct]

In Moscow, Mongolian Prime Mister Byambasuren had a meeting with Ivan Silayev, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, on February 12th. This first visit testifies to the formation of a qualitatively new type of Mongol-Russian relations based on the principles of sovereign equality of the sides. The two men briefed each other on the course of the economic and political reforms in their respective countries and outlined future trends of mutually beneficial and constructive cooperation. They discussed the possibilities of furthering traditional ties between their administrative and territorial units, including border trade. The sides have unanimously agreed that their dialogue was called upon to render favorable influence on the situation [words indistinct] taking place in the Asian-Pacific region.

On the same day, Mr. Byambasuren and Ivan Silayev signed a declaration on friendship and goodneighborly cooperation between Mongolia and the Russian Federation. It lays the ground for interstate Mongol-Russian relations and the principles of a universally accepted standards of international law and proves the growing sovereignty of the two countries. The document notes striving of Mongolia and the Russian Federation to promote in every way the consolidation of security, establishment of a spirit of close cooperation, and interaction in the Asian-Pacific Region. The declaration outlines the basic trends of the entire complex of Mongol-Russian ties in the economic, scientific-technological, humanitarian, as well as environmental protection spheres.

Mr. Byambasuren and Ivan Silayev have also concluded an intergovernmental agreement on trade and economic cooperation which in part envisages the stepping up of border trade, development of direct ties between enterprises, creation of joint ventures, opening of firm representations, as well as the settlement of many issues linked with the recent transition to transactions in free convertible currency.

Mongolian Prime Minister Byambasuren also met with the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Kozyrev, and discussed broad spectrum of issues related with the development of bilateral relations as well as international problems of mutual interest. The two men also considered questions of developing humanitarian cooperation and increasing the pass-through capacity on the Mongol-Russian border.

New Forms of Cooperation Seen

LD1602184191

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0930 GMT on 16 February carries a three-minute report by Vladimir Korolev, correspondent in Ulaanbataar, on the progres of perestroyka in Mongolia. He says: "While in the political sphere its results are palpable—such phenomena inherent in a democratic society as the multiparty system and glasnost have, let us say, triumphed—in the economy, matters are far worse. In this sphere, the situation is described as complicated. The way out of the situation that has arisen is seen here in converting the country's national economy to market relations.

"Recently, the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR] adopted a decision which essentially consists in doubling retail prices for goods, while at the same doubling working people's wages. In an official commentary, the government decision is called: the start of the changeover to the market economy. However, not everyone in the country has welcomed it. Judging from a recent public opinion poll, two-thirds of those polled regard these government measures as useful, but responses to the contrary also exist," says Korolev.

He continues: "Realistically-thinking politicians in Mongolia now stress: Economic stability in our country also depends on how processes of perestroyka proceed in the USSR. Indeed, the disorder in the Soviet Union's economy is in many respects affecting the situation in Mongolia. Many people in Mongolia see the way out of the crisis which has arisen and the country's transition to market relations not only in internal reforms, but also in expanding business ties with the outside world. At the same time, it must be said that so far Mongolia's economic cooperation with the countries of the West and Japan takes up an insignificant place in its foreign economic relations. The Soviet Union remains the Mongolian People's Republic's main trade and economic partner. It is perfectly obvious that the previous forms of cooperation between the two countries have become obsolete and need to be revised, however. At present, a frank and constructive discussion of all urgent questions of their equal partnership is underway. The current visit to the Soviet Union by MPR Prime Minister Byambasuren, too, can be assessed today as a search for new forms of equal cooperation," Korolev concludes.

Visit's Results Noted

OW1702052691 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 14 Feb 91

[Commentary by (Kandeladinyev); from the "Current Events and Commentary" program]

[Text] Dashiyn Byambasuren, prime minister of the Mongolian Peoples's Republic (MPR), was in Moscow 8-13 February for a working visit at the invitation of the governments of the USSR and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR)—the largest Soviet republic. (Kandeladinyev), our foreign affairs reporter, writes on the outcome of this visit.

How to develop the age-old multi-relations between the USSR and the MPR amid reforms currently in progress in each other's own country? How to combine the fine experiences of the past with the new content of relations between the two countries? These questions were brought up during the talks between the Mongolian prime minister and Soviet President Gorbachev, Soviet Premier Pavlov, and RSFSR Government leader Ivan Silayev. Their dialogues also touched on the most crucial issues in the Soviet-Mongolian relations.

During meetings between the Soviet premier and the Mongolian prime minister, the main attention focused on conditions and outlooks in developing economic cooperation between the two countries at a time when both countries are on their way toward establishing a market economy as a basis for their national economies. This is quite natural as such markets demand a new cooperation format, particularly when both sides (?have changed) their [economic] settlement methods. Both sides agreed that the principle of equality and mutual benefit should be the foundation for trade between the two countries. It was very obvious that the cooperative plans between the two countries needed to be renewed under market conditions. The questions of solving the problems involving credit dealings between the two countries and between overall joint-venture enterprises were considered urgent. These questions were discussed during talks between the two government leaders, resulting in the signing of the USSR-MPR Economic and Trade Cooperation Agreement for 1991.

Agreements were also reached between Byambasuren and Silayev concerning the opening of new areas of cooperation and direct contact between the two countries. Such contact is needed not only by the two countries but also by their respective administrative regions. Plans are to be drawn up to further expand border trade between the RSFSR and the MPR. Both sides signed the RSFSR-MPR Good Neighborly Cooperation Declaration, adopting recognized international laws and principles as the foundation of relations between the two countries.

During his news conference held in Moscow, the Mongolian prime minister spoke highly about his visit and the outcome of talks. Touching on the prospect of the USSR-MPR cooperation, he said: We have inherited and further developed the positive aspects of our past cooperation to a new level. Proceeding from here, we maintain that the Mongolian-Soviet cooperation should absorb all the best that exists within international practices and the present day world. He added that these principles were enshrined in the final documents that were adopted as a result of his visit.

Shatalin Speaks on Economic Policy in Seoul

Criticizes Gorbachev's Policy

LD0402132591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 4 Feb 91

[From the "Television News Service" Program]

[Text] Speaking in Seoul today, academic Stanislav Shatalin criticized the USSR president's economic policy, pointing out that it is made up of half-measures. In an address to the participants of the world economic forum in Davos, President Gorbachev warned against a turnaround, as he put in, in evaluating the USSR's role in the world economy.

South Korean Coverage

WA0602181991

For South Korean reportage of the visit to the ROK by Soviet economist Stanislav Shatalin, including statements by Shatalin on the current status of Soviet economic reforms, see the South Korea section of the 5 February issue of the East Asia DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Near East & South Asia

Speculations Continue on Gorbachev Peace Plan

Primakov Aide Interviwed

TA2002091891 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 Feb 91 p A2

["Special" interview with Robert Markoryan, "senior aide to Soviet Middle East envoy Yevgeniy Primakov," by Isabella Ginor; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Ginor] Does the Gorbachev initiative conform with what has been reported about it in the German media?

[Markoryan] I do not know the contents of the BILD report. I doubt whether what was reported is anywhere near the truth.

[Ginor] From the reports it appears that the USSR is offering Saddam Husayn and his regime guarantees that they will remain in power if they withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally.

[Markoryan] I can only say one thing about the Gorbachev plan. It is based on two basic ideas: a unilateral and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, thereby assuring an end to the war. That is all I can say about the plan, at least at this stage.

[Ginor] Israel is not a party to the crisis, but we are worried that if the settlement you proposed is accepted, Saddam Husayn will continue to attack us.

[Markoryan] In the meeting between Primakov and Saddam Husayn, as well as in other Soviet announcements, the USSR stressed its opposition to the attacks on Israel and the efforts to drag it into the war through the missile attacks, which leave casualties among the innocent civilian population. In my view, it would be inconceivable to end the war if Iraq continues to launch missiles at Israel. There is no doubt that the issue was raised in the talks both in Baghdad and Moscow.

I would like to say something else, and this time in my own name, as a Middle East expert: In my view, no matter what the solution to this crisis is, we must think about how to guarantee peace and stability in the region. There is no doubt that Israel must be included in the security measures to be given to all the sides after the crisis ends in order to settle problems and set up a new strategic security system.

It appears to me that the very fact that Israel was attacked by Iraq, an Arab state that does not have a common border with Israel, shows that Israel will also have to reevaluate its defense concept. As far as I understand, that concept is based on the view that additional territories, which assure an immediate security belt, also defend Israel's security. In my view, significant changes in that concept must be considered.

[Ginor] As a partner to Primakov's travels, how do you explain the optimism he expressed after his most recent visit to Baghdad?

[Markoryan] All the talks and the Iraqi foreign minister's arrival in Moscow show that the optimism was not unfounded. The USSR has reaffirmed its basic position, which calls for a withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait unconditionally and without the aggressors receiving any spoils. If the Iraqi leadership finds a basis for continued contacts in that position, that is already a positive sign. The Iraqi leadership may now be realizing that these ideas were put forward earnestly, and that might bring about a cease-fire.

[Ginor] Was the Gorbachev plan coordinated with the anti-Iraqi coalition partners?

[Markoryan] An overall strategic policy was coordinated with the allies, and that has remained unchanged. As a first step, the conditions presented by the international coalition in the Security Council resolutions must be fulfilled. If those conditions are met, in my view there is no need to coordinate each step with the allies. Gorbachev briefed the U.S. Administration and representatives of the other countries on the outcome of the talks.

[Ginor] Can you clarify unequivocally the Soviet leadership's approach to the linkage issue?

[Markoryan] The Soviet leadership begins with the basic assumption that a settlement of the Kuwait crisis need not depend on a solution of other problems; however, we are talking about the need to guarantee peace and stability throughout the region. We will have to begin searching for a solution to other problems, first and foremost the Arab-Israeli conflict. We must understand, however, that that is not part of a direct, hard and fast link, but part of the same plan, and those problems will have to be dealt with as soon as the Gulf crisis is resolved. We can debate the issue, but we believe that there is no linkage.

[Ginor] Will Primakov, the Arabist, also take part in the efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict?

[Markoryan] I do not know. All his activity in recent months has been linked to a well-defined task given him by the Soviet president. If the president orders him to continue in this task, then it is obvious he will do so.

[Ginor] Has the Foreign Ministry not complained that Primakov is taking its livelihood away from it?

[Markoryan] Certainly not, because all his moves are completely coordinated with the Foreign Ministry, and there is total understanding.

[Ginor] But is his mission not a sign of competition between the two policy lines: that represented by the Foreign Ministry and that of the forces concentrated around the presidency?

[Markoryan] No, I unequivocally reject that assumption. There are not two policies. There is one line, which is determined by the president, and there are no counteractivities or attempts by the Foreign Ministry to implement a different policy line. Different methods are being employed, but all are aimed at one final thing: ending the Gulf war and settling the crisis in Kuwait.

[Ginor] The plan, as leaked, refers to Soviet guarantees to rearm Iraq and to rehabilitate its economy after the war.

[Markoryan] I know nothing about that, and I do not believe that the issue was put that way. There was no talk about guarantees. We are operating according to the Security Council mandate whose aim is to free Kuwait, not to punish Iraq and its people and not to destroy its military/economic capability. If the war ends with the other conditions being fulfilled, then the situation will anyway not be one in which Iraq is isolated from the international community. Whatever happens, there will be the task of rehabilitating the region, and the USSR will participate in that effort, to this or that extent.

[Ginor] Did you also accompany Primakov to Baghdad?

[Markoryan] It was my third trip there since the Gulf crisis broke out. I accompanied him on all the trips.

[Ginor] What is your impression of the situation there?

[Markoryan] I was also in Baghdad before the crisis. What can I say? If we talk about my personal impressions, I would say that from a psychological viewpoint, it leaves a hard impression. It is depressing to see that almost the entire country does not have electricity, running water, communications, or heating. In my view, that shows that the war has already caused very serious damage and efforts must be made to end it and avoid further damage.

[Ginor] Did you personally meet with Saddam Husayn?

[Markoryan] Yes, I participated in Primakov's meetings with him.

[Ginor] How does he look?

[Markoryan] You know, he looks relaxed and sure of himself. One could feel that he is in control of himself. He did not give the impression that he is a desperate man.

[Ginor] The press in the West has said that his close aides may be keeping the gravity of the situation from him.

[Markoryan] I would not wish to make something up about that. According to what has been said, many have thought it possible that such evaluations are not far from the truth. It is possible that he does not have a complete picture of the situation.

[Ginor] What is the mood among the people of Baghdad?

[Markoryan] We had limited time to make contact with the people. I would like to say, however, that the main feeling of everybody—primarily the civilian population—is that this war must end as soon as possible. That is the dominant feeling. I assume that desire is shared by all the peoples of the region, including your country, which has been forced to undergo a tough test.

[Ginor] How does the Soviet role in the Middle East look to you?

[Markoryan] The USSR has always played an active role in the Middle East. I believe it will not refuse to continue doing so. I believe that Soviet political activity in the region is not coincidental and reaffirms the political and diplomatic possibilities the USSR has at its disposal. Nobody shirks responsibility for the future of the region. The USSR will fulfill an important political and diplomatic, and I hope also useful, role.

I would like to add a personal message to the Israeli public. I understand Israeli feelings. We all hope for a better future and for a peace in which the people of Israel will be able to breathe freely.

Time-Table Set for Withdrawal

PM1902224591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 91 p 3

[Report by A. Vasilyev: "Gorbachev Plan: The Details"]

[Text] As reported earlier, on Monday during his meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev put forward a plan for a political settlement in the Persian Gulf. Details were not published, however.

We have learned from well-informed sources close to the Kremlin that the first point of the "Gorbachev plan" implies a commitment by Saddam Husayn to withdraw his troops from Kuwait within a specified period. Subsequenty, provided that the time frame satisfies the members of the anti-Iraq coalition, a decision will be adopted on a temporary cease-fire.

An analysis of the information available allows us to conclude that following the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the reinstitution there of the legitimate government, Moscow envisages talks to resolve controversial questions between Iraq and Kuwait, and also to settle the Arab-Israeli problem. It appears that a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops and the troops of its NATO allies from the Persian Gulf area, and their replacement by inter-Arab or UN forces, is envisaged. In addition, in order to persuade Husayn to withdraw his forces from Kuwait, it seems likely that he will be promised that economic sanctions against Iraq will be lifted.

A reply from Baghdad is expected in the Kremlin before the end of the current week. "Moderate optimism" is being expressed there with regard to Saddam Husayn's likely reaction. Allow me to recall that on his return from Baghdad, academician Ye.M. Primakov spoke only of a "glimmer of hope."

In my opinion, the "Gorbachev plan" is more likely to be called into question in Washington or London, rather than Baghdad. Having set the date for their ground forces' offensive against Iraqi troop positions, the leading states of the anti-Iraq coalition are hardly going to show interest in any plan for a peace settlement which would deprive the Western states of implementing their own plan—the destruction of Iraq's military and economic potential and the removal of Saddam Husayn from power.

Saddam's Protection Questioned

PM2002132291 London ITV Television Network in English 1900 GMT 18 February 91

[Interview with Soviet Government spokesman Sergey Grigoriyev at Channel 4 Oxfordshire studios by correspondent Jon Snow in London; from the "Channel 4 News" program—live]

[Text] [Snow] Mr. Grigoriyev, does this plan, as set out in the German newspaper, sound broadly what the Soviets are offering?

[Grigoriyev] Yes, I think it is more or less the reflection of the main topic of negotiations with the Iraqis. I think the most important thing for these negotiations is not only the subject of the negotiations, but the timing—before the ground operations start. I think that, basically, the Soviet message to Iraq is that Iraq should leave unconditionally. There should be no second thoughts about the Soviet position here. The Soviet Government also understands that the war is very close to the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union and there are many reasons and many sorts of different implications that can be involved into this thing. That is why the Soviet Union is trying to tell Saddam Husayn that: You leave unconditionally, but if you leave, you know that at least you can survive and there will be no further involvement in the internal affairs of Iraq.

[Snow] Now, you say, "you can survive," and that seems to be a very personal message to Saddam Husayn himself, which will not be entirely popular amongst all the allies.

[Grigoriyev] I will not call it as a personal message. Basically, while the Soviet Union voted for the UN Security Council resolutions, this also shows our attitude towards Saddam Husayn. But, you see, this man needs kind of a point to save his face and probably at this stage it is time to tell him that, not he personally maybe will survive, but his regime or his administration will survive, because that is the only way to talk the guy into moving out the troops.

[Snow] Mr. Grigoriyev, the Soviet Union can make these promises to Saddam Husayn, can indeed promise to protect its structures, as is quoted in the paper, and even its borders. But can it actually deliver that kind of a promise to Saddam Husayn, can it prevent his prosecution, for example?

[Grigoriyev] Well, depending on the circumstances. My feeling is that the present day level of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the main Western powers is quite high, and there is a lot of understanding in many issues, both with President Bush and Chancellor Kohl, as well as with the British Government. So my feeling is that there will be understanding reached, and we should not forget that the Soviet Union is exchanging messages with the leaders of the major members of the anti-Iraqi coalition.

[Snow] But our impression is that this peace plan is very much Mr. Gorbachev's own and that it has not been hatched, if you like, in any kind of cooperation with Washington. He has merely kept Washington informed.

[Grigoriyev] It is true on one hand, and on the other hand we know that, both on the eve of Mr. Primakov's mission to Baghdad and as a result of his mission, President Gorbachev had his own exchanges with the American Administration and with other world leaders, as today's telephone conversation with Chancellor Kohl confirms. My feeling of course, that it is a beginning. The Soviet Union is trying to take certain steps to make sure there will be no further aggravation or escalation of the conflict.

[Snow] Well, now, is there any truth, then, in this other report that LE MONDE has, which is that the Soviet leader asked for much more time—10 days—and has only been given by the allies some 36 hours?

[Grigoriyev] Well, it is hard for me to judge now. I left Moscow on Friday, but there might be an explanation for one of the points that Mr. Gorbachev made at the end of his conversation with Mr. 'Aziz, which was also announced for the foreign journalists—that at the end of the meeting Mr. Gorbachev expressed the hope that he can get his answer for his proposal for Iraq, from Iraq, as soon as possible. This might be the indication that something is correct in this newspaper report.

No Hidden Agenda Seen

LD2002110791 Moscow TASS in English 1015 GMT 20 Feb 91

[By TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov]

[Text] Moscow February 20 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's initiative, a plan of peace settlement advanced on the sixth week of the Gulf war is in the focus of attention of all countries. It gave an impetus to continued diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the conflict which threatens to develop into a full-scale war with unpredictable consequences for the whole world.

The latest Soviet attempt to bring about peace in the Persian Gulf is welcomed in Tokyo and Rome. Great hopes are pinned on it in Ottawa and Delhi, in the capitals of a number of other countries. Many believe that the will of the international community expressed in the U.N. decisions will soon be fulfilled and all the parties concerned will begin to consolidate peace, stability and security in the region.

However, certain circles not wishing to discard the stereotypes of confrontation and the cold war regard Moscow's clear peacemaking efforts as "loaded" and envisaging "a Soviet map of the Persian Gulf." Having no knowledge of details of the Soviet plan, they circulate allegations in newspapers and on television.

One would like to ask the authors of there speculations: Why not accept this plan as it is? Its essence is clear: it is in the mainstream of the U.N. Security Council decisions. Why read some other purposes into Moscow's clear-cut peace initiatives and try to split the ranks of allies? It is not in the interests of the world community to lose thousands of lives in the sands of the Arabian desert.

Some leaders close to the military establishment, for instance, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, got carried away and seem to have forgotten about the mandate on the actions of allied forces strictly limited by the U.N. decisions. It would not be enough for them to free Kuwait and restore it as an independent sovereign state. They see the task of multinational forces far beyond this framework: in the destruction of the Iraqi war industry potential and eliminating the very Iraqi regime, in other words, in establishing "Pax Americana" in the Gulf zone.

These leaders assert that the Soviet Union has "nothing to lose and in striving to deprive the allies, first of all the U.S., of victory.

But the Soviet Union, first of all, cannot be indifferent to the war raging almost on its threshold. Second, what "laurels of victory" can there be if one is strictly governed by the U.N. Security Council mandate? It does not envisage Iraq's elimination as a state. And finally it is criminal to pay for these dubious "laurels" with the lives of young Americans, Britons, Frenchmen and Arabs.

These leaders also talks about linkages or, simply speaking, about the ever more obvious need of all the members of the international community to think not only to how to end the Gulf war, but also how to build the structures which would ensure in the region a durable security system based on equality. The international community declares precisely for this, specifically for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian problem central to it.

The flame of the Gulf war should be extinguished as soon as possible to end the bloodshed. This should be the purpose of all members of the international community, of all people of goodwill.

Soviet Officials Comment on Gulf Situation

Churkin Says No Aziz Visit Planned

LD2002133391 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Text] A meeting ended about 15 minutes ago between Vitaliy Churkin, chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and journalists. He stated, among other things, that he does not have any information on the visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz to Moscow, which allegedly starts today. Earlier agencies reported that this visit was planned for today.

Answering the journalists' questions, Vitaliy Churkin described the statement by U.S. President Bush about the insufficiency of the Soviet plan for the settlement of the Persian Gulf war as a routine exchange of opinions. Churkin stressed that the USSR does not consider this statement as a rejection of the whole plan by President Bush.

Primakov Interviewed

LD1902205291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Interview with Yevgeniy Primakov, personal representative of the USSR president, by correspondent Yu. Korzin, in the television studio on 19 February—recorded]

[Text] [Korzin] Yevgeniy Maksimovich, the situation in the Persian Gulf is of interest to everyone. People are interested in the way this situation is developing because this situation causes concern. Moscow has now become a kind of center of policy aimed at this region. Tariq 'Aziz [Iraqi foreign minister] has just left Moscow and naturally we want to hear from you, someone who is at the center of all these events—first hand information, as they say. What prospects do you see here?

[Primakov] When I was in Iraq a week ago and they asked me a similar question I answered that in principle certain encouraging rays of hope had appeared in the Iraqi position. I can now say with greater foundation that I am optimistic. Of course, this is not an unthinking optimism; it is a limited optimism, because everything now depends both upon Iraq, because during the talks Mikhail Sergeyevich made a whole number of proposals which are capable of disentangling the conflict. It is now up to Iraq to answer. At the same time, it depends on the United States whether a large-scale land operation begins now on the threshold of this answer. If that does begin, then to some extent the prospect will be muddied.

[Korzin] That is to say the process will break down?

[Primakov] Well, perhaps the whole process will not break down, but at any rate it will be made extraordinarily more complicated. Therefore, it depends upon the Americans to a very great extent now, too.

[Korzin] You met the Iraqi leader. Do you feel that the statement about the withdrawal of troops is sincere? What is the main point here, the withdrawal of the troops or the conditions which were set alongside?

[Primakov] You see, in the first place.... [changes thought] let us go through everything in chronological order. First came the statement 9 February by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. This statement was very timely. It came at precisely the right moment because the war was indeed moving outside the framework sketched out by the mandate that the multinational forces had—the mandate issued by the Security Council. You remember that according to the mandate it was a question of the need to secure the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait....

[Korzin, interrupting] And confine oneself to that....

[Primakov, continuing] ...unconditionally, unconditionally I want to stress, and fully. All this is contained in the mandate. But when war starts escalating both vertically and horizontally, when more and more civilians fall under the blows of bombs and the blows of missiles, when generally speaking not only military installations are destroyed but also the entire industrial potential is destroyed, when Iraq's general infrastructure is destroyed, bridges in Baghdad for example—well, what kind of military installations are these bridges across the Tigris, and moreover, the most beautiful bridges?

[Korzin] There was the report recently about the bomb shelter, too.

[Primakov] Well, the bomb shelter.... [changes thought] I will come back to these questions later. At precisely that time a statement was made which confirmed our principled position. It proclaimed the need for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, but, at the same time, this statement raised questions about the need to stop this war, not to pay such an enormous price, and to try and do this in other ways while retaining the aims and tasks concerning the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. This statmeent also announced that the USSR president was sending his personal representative to talk to Saddam Husayn. Well, I turned out to be that personal representative and I found myself in Baghdad, and the conversation began. The conversation inspired some notes of optimism. Then after that I was told in Baghdad that contacts would continue and that Tariq 'Aziz would be coming to Moscow on Sunday. Then a statement followed before his arrival which you are now asking me about.

Well, about the statement, what is the main point? The main point is that for the first time, publicly, Iraq admitted the need to implement resolutions; true, it named only one resolution, UN Security Council Resolution No. 660. On the basis of that resolution Iraq must unconditionally, unreservedly, withdraw its troops from Kuwait. Iraq said in a statement that it is ready to act on the basis of that resolution. That is the main point. That is the main principal. Well, other points were immediately raised of associated quality, if you like, which accompanied this main point. This main point was packaged into a kind of propagandist cover which you know was no surprise to me because to start with it was Iraq's first statement. Of course it had to be packed in some way and so on, because otherwise Saddam Husayn is subjected... he will be subjecting himself to enormous danger.

[Korzin] I recall an expression you used in one of the interviews when you said that one must give Husayn the chance to save face.

[Primakov] Well, yes, if this can be used to save face and be used to secure the withdrawal of troops, that is one thing; but if this is a condition for the withdrawal of troops, then that is quite different. At the time this was presented as a condition for the withdrawal of troops. But the Iraqi side—and, incidentally, it seems to me that the impact of Soviet policy played an immense role here, particularly the talk which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had with Tariq 'Aziz—the Iraqi side is inclined to explain this not as conditions but as a list of problems which must be solved, but solved, clearly, after the withdrawal of troops. That, so to speak, was how the box-of-tricks could be opened—or, perhaps not a box but [chuckles]....

[Korzin, interrupting] A big chestful!

[Primakov] Yes, a big chestful!

[Korzin] But first you wanted to find out what sort of atmosphere these talks were conducted in and how sincere Husayn was at them. How can you....

[Primakov, interrupting] Yes, this was the third time I had met Husayn recently. I have known him 22 years altogether and I knew him even before he was president. Perhaps this in some ways predisposed a frank conversation. Perhaps he really was predisposed. He and I talked pretty frankly. Well, how was this meeting arranged? In the center of town there was a guest house. My colleagues and I were taken there by the Iraqis. For some reason it seemed to me that this was some kind of transit point and that we would go from there to some sort of underground quarters where he was located. For obvious security reasons, Husayn did not want to take us to his bunker. Well, this was understandable. It was not that we might divulge his whereabouts, but simply that clearly some kind of shadow could have been put on us by those who wanted to know his whereabouts.

[Korzin] Was this not dangerous with all the bombing raids?

[Primakov] Well, there were bombing raids, the most intensive so far, too, during the time we were there, in the opinion of Iraqis, and I do not even know what brought this on.

[Korzin] Incidentally, I do not quite understand the connection between your stay in Iraq and the fact that at the same time reports came in from various agencies that it was precisely at this time that the voices of our advisers were intercepted in Russian....

[Primakov, interrupting] Well, let me first answer your question about how the meeting went.

[Korzin] Yes, we are getting ahead of ourselves.

[Primakov] Well, the meeting went like this. We got there and suddenly Husayn appeared with other members of the Iraqi leadership. He was wearing an overcoat, he was in military uniform, in fact he is always in military uniform. He sat down, he took off his overcoat, he took off his belt and pistol which he put on a shelf as he usually does. He has lost some weight, but he behaved quite confidently; he behaved calmly. The discussion was of one kind while the other Iraqi leaders were present but afterward I asked him to stay and talk on a one-on-one basis and then the discussion became more businesslike, naturally. That is how it happened.

Now you talk about our [Russian] voices and so on. That is a provocation—an out-and-out provocation. I have a high regard for my own name and if it were not so generally speaking perhaps I would have kept quiet. But I want to say straight out that this is a provocation. We have no military specialist in Iraq. There simply are not any physically there, now. We have 13 people in the embassy. They are people living under very difficult conditions, they are true heroes. They are living under bomb attacks. They often sleep in a pipe which they have welded into a pipe only two meters in diameter. There is no water there and no electricity, you understand.

The position there is very difficult. In general, in Baghdad and throughout Iraq, the Americans have put these things out of operation—I am returning to your question about the bombing—and when we were travelling—we travelled by car for two and a half hours across Iraq to Baghdad from the Iranian border. There were no complications with our trip. We arrived in Baghdad and met journalists, including American journalists. I requested that they not ask me any questions because it would be difficult for me to reply to them. But everyone tried to persuade me to stay longer, because they linked the absence of bombing until 1900....

[Korzin, interrupting] [words indistinct]

[Primakov] Yes. But then, precisely at 1900, is started, and the next night there was very intensive bombing. You must understand, however, I do not think that the Americans, or other representatives of the multinational forces, are bombing residential areas in particular, I do not think that this is so. But, at the same time, I must say that it is quite clear that there is now a move toward not just military targets, but also so-called prestige buildings. What are prestige targets, prestige buildings? Well, for example, the Palace of Congresses, located 150 meters from the hotel in which we stayed. During the night two missiles destroyed that palace. It was burned to the ground. In general, when a missile hits a building, all the metal and all the components are twisted. What is this? Is it a military target? Or when strikes are made against the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public Works, against bridges, as I have already said....

[Korzin, interrupting] These are characteristics of psychological warfare.

[Primakov] This is psychological. In this there is a certain element, if you like, of retribution. But, this is...[pauses] near to them are...[pauses] all these buildings are located in the heart, so to say, they are located as rule in residential areas, surrounded by residential areas. The shock wave and the splinters, and the missile, for example, which...[pauses] one struck a bridge. All of us who have visited Baghdad have frequently given it the nickname of Crimean bridge, because it was very similar to our Crimean bridge, and it was very beautiful.

[Korzin] Colored.

[Primakov] Yes, like that. But a second missile missed it, fell nearby, and destroyed several houses. Well, these things happen, you understand. This war leads to terrible consequences. You mentioned the bomb shelter. Well, I can imagine that they thought it was a bunker, but the fact remains that it was a bomb shelter, in which there were several hundred people. Over 300 people died there. This was terrible, really terrible. This slaughter must be halted.

[Korzin] I wish to return to the main theme of our question. Evidently it was this which in the first instance caused the intensification of diplomatic activity from our side.

[Primakov] Undoubtedly, you are right. This is what caused the diplomatic activity from our side. Some Americans are reacting nervously to these things, but I do not think they have any grounds to, because the Soviet Union is not acting behind the back of the United States. In general, we are not operating by pursuing some line of our own, separate from all the others. We are trying to resolve—and I feel that President Gorbachev did this with the utmost clarity during the conversation with Tariq 'Aziz—two tasks simulateneously. The first task is to ensure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, and the second task is not to pay the price for this, which all mankind is now paying.

I can also add to this the ecological tragedy, the ecological catastrophe which might be awaiting us all. If we manage to solve this task, I believe that this will be an enormous service done by the Soviet Union.

[Korzin] Undoubtedly. Now, in connection with the fact that you have mentioned the subject of ecology—especially as they say that the use of chemical, bacteriological, and almost the use of nuclear weapons is possible—this produces some kind of threat, some kind of danger, for our southern regions. At any rate, this is being actively written about.

[Primakov] You know, there is no direct danger now. I know, because I am in a working group on the Persian Gulf, the crisis in the Persian Gulf, and we are receiving relevant data all the time, and the situation in the border region is being monitored all the time. There is no direct danger, because the relevant installations on the territory of Iraq have been destroyed by bombing. But if some kind of large-scale war begins, with the use of weapons of mass destruction, then of course, that might also directly affect our interests.

[Korzin] There are nuclear power stations there. God forbid that some kind of missile has been produced.

[Primakov] No. There are two reactors there—three in practice, but the third is very small. You know, what was immediately obvious was that the reactors were shut down [zaglusheny] at the moment of the allied' air forces' bombardment. But many specialists believe that although Iraq does not have nuclear weapons, it could use radiological weapons: In other words, fill them with such fuel and disperse it.

But now the war has to be stopped, you understand, the war needs to be stopped. Of course, the war must not be stopped in such a way as to reward Iraq for its aggression. No one is posing the question in this manner. The war must be stopped in conditions where Iraq withdraws its troops from Kuwait. But another question immediately arises, for not everyone in the West wants simply to confine themselves to this operation for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, and to solve just that task. Some think that it is necessary to break Iraq's back, and not just the regime's, but Iraq's too, taking account of its accumulated military and industrial potential....

[Korzin, interrupting]...and, to a certain degree, of the subsequent reconstruction in the region.

[Primakov] Well, you know, if the idea is to tackle some kind of security tasks at the expense of the destruction of a nation, I would not like to take part. I believe that every sensible person understands that there can indeed be certain fears that during the period after the crisis, Iraq could once again link its ambitions and its extremist line with regard to its neighbors with the enormous potential that has been built up. Many people have raised this question. For example, when I had occasion to meet Prime Minister Thatcher—she was still prime minister at the time—she spoke about this in absolutely definite terms. But now, undoubtedly, there are no grounds for thinking that Iraq is capable of repeating actions similar to those it undertook with regard to Kuwait. Iraq, against which such an immense blow has been struck. What now? Surely, it is impossible...[pauses] how at least, so to speak, one should act resolutely in order to put an end to this war. In no way do I consider that it was justified earlier, but its continuation is absolutely unjustified, from any point of view. You understand? A nation is perishing. A nation is perishing. It must be stopped.

[Korzin] Yevgeniy Maksimovich, to end our conversation I would like to return to what we agreed on before this conversation, that we would discuss those issues which are simply of interest to people today. The main question they are asking today is this: Is it going to be possible to stop this war, or not? I understand that you cannot give a straightforward answer, but nevertheless if....

[Primakov, interrupting] I wish to say again that I have the impression that Iraq is now closer to a decision on the withdrawal of its troops—an unconditional decision on the withdrawal of troops—than was the case ever before, at any time before. I reached precisely this conclusion while taking part in the talks Mikhail Sergeyevich held with Tariq 'Aziz and Hammadi. Hammadi is another member of the Iraqi leadership, who came with him to Moscow. But now, so to speak, many processes have woven themselves into a single knot. Those who want to destroy the regime of Saddam Husayn and inflict as much damage as possible on Iraq's potential, including its industrial potential, and not simply its military potential, even perhaps those who want to take vengeance on Iraq, perhaps those who fear that Iraq in some way is trying to escape the blow, and perhaps those who think mechanically—all of them, in principle, are now capable of trying to force events along as regards the start of the land operations. If that takes place, then no one has any doubts about the outcome. In the final analysis, Iraq will lose that war.

[Korzin] But how many people will die?

[Primakov] How many people will die? What consequences can this lead to? If that can be avoided, is it not worth doing so? The Soviet Union is working in the Near East now with absolutely clean hands, and I consider that this...[pauses] that if we do indeed manage to take things to a peaceful outcome and secure the withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait by peaceful means, it will bring very great credit to the policy that is directed personally by Gorbachev.

[Korzin] It remains only to wish success in that direction.

[Primakov] Thank you very much.

Intermediary Role Examined

LD1902180391 Brussels Domestic Service in French 1700 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] The Russians are convinced that their plan can put an end to the Gulf war. Many of them defend this plan. Here is the statement by CPSU International Section adviser (Aleksey Kozhemarov), interviewed by Ulysses Gosset:

[Begin (Kozhemarov) recording] What is at stake in this matter is the very existence of the country, the survival of Iraq. Acting like a responsible politician, Saddam must take into consideration all these elements. The plan obviously starts with the unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. It is also a question of maintaining the existence of Iraq as a sovereign state, but an even more important question arises—the global settlement of the problems of the region. We are in favor of convening an international conference; it was in fact the United Nations which gave the green light to the use of force. In my view the United Nations must play an important role. There is no two-party deal between Moscow and Baghdad. In my view the international community must be satisfied with Moscow's ability to play the role of intermediary. This is an essential role which must be used to the fullest. [end recording]

Allied Actions in Gulf Reviewed, Assessed

Ignatenko Calls Acts 'Superfluous'

LD1902133391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1254 GMT 19 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Vladimir Isachenkov]

[Text] Moscow, 19 Feb (TASS)—A ground offensive by forces of the anti-Iraqi coalition "in principle will not yield anything," Vitaliy Ignatenko, head of the USSR president's press service, stated today. "After all, what is important is not absolute destruction, not breaking the back of this country," he continued. "That offensive will bring only new casualties and more bloodshed. Our position is to avoid these new casualties." In reply to journalists' questions, Vitaliy Ignatenko said that in his message the Soviet president did not ask George Bush to postpone the ground offensive until a reply was received from Saddam Hussayn to the Soviet proposals. At the same time, he stressed that "the very spirit of that letter, the very letter of these proposals say that such an offensive today, if we receive a reply from Saddam Hussayn, will be superfluous. [no closing quotation marks as received]

Army Officers Score Actions

AU1802200391 Paris AFP in English 1951 GMT 18 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, Feb 18 (AFP)—Senior Soviet Army officers on Monday [18 February] strongly criticised allied actions in the Gulf, the non-official agency INTERFAX reported.

These were the first public criticisms of U.S. actions in the Gulf by such senior Soviet officers, analysts here said.

The military adviser to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, criticised allied bombardments of "the people and the economy" of Iraq, INTERFAX said.

"The strikes have been launched against the Iraqi people and economy. This cannot be tolerated any longer", Marshal Akhromeyev told the agency, effectively distancing himself from official Soviet policy.

"If necessary we should go to the Security Council and say that the fighting must be conducted in the framework set by the resolutions of the United Nations, or else the fighting must stop. No one should always use the language of ultimatums", he said in an interview.

Marshal Akhromeyev said he found Soviet policy on the Gulf crisis "fairly correct", but admitted he differed with Mr. Gorbachev on some points. "I have my view", he said.

"I think some measures must be taken. (...) The bombing of the bunker (in Baghdad) that killed hundreds of civilians cannot be tolerated", he added, noting that senior Soviet Army officers were following the Gulf crisis very closely.

Deputy Chief of Staff General Vladimir Lobov, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, was even more stinging in his criticism of recent allied conduct in the Gulf conflict.

"No one should be allowed to use Security Council resolutions as a smoke-screen to camouflage the massacre on Iraqi territory", he told INTERFAX.

Gen. Lobov expressed concern over the "testing of advance weapons such as cruise missiles or Stealth aircraft", warning that such tests could "disturb the qualitative parity in the weapons sector and have serious consequences for the future".

The prospects, he said, were "very worrying".

Quick Rejection of Saddam's Proposals Criticized

PM1902204191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Feb 91 Union Edition p 5

[Report by Vitaliy Kobysh: "Political Observer's Opinion: Light at the End of the Tunnel"]

[Text] For several days now the world has been following not only the sorties flown by aircraft carrying bombs. Other flights have also attracted attention. Above all the flights of academician Ye.M. Primakov from Moscow to Tehran and Baghdad and back. Followed by the flights of the Iraqi Foreign Minister T. 'Aziz from Baghdad to Tehran and Moscow and back again. He flew back home yesterday after intensive talks in Moscow.

Let me recall that having met with Saddam Husayn in Baghdad, Ye.M. Primakov, in the course of a frank and fairly tough conversation, as has become known, set out to the Iraqi leader the Soviet Union's stance in respect of the war in the Persian Gulf, and the dangerous nature which it has assumed not just for the peoples of that region, but for mankind as a whole. Practically immediately after that conversation S. Husayn declared first, readiness to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait, and second, that he was dispatching T. 'Aziz to Moscow to continue the talks.

The Iraqi president's statement evoked stormy reactions, of the most varied kind, often diametrically opposed reactions depending on what country they came from. Some people, mainly in the Arab and the so-called "third world" perceived this statement as S. Husayn's genuine readiness to negotiate the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and ending of military actions. Others, mainly the governments and the public of the anti-Iraqi coalition countries viewed what the Iraqi president had said as a subterfuge, because he also called for an immediate ceasefire, the liberation of the territories occupied by Israel, and a comprehensive discussion and solution of the problems of the Near East. As a subterfuge to which S. Husayn had resorted merely to gain time, to put off the offensive of the coalition ground forces which was in preparation.

Unacceptable was Washington's immediate reaction. This time, once again, London went even further. It not only rejected the Iraqi president's proposals, but declared in the words of D. Hogg, minister of state at the Foreign Office: The diplomatic efforts undertaken by the USSR and Iran to end the bloodshed have "absolutely no" chance of success.

This looked strange, to say the least. It was not the UN Security Council, having sanctioned the beginning of military operations by its resolutions, which rejected Iraq's proposals out of hand, without due consideration, but Washington (we will not dwell on London's stance for the moment, that is a separate topic). This confirmed once again that the military operations are being waged by the United States rather than the coalition forces on the basis of a mandate from the UN Security Council which, clearly, should be the one to decide whether the war goes on or not. What is this—a U.S.-Iraq war in which the objective set by the UN Security Council—the liberation of Kuwait—has receded somewhere to the second or third level.

S. Husayn's proposals were rejected without being properly studied, and without waiting for the outcome of T. 'Aziz's aforementioned talks in Moscow.

Rejected, irrespective of the explanation given by the Iraqi representative at the United Nations to the effect that what S. Husayn has said are not some kind of "Baghdad conditions for a deal" but merely topics for subsequent discussions, put forward by the Iraqi president.

They were rejected, essentially making no secret of the fact that no peace negotiations (with or without preconditions of either side) can take place because the date has already been set for a massed land strike against Iraq.

They were rejected, furnishing further proof that Washington's main objective in this war is not the liberation of Kuwait but the destruction of both, Iraq's military and economic potential which would reduce to a minimum its role as a leading power in the region.

There is at least one positive aspect to all this. Wittingly or unwittingly, certain forces active in the United States have exposed their geopolitical aims in this most important, if not crucial, region. They boil down to this. By means of mighty bombing and missile strikes, followed by a large-scale land offensive, to create conditions conducive to the adoption of decisions which would reduce Iraq's role to nought and largely neutralize the USSR's policy in a region which directly adjoins its borders. Israel, on the other hand, would gain. The importance of Turkey as a military outpost of NATO would also be enhanced. And Iran? Here the situation is more complex, Iran is gathering political strength and prestige. This can be curbed by overemphasizing its Muslim fundamentalism which threatens not only the "moderates" in the Arab world, but also the Soviet Union.

"This prospect can by no means please Moscow" is how the French newspaper LE FIGARO assesses these geopolitical reflections. It seems to me that taking account of profound, strategic interests, rather than immediate interests, it [this prospect] cannot please the United States and other Western states. It is not likely that U.S. President G. Bush and his closest advisers espouse these concepts.

As for the role of the Soviet Union in this region, Washington leaders are incresingly clearly aware that, if they are seeking peace and tranquillity, they cannot manage without the Soviet Union here. In this they are proceeding from reality. It consists in the fact, essentially, that even having joined the present anti-Iraqi coalition forces, Arab countries are by no means wanting to find themselves face to face with the United States. Also in the fact that as distinct from the United States, the Soviet Union is not merely a great power, it also belongs to this region.

Unquestionably, something else must not be forgotten either. It is possible to hold different views on the subject of whether the "cold war" has ended or whether it has merely taken on different forms. One thing is certain however: Both in the USSR and the United States people have understood and they now believe that it is not in the interests of these two countries and their peoples to threaten each other. Relations based on trust, which are to no one's detriment, have been established between the Soviet and American leaders. To some extent they are currently being subjected to a test in connection with the military conflict in the Persian Gulf zone. Moscow and Washington remain loyal to the accords which have been achieved, they have exchanged confidential information during the most acute moments. I reiterate, this is to noone's detriment, rather to everyone's benefit.

Precisely for this reason, Washington's reaction to S. Husayn's statement on Iraq's readiness to withdraw from Kuwait seems hasty to me. In diplomacy, just like in many other fields, people proceed from the fact that there is no time to lose. This is correct with the exception of the instances where haste is inadvisable. In view of the further development of events, the U.S. representatives who hastened to react to the Iraqi president's statement were definitely too rash [opredelenno potoropilis].

The events are as follows. T. 'Aziz, who arrived in Moscow on Sunday, yesterday morning met first with A.A. Bessmertnykh, and then had some three hours of talks with M.S. Gorbachev. According to the assessment of V.N. Ignatenko, assistant to the USSR president, the talks were "substantive." During the exchange of opinions, proceeding from the actual situation which has developed and which demands immediate reaction in order to forestall a further escalation of the war in the region, and also taking account of the 15 February statement by S. Husayn, the USSR president has put forward a "specific plan of action to settle the conflict by political means."

Much will now depend on the Iraqi capital's response to the plan put forward by the USSR president for specific actions aimed at ending the bloody war. There are grounds to expect that Baghdad will put forward its own specific proposals comprising a time-table for the withdrawal of troops from Kuwait. This will provide both sides with an opportunity to cease fire.

So there is a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel which offers a chance to restore justice, and simultaneously to save many thousands of lives. Is it necessary to say that in this context any geopolitical strategems, no matter how clever they appear, are speculative and without meaning?

Security Council Gulf Resolution Called Illegal

PM1802152591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by V. Borisov: "Neither the Spirit Nor the Letter; Opinion on the Legality of UN Security Council Resolution No. 678"]

[Text] The war in the Persian Gulf has created a serious threat to universal peace and international security and to Soviet security.

The U.S. leaders who unleashed this monstrous war swear that they are doing this "in the name of justice" and "humanism," "to defend human rights in Kuwait," "in accordance with international conventions," and in accordance with the UN Security Council's decision and instructions. Is that right? If the killing of tens or, maybe even hundreds of thousands of innocent people is "civilized humanism," what, one wonders, represents barbarity, terrorism, and genocide?!

Was the United Nations, whose main aims are "to settle or resolve international disputes or situations by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of justice and international law" (Footnote) (Clauses of the UN Charter are cited here and elsewhere from the "United Nations Charter and Statutes of the International Court," UN Publications, OPI/323-08-482, May

1970) entitled to authorize acts of manifest genocide against the people of a UN member state—Iraq?! How can a whole country be destroyed in the name of carrying out UN decisions?

The 30 November sitting of the UN Security Council did indeed adopt a resolution (No. 678), point 2 of which said that the Security Council "empowers member states cooperating with the Kuwaiti Government, if Iraq does not fully carry out the aforementioned resolution by or before 15 January 1991, as stipulated in point 1, to use all necessary means to support and fulfill Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent corresponding resolutions and restore international peace and security in this region."

It is this point of the resolution, with its vague wording about "employing all necessary means" that the U.S. Administration and its allies in the "anti-Iraq coalition" have used as a pretext for a "legitimate" attack on Iraq, the destruction of its economic potential, and the annihilation of its Armed Forces and peaceful population.

Let us examine the international legal aspect and legitimacy of the references made by the U.S. Administration and its supporters to the aforementioned UN resolution. How well-founded and legitimate is it per se in the international legal context? Did the Security Council have the right under the UN Charter to adopt this resolution?

It can be seen from a close study of the relevant articles of the UN Charter that this resolution contravenes it in terms of its content. This conclusion is determined as follows.

Article 41 of Chapter VII "Actions in Respect of a Threat to Peace, Violations of Peace, and Acts of Aggression" says: "The Security Council is empowered to decide what measures, unconnected with the use of armed force, should be employed to implement its decisions, and it may demand that the Organization's members apply these measures."

In accordance with this article the Security Council adopted Resolutions Nos. 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677 relating to the relevant economic, transportation, and other sanctions against Iraq, insofar as most Security Council members recognized that the latter had committed aggression against Kuwait.

Insofar as Iraq failed to satisfy the demands to withdraw its troops from Kuwaiti territory, the Security Council began to consider the question of further sanctions against Iraq. In this connection the aforementioned Resolution 678 was adopted 30 November 1990.

It is point 2 of the resolution that contravenes article 42 of the UN Charter. Let us ponder the content of this article. It reads as follows: "If the Security Council deems that the measures envisaged in article 41 may prove inadequate, or have already proved inadequate, **it** (!) (the United Nations alone—**author's note**) is empowered to undertake such air, sea, or ground operations as may prove necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. These actions may include demonstrations, a blockade, and other operations by the air, sea, or ground forces of the members of the Organizations [plural as published]."

What is the main element in this clause of the Charter? The main thing is the fact that it does not empower any states or group of states, but only the Security Council itself, to undertake actions of this kind. In this respect Resolution 678 was adopted in total contravention and violation of article 42 of the UN Charter since it "empowers" not the Security Council but "member states cooperating with the Kuwaiti Government" to undertake such actions. This is a fundamental and inadmissible breach of the letter and spirit of the UN Charter, insofar as this resolution illegally transfers rights and powers which the UN Charter entrusts **solely and exclusively** to the UN collective international organ—the Security Council—to an undefined state or group of states—to all intents and purposes to the United States and its allies, above all its NATO allies.

That is the first point.

Second. Proceeding from the clauses of Article 42 that we have quoted in full, subsequent articles of the UN Charter determine in a clear, most definite, and unequivocal fashion the procedure for the UN Security Council to use its powers. Article 43 binds all UN members to place at the disposal of the Security Council—on demand and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements—the armed forces, aid, and appropriate support facilities needed to maintain international peace and security. The Charter envisages that these agreements should determine the numerical strength and nature of the troops, their degree of readiness, their overall disposition, and the nature of the support facilities and aid being provided.

These agreements, the UN Charter says, are concluded between the Security Council and UN members, and are subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their constitutional procedure. Article 46 of the UN Charter demands: "Plans for the use of armed forces are drawn up by the Security Council with the help of the Military Staff Committee, which (Article 47) is established specially 'to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to its military requirements in maintaining international peace and security, the employment and command of the troops at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.' 'The Military Staff Committee under the jurisdiction of the Security Council bears responsibility for the strategic leadership of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council'" (Article 47, Point 3).

Article 48 of the Charter also stipulates that "the actions needed to carry out Security Council decisions aimed at maintaining international peace and security are taken by all members of the Organization or some of them, depending on what the Security Council decides."

I must point out that article 51 of the UN Charter makes provision for every state's right to individual or collective self-defense if it is subjected to armed attack "until such time as the Security Council adopts the requisite measures to maintain international peace and security." These can be **unilateral measures** outside UN competence. Nevertheless, even in that eventuality the UN Charter envisages that "steps taken by members of the Organization when exercising this right to self-defense must be communicated immediately to the Security Council and must not under any circumstances touch on the Security Council's powers and responsibility, under this Charter, as regards taking such actions at any time it deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."

Thus, even when actions of collective self-defense are taken independently of Security Council decisions, **its responsibility** for taking the requisite steps to maintain and restore peace is not waived.

What conclusions ensue from this as regards an **assessment** of Resolution 678? The **main conclusion** is that the Security Council has illegally **evaded** performance of its duties and the use of the powers vested in it by the UN Charter.

The **second conclusion** is that, by adopting Resolution 678, the Security Council illegally transferred powers belonging to it alone, **to it exclusively**, to a group of states headed by the United States, deliberately renouncing all control and guidance of the process of utilizing the various types, means, and forms of armed struggle and military sanctions against a UN member state, Iraq, thereby abandoning it to what amounts to dismemberment.

The **third conclusion** is that, in adopting Resolution 678, the UN Security Council violated the UN Charter by failing to do its duty of setting up special troop contingents under UN Security Council jurisdiction to implement military sanctions, failed to activate the Military Staff Committee for this purpose, failed to adopt plans for the use of armed forces (Article 46), and failed to define clearly the actions that should be taken by particular UN member states (Article 48).

It follows from the above-cited clauses of the UN Charter that it is the Security Council that should specifically decide which "necessary means" should be used to restore international peace and security in the Persian Gulf zone. The Security Council has in fact wrongfully evaded defining these measures, leaving everything, including resolution of the question of the "need" to use nuclear weapons, to the discretion of the U.S. Administration and the command of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf zone.

Thus, it is totally evident from the aforementioned clauses of the UN Charter that the UN Security Council resolution of 30 November 1990 (No. 678) is **a clear violation of the spirit and letter of the UN Charter** and goes against the interests of strengthening peace and international security.

The U.S. aims in accordance with which it imposed Resolution 678 on the Security Council are clear. U.S. academics are saying bluntly that the U.S. oil monopolies are afraid that, with Iraq's seizure of Kuwait, one-fifth of the world's oil supplies may be concentrated in Iraq's hands, and this—according to U.S. President G. Bush—America cannot permit.

But there is another significant reason for the U.S. attack on Iraq. The point is that this country is at present the main bastion and base for the Arabs' struggle against U.S. and Israeli domination in the region, and that Iraq possesses the largest economic and military-political potential threatening Israel.

Under these conditions the U.S. and its NATO allies' Armed Forces—with the participation of certain Arab states—are effectively acting as the "instrument" and "strike force" to wipe out Iraq's economic and military-political potential.

With Iraq's seizure of Kuwait and the U.N. Security Council's ratification of Resolution 678, the U.S. Administration obtained a nice pretext to attack Iraq.

In these circumstances, the stance held by the USSR's former foreign minister, E.A. Shevardnadze, on the question of the Gulf crisis cannot evoke anything but surprise and perplexity.

At a joint sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities 15 October 1990 E.A. Shevardnadze stated authoritatively that he would firmly abide by the procedure laid down by the UN Charter for the utilization of armed force against a state that has violated peace and international security. Regarding this he spoke of the need and obligation to fulfill the Charter's demands whereby the "Security Council must, with the aid of the Military Staff Committee, conclude special agreements with the five permanent members of the Security Council to place at the disposal of the Council troop formations that could be used in actions to suppress aggression and restore peace...." "You have to decide," Shevardnadze said, "what is more sensible and more reliable: Collective actions within the Security Council framework, or unilateral measures that arouse hostility in many people. **Our principled line is that** from any viewpoint it is preferable to maintain just law and order in the world by collective efforts on the solid legal base provided by the UN Charter" (quoted from Bulletin No. 27 of the 15 October 1990 joint sitting of the Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities, pp 11-12).

The legitimate question arises: Why did E.A. Shevardnadze, when speaking at the United Nations in

November as USSR foreign minister, unexpectedly deviate from this "principled line" without requesting and without obtaining Supreme Soviet consent (as he had promised to do 15 October 1990); that is, in breach of his promise to the Supreme Soviet, he "forgot" the demands of the UN Charter and raised his hand in favor of "unilateral measures" against Iraq, thus giving the go-ahead for the attack on Iraq by the war machine of the United States and its allies.

How are we to escape from this situation? Obviously, the only correct way to rectify the Security Council's mistake is to immediately adopt a decision compelling all parties to the conflict—the United States above all—to cease firing and halt all military operations.

West Europe

European Reports on Persian Gulf Crisis Noted

French Press Criticized

LD1302163891 Moscow TASS in English 1619 GMT 13 Feb 91

[BY TASS political analyst Askold Biryukov]

[Text] Moscow February 13 TASS—The French press contest for sensationalism is hitting new heights. LE FIGARO was in the lead last week, LA LIBERATION outstripped it this week. The subject is the same—the Persian Gulf conflict. LA LIBERATION has taken up the story about "secret activity by Soviet specialists in Iraq".

The newspaper cites "Saudi services" that have "monitored numerous conversations in Russian on Iraqi military transmitter frequencies". This information was kept secret by the allied forces until the present moment, the newspaper says. The implication is that LIBERATION journalists have managed to break through the cover of secrecy.

Journalists then 'disclose' that the conversations were conducted by Soviet military specialists, high ranking at that, who were assigned jobs not with Iraqi corps and divisions but—hear, hear—with battalions and companies.

The newspaper then draws a profound conclusion: The overheard conversations raise questions about the Soviet Union's actual stance with regard to the conflict.

More fuel has been added to the fire of doubts about the Soviet position on the Gulf conflict by other French newspapers. LE MONDE, for instance, says in its commentary on LA LIBERATION's fabrication that the people in question are Soviet military advisers with Iraqi units ensuring technical servicing of the equipment. LE FIGARO says that these advisers must have remained in Iraq secretly with the tacit agreement of the Soviet military leadership, which is at loggerheads with Gorbachev over Iraq. LE PARISIEN insists that there are 150 Soviet specialists in Iraq.

LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, however, quotes the American military in Riyadh as saying that they have no confirmation of the existence of any such monitoring. The American military are certainly people who know better.

Moscow has repeatedly explained, responding to allegations in the Western—primarily French—press, that there is not a single Soviet military specialist in Iraq. This and other clarifications were given to French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas during his visit to Moscow on Tuesday.

A French TF-1 television commentator noted that the Soviet Union reiterated categorically the position stated by the Soviet leader on February 9. Its aim is to help, together with Arab and other Muslim states, European and Asian countries and above all with other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, find a way towards a reliable and just, peaceful settlement. It seeks to begin preparations for establishing a durable and equitable security system in the region, including the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem. Iraq should find its due place in the process, too. Nothing more.

Any attempt to cast a shadow on, or distort the Soviet Union's position in this question pursues aims that are most likely mercenary.

Italian Premier Receives Message

AU1502125291 Rome ANSA in English 1215 GMT 15 Feb 91

[Text] ANSA, Rome, February 15—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev voiced some optimism for Gulf peace prospects in a message Italian Premier Giulio Andreotti who met here Friday with Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati.

Velayati quits Rome for Moscow and talks with Gorbachev later in the day.

According to Gorbachev's message, delivered to Andreotti Thursday night by the Soviet Ambassador to Rome Anatoliy Adamishin, "it seems there is some willingness on the part of Iraqi leader Saddam Husayn to withdraw from Kuwait."

Gorbachev's guarded optimism comes after a mission to Baghdad by Soviet Special Envoy Yevgeniy Primakov and before Sunday's talks in Moscow between Gorbachev and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz. The Soviet President added that he would be studying "in very precise items" this apparent willingness during his meeting with 'Aziz.

Gorbachev wound up saying that the liberation of Kuwait, invaded August 2 1990, by Iraqi forces, and the restoration of its sovereignty remained the top priority for the Soviets.

According to a spokesman for the Italian Premier, the contents of Gorbachev's letter were discussed over a working breakfast here Friday morning by Andreotti and Velayati, who arrived in Rome after attending this week's special session of the non-aligned nations where a peaceful solution for the Gulf war was discussed.

The two-hour meeting was also attended by Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis who will be travelling to Moscow Saturday as part of a European Community delegation.

Velayati briefed his hosts on Iranian initiatives for peace in the Gulf, initiatives already outlined by Iranian President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in a telephone conversation with Andreotti last Sunday.

The Iranian minister suggested part of the 198 United Nations Resolution on a cease-fire in the eight-year Iran-Iraq War as a basis for future peaceful cohabitation in the area, a proposal which received the backing of Andreotti who will put it to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.

Article 8 of UN Resolution 598 specified that the UN Chief would, "in cooperation with all the states in the Gulf region, establish measures aimed at ensuring security and cooperation in the whole area."

The importance of Resolution 598, Velayati told his hosts, is that it covers all outstanding Gulf questions, "singling out (?cooperation) between all countries as the fulcrum around which a system of stability and security can be built."

The Iranian minister stressed the importance of not confusing the Iraqi leadership with the Iraqi people, saying that Teheran was growing increasingly worried that Arab sentiment was shifting its sympathy towards Iraqi leaders, who did not merit it, rather than towards the Iraqi people, who did. He went on to warn that the longer the war goes on, the more support Iraqi President Saddam Husayn will gather in the Arab world, "creating new difficulties and complications."

Andreotti assured his guest that [word indistinct] aim in the Gulf was limited to liberating Kuwait from its Iraqi occupiers, adding "there has never been any aim other than this."

Luxembourg Foreign Minister Comments

WA1702134691 Paris AFP in English 1246 GMT 17 Feb 91

[Text] Luxembourg, Feb 17 (AFP)—Moscow might reconsider its support for the U.N.-sanctioned effort to expel Iraq from Kuwait if irreparable civilian damage is caused in Iraq, Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jaques Poos said here Sunday.

He was speaking on his arrival from Moscow where, together with the Italian and Dutch foreign ministers, he held talks Saturday with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh.

Mr. Poos said Mr. Gorbachev had assured the European Community (EC) leaders that the Soviet Union "has no intention of distancing itself from the framework traced by the United Nations" to expel Iraq from Kuwait. He said, however, the Soviet leader had warned that Moscow would consider the U.S.-led coalition to have overstepped the bounds of U.N. security council resolutions if irreparable civilian damage was caused in Iraq.

Mr. Poos said he had the impression Moscow considered that the coalition's military operations had not yet overstepped these bounds. He said Mr. Gorbachev had also warned the belligerents in the Gulf war not to use arms of massive destruction, such as nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons.

UK Prime Minister To Visit USSR 4-6 March

LD1802224491 Moscow World Service in English 2200 GMT 18 Feb 91

[Text] British Prime Minister John Major will visit the Soviet Union on 4-6 March. He was invited by President Gorbachev. The date of the visit was announced at 10 Downing Street on Monday. It is expected that the agenda of the talks will include the war in the Persian Gulf and economic cooperation.

President Gorbachev invited John Major to the Soviet Union as soon as he took office as British prime minister.

PRAVDA Welcomes Visit

PM1402145591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 91 First Edition p 4

[Report by Correspondent A. Lyutyy: "Visit In March"]

[Text] London, 13 Feb—British Prime Minister John Major intends to visit the Soviet Union in March. He announced this yesterday in a speech in the House of Commons.

Major would like to discuss various aspects of the world situation and bilateral relations with the Soviet leadership. The premier also stated that he is going to raise the question of the Baltic republics.

The statement by the head of the British cabinet provoked noticeable excitement in London political circles. At the present stage it has dissipated the fears of one group of British political observers that London was in the process of curtailing or freezing dialogue with the USSR, which over the last few years has become one of the pivotal factors in European politics in general. There were definite grounds for such fears.

First of all, a kind of watershed in our relations came with the departure of Margaret Thatcher, who considered it a question of principle and even of personal prestige to support perestroyka and the Soviet leadership personally. "Will Major be just as devoted to this policy?" was the question the commentators were asking themselves. Second, certain statements and actions by the British leadership with regard to the events in the Baltic have given cause for alarm. London's rhetoric has been extremely harsh, and the government froze the 20-million-pound "know-how fund" intended to supply aid to us during the transition to a market economy. The theme running through the arguments was as follows: We are offering the USSR assistance to promote reforms, not coercion. Only the recent appeal by the premier himself not to draw hasty conclusions regarding the Baltic dampened the critical heat somewhat in government and parliament.

It is very important that, despite the resounding advice of right-wingers and Baltic emigrants not to travel to the Soviet Union, the prime minister has nevertheless decided to go ahead with his visit at precisely this time. It is essential to carry on the dialogue. Both the British and our side will have the opportunity to provide each other with an explanation of provocative obscurities or momentary doubts in the bilateral relations. Firsthand information at the highest level is invaluable during the present critical period.

Major's intention also has a definite symbolic significance. It is no secret that many British businessmen are currently paralyzed by indecisiveness, as it were: What should they do? How are they to interpret the situation in the USSR? Does Moscow intend to push on toward the market? The premier's statement should be a stimulus to those businessmen who prefer to act with one eye on the government. In only a few days' time an important delegation of bankers and leading stockbrokers from the City of London is coming to Moscow. This is the first trip of its kind with the aim of finding out about the restructuring of the USSR banking and credit system. If we are to believe the press here, this trip has been in jeopardy for some time because of events in the Baltic. The fact that it is going ahead nonetheless may be interpreted as indicating a desire on the part of the City to have mutual relations with us which are not governed by fluctuations in the immediate political context but are based on long-term considerations. In the words of Saxon Tate, leader of the delegation and chairman of the joint committee of London exchanges, "the transition from a centralized to a market economy in the USSR is an exceptionally complex task, and nobody should delude themselves that progress toward it will be free of problems."

Bessmertnykh Meets Irish Deputy Foreign Minister

LD1302152391 Moscow TASS in English 1336 GMT 13 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow February 13 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh today met Irish Deputy Foreign Minister Padraig Murphy, visiting Moscow for political consultations.

The sides expressed satisfaction that Soviet-Irish relations were developing in a spirit of mutual respect and constructive interaction in European affairs.

They confirmed their desire to use the diplomatic reconstruction of international relations more fully and effectively to promote trust and cooperation between the two countries.

They discussed many international issues, agreeing that all burning international problems should be solved exclusively by political means.

Padraig Murphy passed Aleksandr Bessmertnykh a message from Irish Foreign Minister Gerald Collins. Collins is to make an official visit to the Soviet Union.

Murphy also met deputies foreign minister Viktor Karpov, Yuliy Kvitsinskiy and Vladimir Petrovskiy.

Norway Protests USSR Bomber Deployment

LD1302122691 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 13 Feb 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Norway has accused the Soviet Union of deploying on the Kola peninsula additional bombers, called Backfires in the West. This has been done despite an official statement on reductions in this region, added (Gunner Angeltweit), minister of defense of Norway.

Pavlov Receives German Economics Minister

PM1502152791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 91 Union Edition p 5

[Text] Moellemann discussed here on 13 February a broad range of issues related to Soviet-German economic cooperation and prospects of its development during the period of the USSR's transition to socially oriented market relations.

The sides reaffirmed their striving to expand economic ties and enhance their efficiency on the basis of Soviet-German treaties and agreements signed during President Mikhail Gorbachev's recent trip to Germany.

Special attention was paid to issues of maintaining traditional ties with enterprises on the territory of Germany's five new lands. The governments of the two countries will do everything possible to prevent a slump in trade and economic cooperation with the new lands and ensure steady reciprocal deliveries.

As a result of the detailed exchange of views on the placement of Soviet orders with corresponding enterprises and ways to overcome difficulties in the development of trade and economic relations between the two countries, the two sides agreed to organise work in this direction and conclude it as soon as possible.

They also discussed other issues connected with the forthcoming discussion of Soviet-German treaties and agreements by the Soviet legislature.

USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman S.A. Sitaryan; Secretary of State at the FRG Economics Ministry von Wuerzen; and FRG Ambassador to the USSR K. Blech participated in the conversation.

Supreme Soviet

Bessmertnykh Speaks to Supreme Soviet on Gulf War

LD1902230291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1620 GMT 19 Feb 91

["Full text" of speech by USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh at a USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 19 February; all quotation marks as received]

[Text] Moscow, 19 Feb (TASS)—We transmit the full text of the speech by USSR Foreign Minister Alesksandr Bessmertnykh at the USSR Supreme Soviet on the situation in the Persian Gulf zone:

"During the last few months, the USSR Supreme Soviet has considered the situation in the Persian Gulf more intensively, and more emotionally, than any other international affairs issue. It is understandable, as it is the question of the most serious regional conflict in the past two decades, which was initiated by the aggression of one state against another—a small, and in fact, defenseless state. This happened at the time when the world community was moving away from the "cold war" period to more stable forms of peaceful development. It was at this transitional stage that the strength of the new system of international relations, which was being formed, was put to the test. As a matter of fact, a precedent is being created: Can small states, and not just small states, rest assured with regard to the preservation of their sovereignty and territorial integrity? Can the United Nations, and specifically the Security Council, act as a guarantor of order and security in various regions of the world? Can the international community act in time to localize an armed conflict that has started, and channel it toward political settlement? Can an aggressor, irrespective of the motives that guide him, count on his (?actions) going unpunished. [Word indistinct] the crisis in the Persian Gulf has other aspects as well. But what has just been said contains the key to understanding the line of action taken by the Soviet Union since the beginning of the Kuwaiti crisis, i.e., from 2 August last year, when Iraq occupied Kuwait, proclaimed it its "19th province," and holds onto it at the present moment.

There are no "double standards" in our position. We wished and do wish that the crisis that has arisen will be settled at the least possible cost to the peoples of Kuwait and Iraq, and to other peoples that have found themselves in the epicenter of the conflict.

Analyzing retrospectively the whole period after 2 August 1990, we have again come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has undertaken everything possible to find the formula for a political settlement which would be in accordance with the universally recognized norms of international law, and based on the well-known UN Security Council resolutions. Our dialogue with the Iraqi leadership over many months was aimed precisely at this. This was the reason for the contacts with the leaders of the United States, France, Great Britain, China, and a wide range of Arab states.

Regrettably, the development of events confirmed the unshakeable axiom that exists in international affairs—a rigid position, without flexible elements on one side, puts the other sides into a rigid political and diplomatic framework, and in the end creates an impasse for everyone. A specific direction is set up along which the situation develops. Events start to build up their own inertia, which is possible to overcome only when qualitative changes take place in the positions of the main sides.

As friends, we warned the Iraqi leadership that the seizure of Kuwait could lead to far more serious consequences than, as we understand it, were expected in Baghdad. We warned that the "right of the strong" used by Iraq against Kuwait would turn in the end against Iraq itself. We also said that the longer the Kuwaiti crisis continues, the more difficult it would be to find a way out which would be respectable and, the main thing, fairly painless for Iraq and the other countries, from the situation, which was becoming more and more complex and explosive with every passing month and week.

At the same time we held intensive contacts with the other parties that were also drawn into the crisis over Kuwait. During the course of these contacts we have been pursuing a policy whereby, in order to achieve a political, nonmilitary settlement, the full potential of peace-making means at the disposal of the international community should be used.

Questions are being raised among some of our deputies, and also among the public, as to how justified was our support for the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council on the Kuwait question, and whether we acted correctly when we voted for Resolution No. 678 sanctioning the use of all necessary means, including military force, to liberate Kuwait.

Each decision has its alternatives. I believe that they were studied, and our policy was deemed to be the optimum one. At the basis of this policy was placed the principle that aggression is impermisible. There is not only a moral and ethical basis to this principle. In our cruel times this does not always, unfortunately, turn out to be sufficient. But there are also pragmatic considerations of guaranteeing one's own security. If aggression in the world is to be punished, as murder is punished, then other states will be able to live more at ease. In questions of this kind there can be no place for cynicism of the kind which says there are good and bad forms of aggression. Each of the 12 resolutions adopted by the Security Council has been inscribed into a specific context, and was the reaction to one turn of events or another. Incidentally, the very number of resolutions shows how many signals have been sent and how many opportunities have been given to correct a line of action, and to bring it into accordance with the will of the international community. At our initiative a paragraph about a 6-week "pause of goodwill" was specially included in Resolution 678, the purpose of which was to move toward a political settlement of the crisis, and not to lead matters toward hostilities. It can only be deplored that the Iraqi leadership did not listen to the signals of common sense.

With this, the first phase in the development of the Kuwait crisis ended. I would not want to repeat myself, but all the same I will stress—there were possibilities for averting the worst case scenario. Those who held the keys to unlocking the situation should have made use of them.

The events that began on 17 January meant that the crisis in the Persian Gulf region had entered a qualitatively new phase. Military actions began, military equipment went into action. But that was not the only thing. The number of victims among the civilian population began to multiply. Kuwait and Iraq found themselves increasingly under the threat of catastrophic destruction, ecological disaster loomed—the waters of the Persian Gulf are being polluted by a large quantity of discharged oil. Strikes are being made at Iraq's economic infrastructure. The Soviet Union was the first to raise the question of the danger that the logic of the armed conflict could take the situation outside the framework of the mandate determined by the resolutions of the Security Council. Yet another risk appeared—that of an expansion of the conflict. Clear attempts are being made to draw Israel into the war. Some people are trying to give the conflict an even more dangerous dimension, presenting it as a confrontation between the Muslim and the Christian worlds.

However, to the honor of the leaders and the peoples of the region, this provocative line did not spread on account of its crying absurdity.

I do not think it is possible to find in any of the canons of any world religion justification for violence and the seizure of something that is someone else's, be it someone's personal property or a whole country. It is noteworthy, for example, that such a high Islamic authority as Khamene'i, who is the spiritual successor of Khomeyni, the leader of the Iranian revolution, and who now occupies the supreme constitutional post of the Islamic Republic of Iran, gave a special explanation for believers that the armed conflict now taking place in the Persian Gulf cannot be viewed as a war between Islam and those who reject Islam, as a war between Muslims and non-Muslims. Statements by leaders and religious figures of other Islamic states, like Turkey, for example, are being made in the same spirit.

And so a complicated military and political tangle has come into being. Vigorous, purposeful actions were required of Soviet diplomacy, what's more, in several directions all at once.

The main one of these, of course, is to try to end the military actions and unfold the course of events in the direction of a political settlement. Hence the virtually continuous contacts with the leaders of Iraq, Kuwait, other Muslim states, the United States, European countries, and so on.

At the same time we are undertaking efforts aimed at averting a widening of the geographical boundaries of the conflict, and at preventing other states being drawn into it. We are gratified that, despite a systematic missile bombardment, Israel has restrained itself from interfering in the hostilities against Iraq. Deserving of positive appraisal has been the position of active neutrality taken by Iran, with whose foreign minister, Velayati, additional talks were held the other day. Turkey, with whom we are also in contact, has not been drawn into the hostilities. We proceed from the fact that the involvement of further participants in the conflict would make it even more inflammable, and would not only make the task of a move toward a political settlement more complicated and difficult to achieve, but would also constitute a direct threat to our national interests, the defense of which is the main basis of our policy.

We are worried by statements that have been made recently at the political level, and by reports in the influential mass media about the possibility of the use of mass-destruction weapons during the course of the hostilities. We consider absolutely impermissible the use of chemical, bacteriological, and nuclear weapons. We have made this firm position known to everyone. As USSR President M.S. Gorbachev warned in his statement of 9 February, if this occurs, then all world politics and the whole world community would be shaken to its foundations. There can be no doubt of this. We have also made the appropriate contacts through diplomatic channels.

I would like to take the opportunity to inform you that from the onset of hostilities in the Persian Gulf zone, permanent monitoring of the atmosphere, with the object of establishing the presence of poisonous substances and morbific microbes, has been carried out along the southern borders of the Soviet Union. So, in this sphere, the necessary measures have been taken.

The Soviet Union did not remain indifferent in the face of the ecological catastrophe which fell upon the Persian Gulf, and declared its readiness to participate, together with other states, in the elimination of the consequences of the emission of enormous quantities of oil into the waters of the Gulf.

Talking about the military-political situation that has developed in the Persian Gulf region, permit me to say a few words about the work of our Baghdad embassy. The constant air aids and the absence of water and electicity in the city are creating great problems for our diplomats, not only from the point of view of ensuring their safety, but also on the purely practical, everyday level. At the same time, our comrades, led by Ambassador Posovalyuk, are displaying the highest sense of duty, strength of spirit, and personal courage. Without their contribution our political- diplomatic activity in connection with the present conflict in the Gulf would be attended by certain difficulties. Let me note, incidentally, that all the embassies of the majority of other countries, including the great powers, have left Iraq. The responsibility and importance of the mission being performed by the 13 citizens of our country who now form the embassy staff are all the greater.

Another important area of the Soviet Union's political-diplomatic efforts is the work on creating a regional security zone in the Persian Gulf and in the Near East. Everyone must learn a serious lesson for the future from the current tragic events: Not to allow this region, which is so important and, at the same time, torn apart by contradictions, to be drawn again into a whirlpool of war and violence. From what premise are we proceeding? We are convinced that the decisive part in the future structure of the region should be played primarily by the countries located there. This also matches the assurances given by the leaders of the United States and a number of other states that after the settlement of the Kuwait crisis the contingents of the multinational forces will be withdrawn from the Near East and the Persian Gulf zone, and the situation restored to the position on 1 August. But other Arab countries, as well as the United Nations and the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, must also play their part. And the Arab factor, of which we come out in support, must become just as active, more active, and particularly active.

What is the main task at this stage?

In his statement of 9 February, President M.S. Gorbachev stressed that against the background of the ever more alarming and dramatic turn of events are taking in the Persian Gulf region, historical responsibility, common sense, and humanity dictate one conclusion—to bring into motion all the levers of a political settlement on the basis of the Security Council resolutions.

In the developing critical situation, the Soviet leadership has publicly addressed the president of Iraq with an urgent appeal to once more weigh up everything that has been staked for his country, and to show realism, which would make it possible to move to the path of a reliable and just, peaceful settlement. Certain practical considerations on this score were set out to Iraqi President S. Husayn by the USSR president's personal representative Ye.M. Primakov who, as is known, went to Baghdad with this objective. We have from the very outset considered this trip necessary and useful.

On this occasion the Iraqi leadership has displayed an active interest in maintaining the dialogue at a substantial level. S. Husayn said that he would send his special representative to Moscow. The statement of Iraq's Revolution Command Council of 15 February was published on the eve of his arrival. Changes stood out noticeably in the Iraqi position, since for the first time since the moment the Kuwait crisis arose, the document speaks of Iraq's willingness to withdraw its troops, and to act with regard for UN Security Council Resolution No. 660. Undoubtedly this is a step in the right direction, even if at the present stage it is outwardly hedged around, as it were, with conditions and provisos. The main thing is that is reveals, in our view, a possibility that has been lacking since 2 August for trying urgently and specifically to move onto a political solution of the conflict.

In the present situation—and this is a serious new factor—dialogue with the Iraqi leadership, linked with the prospect of a peaceful settlement, has begun to work actively. T. 'Aziz and S. Hammadi, Iraq's deputy prime ministers, were in Moscow yesterday. The Soviet president held a substantive exchange of opinions with them, covering the range of problems connected with the Persian Gulf. Talks were also held at ministerial level. With due consideration for the real situation that has arisen today, and which requires one to react without delay in order to prevent a further escalation of the war, and also bearing in mind the latest statement by the Iraqi leadership, USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev put forward in conversation a specific plan of actions for the settlement of the conflict.

T. 'Aziz left by air for Iraq to report to S. Husayn and the Revolution Command Council. If the Iraqi side accepts the proposed plan of actions, then efforts aimed at putting the conflict over Kuwait into the phase of a political settlement will have a practical base. At the same time I would like to warn that one can only count upon a rapid and real return from these efforts if all the sides involved in the conflict act sufficiently realistically and constructively. Insofar as the crisis in the Persian Gulf began with the occupation of Kuwait, accordingly, the main element of a settlement and its basis must be the restoration of Kuwait as an independent, sovereign state.

There is nothing anti-Iraqi about this, our principled position. On the contrary, during the course of contacts between the Iraqi and Soviet leaders, it was stated a number of times from our side that the Soviet Union wishes to see Iraq as a prosperous, territorially integral state, playing a worthy role in the international community. We intend to build our future relations with Iraq on this battle, too. Among other things, we do not want Iraq to be treated as some kind of "odd man out" in the future regional security structures which will be created once the conflict is over. It is a large and important state, and its vitality is an integral part of the regional balance.

We attach serious importance to the guarantees of Iraq's territorial integrity. Firm assurances exist on the part of the leadership of the main countries bordering Iraq regarding the fact that none of them has any territorial claims to Iraq, and that they will oppose any attempts from whatever side to place in question the integrity of the Iraqi state. It would seem that all the countries of the region are as categorically opposed as we are to redrawing its political map. All this, of course, does not mean that if after the war, and after the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, Iraq and Kuwait sit down at a conference table and peacefully reach agreement on questions of dispute between themselves, that we would object to such a settlement. Moreover, we are in favor in general of a peaceful settlement.

The Soviet and Iraqi peoples have many years of close relations and diverse and fruitful cooperation behind them. We nurture feelings of sincere good will and compassion toward them, just as we feel sympathy for the people of Kuwait. The tragic page that was opened on 2 August of last year must be turned as quickly as possible. The experience of many countries reaffirms that the most stable and, if you like, "thrifty" solutions to problems are precisely those which are worked out at the conference table, and on the basis of the universally recognized principles and norms of international law.

It is precisely in this way, within the framework of international legality, that we see a way out of the war and a settlement of the conflict. Unfortunately, much time has been lost, and the level of mutual trust of the belligerents in this war has dropped dramatically. That is why the launching of the political process will require of everyone and, of course, the Soviet Union, considerable effort and persistence. But we see for ourselves no alternative other than continuing in coordination with other states, harnessing our own efforts with those of others, and trying to do everything possible, and impossible, so that the fires of war in the Persian Gulf can be put out as quickly as possible, and that matters may be turned toward a political settlement. Herein lies the essence of our approach, and herein lies the demand of the supreme interests of the Soviet state."

Pavlov Addresses Supreme Soviet on Economy

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[Address by USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, with introduction and interjection by USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov, at the USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 18 February—recorded]

[Text] [Lukyanov] We now move on to consideration of the statement of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers on measures aimed at the stabilization of the consumer market, implementation of the price policy, and ensuring the social protection of the population based on the decisions of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Comrade Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov, prime minister of the USSR, has the floor on this issue.

[Pavlov] Esteemed comrade deputies! In accordance with the decisions of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the agreement of principle between the USSR and the republics on the need for the implementation of a common policy in the field of price-setting and the social protection of the population, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, developing work that had been done earlier in this field, has prepared proposals for the reform of retail prices, linking this measure in principle with questions of wages and problems of the social protection of the population.

I would like to return once again to the question of what it was, first and foremost, that brought about the need to implement these major socioeconomic measures, for what we are talking about today is not simply a reform of retail prices but a wide reform of overall price-setting, and essentially a start is being made in the reform of labor remuneration in the national economy.

It would therefore be radically wrong to believe that the reform of price-setting is merely the result of the introduction of new wholesale and procurement prices. The thing here is that... [changes thought] And the main reason cannot be formulated, as is done in some cases today, along the lines that someone has made a mistake and changed wholesale and procurement prices without sufficient foundation. If that were the case, in principle the situation could have easily been put right long ago by cancelling that decision and by removing the people who had made the mistake, although these things, too, have been done in developing the decisions and in carrying out the decisions of the supreme body of legislative power of the Union, the Congress of People's Deputies.

But time and again the essence of the matter amounts to this, that the wholesale and procurement prices which were in operation until 1 January of this year did not reflect the real cost of the labor of the miners, the metal workers, the rail workers, the peasants, and all other representatives of the industries in the production sector. Nor did they reflect the cost of natural resources. The question therefore was this: Is it fair that the work of the enterprises of these industries should constantly be subsidized by the budget? And in general, do we have any grounds for expecting, under such conditions, to be able to increase production and speed up scientific and technical progress and emerge from the crisis upon transition to market relations?

Nor can we today accept the rebuke made against the Union government by the leaders of a number of krays and oblasts and the cities of Moscow and Leningrad that delaying the issue of raising retail prices is holding back sales of consumer goods. Today I will allow myself to remind you of a question put to me as minister of finance during discussion of the country's budget for 1991. Essentially the question was asked in the form of a statement, that the question does have to be resolved, but first of all one has to resolve the issue of where the money goes. And a figure was given: 203 billion rubles [R] in subsidies and price differences. I think the question was asked by Comrade Lisitskiy. I have to say that the budget determined by you for the year 1991 envisaged subsidies and price differences for various types of output and consumer goods to a total value of R229 billion. Are you really going to say that they were not enough, even for one single month?

I believe that other reasons are in operation here. It is not a question of our not being able to realize output, of there not being prices: It is a question of our either not wanting to do this in a number of cases or of our wanting to do something different. Therefore, if we get away from these polemics and return to the initial, basic point, for the sake of which and for the purpose of which the reform of price-setting is being carried out today, then we believe that the landmarks and the principles of the approach to the reform of price-setting, including compensation and protection for the least protected strata of the population, which were adopted both by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and by the Supreme Soviet, seem to us to be correct and suitable for implementation in practice as quickly as possible, rather than having an amendment despite the fact that this is what several of the mass information media, several economists, and even deputies are actively calling for.

I can say that the reason evidently amounts to this—and here I am going to be absolutely frank—that a whole number of regions and republics today have used for other purposes the money that had been envisaged for subsidizing retail prices. Indeed, a whole number of regions and republics are short of resources today. So today the question arises of meeting this shortage through raising prices by means of incomplete—or, let us put it this way, by means of insufficiently complete compensation for individual strata and categories of the population. I can give the following figure: For the base of the Russian Federation, the subsidies were to have been R116 billion rubles. In the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] budget, R69.7 billion have been confirmed. There are no subsidies for light industry. There are no subsidies for canned food and for many other things. For the Ukraine, subsidies totalling R20.9 billion for meat and milk, instead of R26.7 billion, have been approved, and so forth. This then is where the reason for the acuteness of today's problem lies. But I would not want to develop this dispute here and move in that direction inasmuch as I am profoundly convinced that the question as to who spent money and on what cannot be substituted for the question of reform.

Proceeding from this, the government, together with the governments of the Union republics, has in the course of the past months been intensively modifying and coordinating questions on the reform of retail prices. To date these questions have twice been examined at the Coucil of the Federation.

Proceeding from the need to stabilize the consumer market, to strengthen motivation for high-performance labor, increase the production of consumer goods, and combat speculation and the shadow economy, the president and the supreme leaders of the republics have agreed that it is necessary to establish common limits for the country's entire territory on increasing state retail prices for the main foodstuffs and non-food goods which determine the population's living standard. At the same time, it is envisaged that the prices and rates for services should be established by taking into account the real cost of their production and marketing, consumer characteristics, and the correlation between supply and demand. On the basis of all calculations it is assumed that the level of retail prices will subsequently increase by an average of 60 percent. In our view, the state itself should set stable price lists for a number of consumer goods, which determine the population's living standards, and control their rise. Taking into account the national, regional, and production specifics, we proceed here from the fact that the top limit of their increase should be determined at the Union level, while keeping in mind that in doing this the republics can set prices for such goods at levels lower than those determined by the center. By such goods we mean: Meat, milk, eggs, bread, flour, sugar, tea, salt, linen, goods for children, rates for internal republican passenger transport, and a few other things.

We think that it would be wrong for tomatoes to cost the same both in the areas where they are grown, and beyond the Polar circle or in Moscow, and for milk to be sold for the same price in the area of its mass production as in large industrial areas. That is to say, we believe that the concept of real value should be restored, while taking into account transportation outlays as well as other expenses making up the value of a commodity.

At the same time, we believe that prices should also take into account the creation of required interest in increasing the marketability of our agriculture. In so doing, regardless of any outlays, we deem it necessary to refrain from increasing the state retail prices that are in effect for medicines and medical items, coffee, synthetic fiber textiles and their products, footwear, furs, knitwear, hosiery toys made of synthetic materials, gasoline, kerosene, electric power, gas, coal, stove fuel and firewood sold to the population, and also for vodka.

If deputies are interested in the reason why we have grouped together such a list of commodities, I can dwell on this issue separately but, on the whole, there are individual features and reasons for each of these commodities, on the one hand, and loss- making commodities on the other; however, there are approaches from both social importance and the economic points of view...

[Lukyanov, interrupting] Valentin Sergeyevich, the simple thing is that some deputies would like to decrease these prices, whereas others would like to raise them—that is all. Please continue. Let us listen.

[Pavlov] Anatoliy Ivanovich, the whole issue is that each of these commodities is oriented toward an absolutely definite population group. On the subject of vodka, no matter how much you and I talk about this being an evil, this evil nevertheless does exist, and any increase in the retail prices of vodka that goes beyond what is reasonable would be an incentive first for the production of home-distilled vodka, and second, in one way or another, it would be a blow to families' budgets.

With the purpose of limiting an increase in retail prices we assume, at the same time, that it is necessary to preserve state subventions for meat, dairy and fish production, medicines, and certain other socially important consumer goods in 1991. We would say it is wrong to set the level of retail prices today at a level exceeding purchase prices and distribution costs. The thing is, we believe that an element of the low qualitative level of the development of our agriculture is still present to a considerable degree in the level of these prices.

You and I are clearly aware of the fact that losses of agricultural produce are too great, and therefore it would be wrong, I believe, to shift these losses onto the population by means of retail prices at this stage.

Yes, and in principle, to shift losses on to the people is not, probably, the best way to solve the state's economic problems. Therefore, we consider that in 1991 all subsidies should not be liquidated, although food, according to the proposed prices that have been worked out, will be marketed without entailing loss, but the subsidies on these goods will remain. True, they will be reduced approximately three-fold. We have in mind to extend the range of goods sold to the population according to contract, free and regulated retail prices. By our calculations, proceeding from an enumeration of these goods, approximately 30 percent of goods will be sold at these prices on the basis of their proportion to the overall volume of trade turnover. This covers natural fabrics, new fashionable article of natural fibers, leather footwear for adults, fashionable and high-class sportswear, rugs and carpets, watches, certain makes of refrigerators, washing and sewing machines, vacuum cleaners, electrical and radio measuring instruments, uncooked smoked sausage, confectionery, fresh fish, and imported tobacco articles. At the same time we proceed from the fact that the governments of the union republics can add to this list and make it more precise.

We consider that the measures being proposed to reform retail prices, combined with the measures to stabilize and build up production, should enable the situation on the consumer market to be normalized. Today it is being said that in a number of regions there have been widespread instances where there are goods in warehouses, but they are not being disposed of through the retail trade by virtue of the fact that retail prices have not been established for them, which would permit enterprises to work profitably. This refers to goods relating to social amenities and domestic use. I have to say that this, to put it mildly, is not precise, because at the end of last year the Prices Committee gave the right to industrial enterprises to market their output in those instances where retail prices for this output were lower than the wholesale prices, and on these new wholesale prices to set a mark-up of 20 percent in the retail trade. It must be said that the majority of local bodies did not discharge this decision, and as a result, an artificial crisis situation was created, with the marketing of goods relating to social amenities and domestic use. They did not wish to take responsibility, for this or that reason, although there was a decision of the Union Prices Committee on this subject.

We consider it to be fundamentally important to report to you today that in accordance with your decisions the reform of retail prices and tariffs has been linked first and foremost at this stage with the problem of pay and the social protection of the population, and primarily with the question of implementing compensation measures in anticipation. We feel that the people who are correct are those who say unambiguously that unless a person knows in advance how much you are going to pay him—and even better, unless the money is put into his hands before the date on which retail prices are raised—a majority of the population will not believe in the compensation.

On this basis we approached our work from the standpoint that compensating the population for the additional costs brought about by the increase in retail prices has to be carried out in accordance with the following basic principles: Full compensation for the increase in the prices of basic foodstuffs, linen, mass types of fabrics, clothing and footwear, items of personal hygiene and tobacco, building materials, furniture, wallpaper, crockery, domestic chemical products, several other types of goods, and also passenger transport fares; full compensation for the increased cost of children's goods, with the appropriate resources targeted on families with children below the age of maturity; the provision, from the budget and from other sources, of compensatory payments that are differentiated according to the social and demographic groups of the population, with material support for the socially vulnerable strata having priority, first and foremost children, young people who are students, invalids, pensioners, young people in incomplete families, and families with many children; an increase in salaries and wages for those in employment, together with a simultaneous reduction in tax on profits of enterprises and collective farms, and on the incomes of citizens; the special allocation of part of the resources our enterprises receive from raising prices and tariffs for an additional increase in the level of the pay of workers belonging to the leading professions in the sphere of education, public health and social security, culture and archive establishments; an increase in existing grants for young people who are students, and the introduction of new ones; an increase in the size of financial allowances for food, clothing, and other types of material provisions for servicemen; an increase in the size of all types of pensions, benefits, and other social payments, and also a broadening of the circle of individuals enjoying the material support of the State through the resources of the USSR Social Insurance Fund and the USSR Pension Fund; full compensation for an increase in expenditure on social services to the population in hospitals, boarding schools, schools, centers for the aged and disabled, and preschool and other establishmetns in the social sphere.

We also proceeded from the fact that monetary compensation for the less well-off sections of the population will be supplemented by means of various types of social, and especially assistance in kind, which is rendered by local bodies; that zonal differentiation between state retail prices for foodstuffs will be abolished; and that the amounts of compensation payments will be fixed, taking into account existing regional salary coefficients, so that the question of the North is reflected in these compensations.

We approached it in the following way: The amount of compensation, taking into consideration the instability of the current situation in the economy, should, under agreement between the Union and the repubics, be determined on the basis of the population's actual consumption of goods and services from state resources for the year 1990. I deliberately emphasize this circumstance, bearing in mind that today we have so far been unable to maintain the 1990 level of consumption.

The first payments of compensation to students and pupils, pensioners and children, and other individuals receiving social pensions and benefits are being carried out in anticipation, before the date on which the new prices for consumer goods and services are introduced.

We proceed from the fact that the specific amounts and procedures governing the compensatory payments are set by republican bodies with due consideration for the regional conditions and consumption structure at levels no lower than those that will be adopted at all-Union level as guaranteed amounts by which incomes will rise for corresponding groups of the population, on condition that retail prices are introduced, naturally, on the basis of the maximum level envisaged by the agreement.

We believed that at state enterprises, organizations and establishments the procedure and the minimum guaranteed amounts by which incomes are being raised for citizens in employment should be put into effect by means of a revision of basic wage rates and salaries, which have been confirmed by a decision of the government, or other Union bodies acting on the instructions of the government, at the same time having in mind that the working people have to be compensated for the increases in the prices of goods and services in daily demand to the extent we agree the minimum, with due consideration for the possibilities that there are at these enterprises. What we have in mind is that wages rates will be raised to the extent that is determined by the administration of the enterprise, in agreement with the trade unions, based upon the general principles defined by the Union government and the governments of the republics, but by no less than R60 per month.

At the same time we take into account the fact that in a number of cases enterprises, for technical reasons, will not perhaps be able to carry out the recalculation of basic wage rates and official salaries. We therefore proceeded from the fact that in order to ensure advance compensation for the price increases it will be necessary to give permission for the first payments to be made in the form of special supplements to wages in absolute sums on a separate payroll, with those sums being included subsequently in the pay rates. We believe that it could be recommended that these principles be applied also in cooperatives and collective farms.

We proceeded from that fact in principle, after wages and salaries have been raised in accordance with this approach, the enterprise will henceforth independently establish increased wage rates and staff salaries for blue and white collar workers, while maintaining in so doing the existing correlation in the level of wages and salaries within categories of personnel, and will also determine the form and level of increments, supplementary payments, bonuses, and other payments of a stimulating nature, including one time awards for long service provided that the enterprise still has available the funds previously allocated for these purposes.

The intention is that the specific level of wages and salaries, and also of increments, supplementary payments and bonuses for the appropriate professional groups of workers will be determined at an enterprise by the conditions of collective agreements and wage agreements.

Enterprises will implement these rights at the expense of, and within the limits of funds earmarked for wages in accordance with USSR laws: On enterprises in the USSR, on taxes from enterprises, associations and organizations, and on the Union budget for the year 1991. In doing this we assume that it will be necessary to raise the base wage fund being used for calculating the consumption fund for the year 1991. According to our calculations it must be determined approximately somewhere in the region of R450-480.

Enterprises, organizations, and institutions being financed from the budget will independently implement their rights within the limits of the funds being allocated to them for these purposes, as regards increments, supplementary payments, bonuses, and other kinds of incentives, and regarding wages and salaries, by agreement with the relevant bodies doing the financing of these enterprises, organizations and institutions.

With a view to strengthening the social protection of workers in education, public health, and social security, and in cultural institutions and archives, we find it necessary to eliminate the falling behind of their pay, and to channel a proportion of the funds from raising prices and rates into improving the wages of workers in the leading professions in these sectors.

We believe it will be necessary to establish new levels of wage rates and salaries for the afore-mentioned categories of workers, raising them on the whole by an average of some 60-80 percent, as against what was determined by the Union government. Therefore it is believed that this will make it possible, on the one hand, to bring the level of these workers' wages up to the level of wages of workers in production sectors and, at the same time, to equalize the approach itself to paying wages in various regions.

I think it is no secret for you that today, in various places in our country, various wages have appeared both for teachers and doctors in connection with the fact that individual regions have found some additional resources: In one place there were strikes, while in another they continued work with a resulting discrepancy. It seems to us that in this sphere the state-wide principle of equal pay for the same work should be preserved.

We also assume that the republics will raise maximum level of wages in effect today—it now stands at R300—for calculating coefficients—for work in mountain, desert, and arid regions—and percentage allowances to wages for an uninterrupted work record in the country's northern and eastern regions, taking into account the necessary level of guarantees for raising the population's income in connection with price increases.

We think it is particularly necessary to single out the issue of giving help to families with children. In this connection we believe that it is self-evident that families with children belong to one of the largest socially unprotected groups of the population. In connection with this we proceeded from the fact that in order to preserve the standard of living for these families, social benefits to them should be increased by about 60-80 percent, and special compensations or benefits to children up to age 16 who do not receive such benefits today should be introduced, and if the child studies and does not receive a stipend, then for those up to age 18.

We believe that before a new level of minimum wages is approved, state guarantees of the minimum benefits to families now in effect should be introduced: R250 when a child is born and R110 in monthly payments. Childcare allowance for mothers until the child reaches a certain age should be increased. The allowance to children of servicemen on regular service, to children in care, to single mothers, and to the sick should be increased. In other words, a broad-scale program for increasing the stability of the material situation of families with children should be implemented. [bell rings]

[Lukyanov] Well, comrades, I beg you...

[Pavlov, continuing] I will not unfold the entire program in detail now. I would like to say that we consciously think it is necessary to opt for even a certain redistribution, to a certain degree, of means in favor of these families.

Let us also include here, in this concept, young people who are studying. We consider that the stipend for students at higher education establishments should be set at R120, or those at technical colleges at R100, and for those at trade colleges as a rule at R80.

The problem of pensioners, disabled, and families who have lost their breadwinner was singled out in particular. We consider that it is essential that a program of direct compensation be implemented accordingly here as well, for all categories of the population which fall under this umbrella.

As far as servicemen are concerned, we considered it essential to raise the official salaries of officers, warrant officers, naval warrant officers, and servicemen on extended military service by R80 and that of the ranks and those in command of internal Affairs bodies by R60.

As far as those on compulsory service are concerned, for students and cadets at the Suvorov and Nakhimov Academies it should be raised by R20 a month and for students at military educational establishments who do not yet have officers' rank, by R60 a month. In addition to this, we consider it necessary to increase correspondingly the expenditure on foodstuffs, clothing and medicinal types of material provision for servicemen.

From our point of view, it will then be necessary to introduce compensatory payments for nonworking wives of rank-and-file servicemen and of servicemen at the command level at Internal Affairs bodies in remote garrisons and localities where there are no opportunities for employment placement. A list of such locations should be determined in accordance with the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. We propose that it would be equitable here to set the compensation payment at R60.

It will be necessary to raise pensions for pensioners who were servicemen with the Ministry of Defense, internal affairs, or the State Security Committee.

For the first time we have encountered the problem of unemployment. Proceeding from a thorough examination of this set of problems, we consider today that it is necessary to introduce the payment of compensation of R50 a month for the period of retraining of these individuals and for those who are acknowledged, in accordance with the law, to be without work. This R50 should be paid in addition to the unemployment allowance. We have also envisaged a whole series of measures to implement other compensation payments.

In particular we consider it essential—in connection with the rate of taxation of enterprises to 35 percent—to raise the tax threshold to R160 and correspondingly reduce the rate of income tax on citizens' incomes that exceed R160 a month.

A major problem which has caused a great deal of discussions is the question of protecting savings. We proceeded from the fact that in all cases the owners of deposits or certificates must be provided with compensation by way of recalculation of their deposits. I think this question will be specially considered and adopted by the State Bank and the Savings Bank after approval from the cabinet of Ministers. All questions of principle have been already discussed and we are having in mind in his case that, by taking into account the interest and the recalculation of the deposits according to a specially elaborated scale, or several scales, we will guarantee compensation for the population—for their savings against devaluation.

It must be said that to date the situation is twofold. The majority of republics, practically, one must say, all the republics have confirmed their compliance with the level of prices. As far as the level of retail prices is concerned, let me report to you, there are no disagreements at the moment. As to the issue of compensation, that has turned into one of the most topical issues of the moment. Here two points of view have clashed quite openly. We supposed that the questions of compensation must be resolved by everybody according to the principle of a uniform approach to the all-Union market, in the same way as the question of prices is being solved. We supposed that there can be no unified economic space if the pay for work in accordance with its amount and quality is to be tackled on the basis of different attitudes on different territories, while retail prices, one of the chief criteria of evaluating the costs of labor, are going to be addressed on a uniform basis.

This is not going to work. In this connection we supposed that the decisions on prices and on compensation must be taken at the level, which is stipulated by the Constitution. The point is that we supposed that equal rights for the citizens of the USSR to work, to just pay for this work and to social protection are enshrined in our Constitution. That is why our approach followed from the need, proceeded from the need, to provide a uniform approach, both from the point of view of the reform of price formation and from the point of view of the revision of the principles and the level of attention to the protection of the population during the transition to the new principles of the formation of retail prices. But as I have already said, we came up against divergent approaches here, because a number of republics—in particular the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, and Belorussia—proposed that the issue of retail prices be left to the union government, while the question of compensation should be left to the republics. The Union Government could not agree to this, primarily for reasons connected with the difference in the development level of our regions. The fact is that when the principles of price formation and the retail price level are changed, revenue will in the main, or primarily, be generated on the territory of those union republics which have a higher proportion of output of finished production, above all of consumer goods. Those regions which supply raw materials for these goods, however, will end up without sources of compensation and funds for their population. In this respect, the republics will be split into two camps: some will have additional funds to provide a certain amount of insurance for themselves and give a more protected position from the point of view of retail prices, and also, frankly speaking, in some measure to resolve their other problems, if these have already come to a head today.

Other republics, however, will have to either start raising prices for raw materials and start price hikes all over again, or they will have to ask for compensation from the center—with the center, in this case, being understood as the Union Government. However, since we do not have a unified state budget today, and since revenues are strictly allocated between the Union and the republics, given this, I can say in advance that the Union Government will be unable to support these republics on the required scale. The measures will, therefore, in this case be implemented in accordance with the second option, whereby such backing may be given, if they so wish, by those republics which are exporters of consumer goods, so to speak. This signifies, in effect, the transference of the functions of the Union Government to the level of individual republics.

In connection with this, the Union Government abides by its view that decisions both on prices and on the issue of minimum level welfare compensation should be made at the center, at all-Union level.

The second aspect I would like to report on today in connection with this is that we also think it is essential to resolve the issue of mutual relations between the Union and the republics, in connection with reform of price formation, bearing in mind that in one form or another it will once again be necessary to redistribute between individual regions the additional revenue which they will receive as a result of the reform of retail prices.

This would mean, I suppose, a sort of Union republican fund for the reform, because the problem of redistributing resources concerns not only mutual relations between the republics—that is, at the level of the Union republics and between each other—but also within republics. If one takes, for example, the RSFSR itself, then it is quite obvious that the Yakut SSR—where the main exportable commodities, so to speak, are gold and diamonds, and where 90 percent of all consumer goods are brought in from other regions—should, when retail prices are raised, receive some sort of direct compensatory subsidy either from the Union government or from the RSFSR government. Otherwise, the population of the republic will quite simply not withstand the level of increase currently taking shape in our country.

At the same time I would like to report on another very important question today. I think that many deputies have heard that the minimum compensation was, at a certain stage, put at a level of R40. The fact is that at the start of our work, we and the republics started off with compensation for rises in fixed state retail prices. When drawing up the results, our calculations showed that at the same time as state retail prices go up, all prices for goods whose prices the state assigns to the category of regulated or free ones, will in the natural course of events go up too. We did not need any proof here, but when we made the calculations we saw that of the total sum of the increase, about one-third of the rise did indeed fall into the category of the liberalized price structure. Then we saw for ourselves that it was obvious that postponing compensation for the rise in free prices to the stage of indexation would be wrong, as quantity would take over from quality. In this sense we also recognized what is obvious today to everyone: the uncontrolled process of price increases resulting from what is in fact their liberation by decisions made independently at both the level of kray and oblast, as well as at the level of the enterprise.

This is why, in this case, we consider it essential to include in the compensation not only the cost of changes in state retail prices but also the surge in prices which we are forecasting for the goods whose prices we are no longer going to fix firmly.

With this approach we did in essence arrive at a new level of minimum compensation for workers, at a level of R60. This new level produced a number of objections from several republics. I must say that today the majority of republics have dropped these objections, apart from the RSFSR.

The republics considered that they would not have sufficient funds for compensation at the level planned by the Union government. However, I must inform the Supreme Soviet today, that all our calculations are based on the fact that we will compensate 85 percent of the retail price rises.

Why 85 percent? Well, in the first place, we do not think that all the goods that have been increased in price need to be compensated for. I have listed some of these goods. Second, taking account of the calculations for the level of consumption for 1990, we have currently, in effect, reached somewhere around 95 percent in terms of physical volume. Therefore, we thought that on the one hand we need to have a certain reserve, to have some leeway for possible mistakes, in terms of territorial distribution, in terms of miscalculations over the structure of the range of goods, from the point of view of production and imports. We also thought that a certain part of the retail price rise, essentially should be shown to be a market-stabilizing factor. At the same time, we proceeded from the view that this part cannot be planned to be so large that it would essentially alter in qualitative terms, or in terms of content, the proposed reform of price setting.

This is so that we do not slide from reform of price setting as a necessary factor in the transition to a market economy to a confiscation-oriented reform of retail prices. Proceeding from this we believed that 85 percent of compensation calculated from the cost of raising retail prices, including freeing them, is the optimum size. Well, in doing this we proceed from the fact that after the price-setting reform is completed, we will gradually advance toward a further liberalization of prices for the output of material production and technical application and of retail prices. At the same time, understanding that the issue of indexation should be solved since we understand that there is a possibility of further price increases, we have already developed and submitted to the president a draft decree on general principles of making up a minimum consumer budget for examination today. As a matter of fact, the need to elaborate this task was determined by a decision of the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies. Well, you will remember in particular, that is was envisaged that a minimum consumer budget should be made up on the basis of norms and should determine citizens' minimum living wage.

I believe that in the course of the ensuing implementation of the program to switch to market-based relations, we will seek to observe the unity of the principles behind pricing, pay, and the social welfare of citizens throughout the country. We see this as a binding prerequisite for maintaining a unified economic area and a unified state. We would ask the Supreme Soviet to back our proposals for carrying through the reform.

Peaceful Solution to Gulf War Seen Possible

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[Text] Moscow February 19 TASS—It would be good if, as a result of the latest contacts, including Soviet-Iraqi ones, all states involved in the hostilities in the Gulf would as actively turn toward participation in a political settlement of the conflict, Aleksandr Dzasokhov, chairman of the Soviet parliamentary Committee on International Affairs, told the Soviet parliament today in a debate on Soviet Foreign Minister Alesksandr Bessmertnykh's report on the situation in the Gulf.

Dzasokhov read out a draft "address to the parliaments of all countries", in which the Soviet parliament expresses deep concern over the dramatic developments in the Gulf.

The Soviet parliamentarians are convinced that a peaceful solution to the crisis is possible. With this end in view it is essential to ensure an unconditional and immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and restore the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country, as is required by U.N. Security Council resolutions, the document says.

The Soviet parliament expresses support for the active politico-diplomatic efforts of the Soviet leadership aiming to resolve the Gulf conflict by peaceful means.

The contents of the address did not raise principled objections. After a short debate the parliamentarians instructed the committee to polish [the] document up "stylistically".

Reports Outline Supreme Soviet 19 Feb Session

Laptev Defends IZVESTIYA

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[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1630 GMT on 19 February carries a 30-minute "Legislative Diary" program conducted by announcer Lyudmila Semina, who says that the 19 February Supreme Soviet session discussed its agenda.

Semina says: "There are now 53 questions on the session's agenda. Here is what Ivan Dmitriyevich Laptev, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, said on the subject of other important problems which deputies suggested discussing at this session."

Laptev mentions various suggested points and explains why they were not included on the agenda. Semina notes that Deputy Alksnis was as persistent as usual.

A recording of an exchange during the session is played. Deputy Alksnis asks Laptev: "What is your attitude to the proposal that I made yesterday, especially since you are a former editor of IZVESTIYA, to discuss the IZVESTIYA question at the Supreme Soviet session?"

Laptev answers that the Supreme Soviet chairman can put this question to a vote. He asks Alksnis to properly study the law on the press and other mass media before putting forward his proposal. A shout of "quite right!" is heard from the hall. Laptev continues that no one can force an editorial collegium to publish material which the editorial collegium has refused.

Laptev says that in this regard, "a newspaper is run by an editorial collegium and this editorial collegium bears the full weight of responsibility for it, and for the chief editor in the first instance. If you are dissatisfied with the work of the newspaper, then raise the question of changing the leadership of the newspaper. To examine the question of the newspaper in general, however, it is appropriate to carry out, if only once a year, an analysis of the work for which the newspaper fights, what aims it defends."

Appeal on Gulf War Adopted

LD2002050791

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1730 GMT on 19 February carries a 25-minute "USSR Supreme Soviet: Legislative Diary" program, conducted by announcer Lyudmila Semina, dealing with proceedings at the 19 February USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow.

Semina opens her report by noting that five more issues were included on the agenda, making the total number of issues for consideration at the session to 53, including the implementation of the USSR law on banks and banking system; consideration of the draft law on basic principles for labor protection in the USSR; bringing into force the law on property in the USSR; the resolution on the abolition of acts on repressed peoples; and the draft law on refugees.

Semina introduces a five-minute recording of USSR Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh who speaks about the situation in the Persian Gulf and stresses that this conflict is the most serious regional conflict over the last decades.

Following a sharp discussion, an appeal to legislatures of all countries was adopted. The appeal calls for the cessation of the war in the Gulf.

Semina mentions that at the beginning of today's meeting, some deputies touched upon the activity of the Russian Legislature. The issue of the inadmissability of insulting remarks in the USSR legislature addressed to the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet was raised. A letter published on the initiative of Marshal Akhromeyev contained such remarks, Semina notes.

'Polemic' on Party Role in Baltics

LD1902144391 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1347 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Excerpts] At this morning's sitting of both chambers, the Union legislature began the final drawing up of the program for the session, which opened on Monday. [passage omitted]

Today, incidentally, was marked by a trenchant polemic over a question from Deputy Koltsov to USSR Justice Minister Lushchikov. The deputy was trying to elucidate the Justice Ministry's position regarding the role of the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party in setting up the National Salvation Committees in the Baltic republics.

Lukyanov, in the chair, suggested that the deputies should decide whether the issue should be examined or not. Koltsov's question did not get the majority required according to the standing instructions.

Lukyanov, Laptev Address Supreme Soviet Session

PM1902124591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by legislative correspondents A. Stepovoy and S. Chugayev: "Fifth Session Has Opened"]

[Text] On 18 February at 1000, A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, announced the opening of the fifth session of the Union legislature. On that day USSR President M. Gorbachev, the country's vice president and prime minister, and members of the government took part in the work of the session. The results of the registration showed that 437 members of the Supreme Soviet and 130 USSR people's deputies are taking part in the work of the sitting.

In his introductory speech, A. Lukyanov, who was in the chair, said that the new parliamentary marathon would be complex and difficult. Social tension remains in the country, prices are rising, and the economy is out of balance. In this situation the task of stabilizing the situation in the country and society rises in all its magnitude. During the parliamentary recess a number of presidential decrees and government resolutions were adopted which, in A. Lukyanov's opinion, were aimed at rectifying the situation. Unfortunately, over the past month there has been no improvement in the country's hot spots and the serious threat to the USSR's unity remains. The shots are not becoming silent and people are dying. Union parliament delegations have traveled to those regions.

Throughout the time that has elapsed since the end of the fourth session of the country's Supreme Soviet, A. Lukyanov stressed, the attention of the world public, including the Soviet public, has been riveted on the military operations in the Persian Gulf region. The situation here is distinguished by great acuteness. People are dying. There is a threat, the speaker stressed, that the multinational forces will exceed the UN mandate.

Turning then directly to the agenda, A. Lukyanov noted that the results of the present session will depend largely on the stabilization in society of the movement toward a market economy, on the creation of new state structures, and on the consolidation of order. He urged the parliamentarians to conduct constructive dialogue, to dwell in their work on the most important problems of our life, and to do everything possible to consolidate society. We have no other path, A. Lukyanov said in conclusion.

On instructions from the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, I. Laptev, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, gave the deputies information on the procedure for the work of the fifth session of the country's parliament.

The experience of previous sessions, he said, provides quite a few examples of the imprecise observance of the work schedule. To avoid a repetition of that sorry practice, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium proposes a rather different approach toward the organization of the session's work, tested, moreover, in several republican parliaments. If the Supreme Soviet agrees with the list of questions submitted for examination at the fifth session, I. Laptev stressed, then it will be the main document determining the union parliament's work at the present stage.

What has gone on the list? I. Laptev reported that initially 135 questions were submitted for examination at the session—by the USSR president, the parliament's permanent formations, and the deputies' groups. After a careful selection the Supreme Soviet Presidium suggested including 45 questions. The others are to be carried over to the sixth session. But that does not mean that the session is thus protecting itself from a discussion of topical issues which our reality might submit. If necessary any question can be put on the agenda.

In the "list" the problems are divided into five large blocks. They include questions of economic reform, social development, state building and the consolidation of legality, foreign policy question, and organizational questions. On the basis of the "list" parliament has been asked to determine its activity for the next month and to confirm the procedure for work at this time through 18 March. During this time it is proposed to examine 15 questions from all blocks of the "list." They include draft laws on the basic principles of entrepreneurship in the USSR, on destatization and privatization, on the procedure for entering and leaving the USSR, and on the procedure for resolving individual and labor disputes.

Is 15 draft laws a lot or a little? It is not hard to calculate that to examine them all the deputies will have to spend virtually all their time with three session sittings a week. In brief, a very rapid pace has been set.

Then I. Laptev spent an hour answering the deputies' numerous questions. After that the debates on the session's agenda were opened.

Nishanov Says No Plans for Presidential Rule

PM1902130391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "USSR Supreme Soviet Refutes"]

[Text] "Presidential rule will be introduced 23 or 24 February throughout the Soviet Union"—this sensational news is reported by GAZETA WYBORCZA correspondent L. Bojko, citing "a well-informed source in Moscow." According to L. Bojko's claim, the decision on this will be made at the USSR Supreme Soviet session scheduled for 18 February.

R. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities said: There are no such plans and there cannot be any. The session opens 18 February. On its first day questions regarding the agenda and the holding of a referendum on preserving the USSR will be considered.

Correspondent: Perhaps the question will be discussed on other days?

[Nishanov] Not in any circumstances. I say responsibly: Questions on any kind of presidential rule or the like are not being considered. The Supreme Soviet has no notion of this. I think that the Polish newspaper report is a sheer fabrication.

Interregional Deputies Group Discusses Agenda

LD1702145391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1412 GMT 17 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, 17 Feb (TASS)—The issues that are to be discussed at the fifth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet were at the center of attention of the meeting of the Interregional Group of Deputies that took place in Moscow on Saturday.

Judging by the statements of deputies who were present, they are especially alarmed by the complex sociopolitical situation in the country. The texts of the documents which the parliamentary group intends to present for consideration by the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet were discussed.

"Much concerns the representatives of the Interregional Group of Deputies," USSR Supreme Soviet member Yuriy Shcherbak told a TASS correspondent when commenting on the results of the sitting. "First, the strengthening of the danger from the right was declared, the attack on glasnost and the worsening of the economic situation in the country. In particular, it was pointed out that throughout the five years of perestroyka very serious mistakes were made which might simply lead to chaos. A resolution was adopted on the attitude toward the rise of prices and the social protection of the workers. It was decided to ask the prime minister what he meant when he spoke in one of his interviews about a 'plot' against our country. There was a serious conversation about a number of decrees by the president, such as the one on the reorganization of Gosteleradio, which members of the Interregional Group of Deputies considered unconstitutional. The question of the necessity of calling to account the organizers of the recent events in Lithuania was raised. The attitude of the parliamentary group toward the forthcoming referendum of 17 March was also discussed. Opinions were divided but, in the final analysis, it was proposed that this poll should not be held or, at least, that alternative questions should be formulated. The tasks of the Interregional Group of Deputies as an opposition faction both in the parliament and in the democratic movement were discussed."

Political & Social

Gorbachev Called 'Leader Without Power'

LD1902203891 Hamburg DPA in German 2019 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is playing the same kind of role as the Queen of England: leader without power. No one knows who has the power in the Soviet Union at present. Former Gorbachev adviser Oleg Bogomolov, who has now moved over to the staff of advisers of the Russian Supreme Soviet President Boris Yeltsin, expresses this view in an interview in the Berlin daily JUNGE WELT (Wednesday edition). The military-industrial complex is pressuring Gorbachev, and the old party structures are being reactivated and want revenge. "His (Gorbachev's) inner convictions do not seem to be unaffected by this," Bogomolov says, according to the newspaper.

The interview was supplied to DPA in an edited form.

Gorbachev, Pavlov Attend Directors Congress

LD1902143791 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] Only in qualitatively new economic conditions can the national economy be stabilized and the rhythm of industry be made to work normally. This opinion was expressed by participants in the all-Union Directors' Congress which opened in Moscow today. They see the formation and development of an all-Union market at the basis of the country's economic revival. USSR President Gorbachev and Prime Minister Pavlov are taking part in the work of the congress.

Gorbachev Interviewed at Congress

LD2002110591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Report by correspondent S. Medvedev at the All-Union Directors' Congress in Moscow on 19 February, including interview with USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] An All-Union Directors' Congress opened in Moscow today. It was convened on the initiative of the USSR Scientific and Industrial Union. This organization, founded by major state enterprises and associations and by the Union of Cooperators and Leaseholders, brings together more than 1,500 enterprises.

[Medvedev] Almost the same number of leaders of these enterprises gathered in the Columned Hall of the House of the Unions today. They represent not just state enterprises but leasing enterprises, joint firms, and cooperatives. The people running these production facilities—and they are regarded as key figures in implementing economic reform—began their great council today. How can industry be brought out of the crisis? How can ways be found of building the market mechanism into the real economy, which is currently undergoing a fairly serious recession?

Many works and factories are on the verge of shut-down and the country—in the opinion of Arkadiy Ivanovich Volskiy, the rapporteur—is going to go neither to the left nor to the right but in all directions at once if the confrontation is not stopped. The measures and decisions of the legislators and the executive—measures of a total nature—which place different sectors of the economy and different forms of ownership on the same plane were given as some of the main causes of the slowdown. Attempts to improve the system without changing its nature are doomed. Among the immediate measures, therefore, it was suggested that the complete transition to market relationships should not be rushed through—we are not yet ready—but at the same time the centralized provision of supplies to enterprises should be retained in part. That will provide breathing space for economic stabilization. Volskiy described this not as a conservative measure but as a tactical step.

Other conclusions include: Monetary reform is inevitable, but the present taxation system—and nearly all those who spoke agreed with this—does not provide any incentive for developing the initiative of entrepreneurs. There was also serious criticism of the measures directed against economic sabotage which has been undertaken by the government and the president. On the subject of privatization, sale is preferable to handing out the enterprises without payment.

Mikhail Sergeyevich, this is the "Vremya" program. Why did you respond to the invitation to work at this congress? You receive a lot of similar invitations and you chose to come to this one.

[Gorbachev] That is a good question and I will try to answer it, briefly, perhaps, but from positions of principle. Represented here, you know, is our country's corps of directors, and it is represented here in such a way that this is a congress, thus there are democratically-elected people here and I hope that they are the most worthy ones. Listening to the opinions of the corps of directors and its assessments of the political, economic, and social situation in the country and—I have to say—listening to the critical remarks and that makes up a substantial part of the work...

[Medvedev, interrrupting] Have there been some already?

[Gorbachev] There have been some already, many of them, and you have heard them. I think that this is very important, for what is taking place is a check of the way politics and practical activity fit together. I see that we are going to have to think over many proposals. I am certainly not inclined to react to all the observations, including the critical ones, to the complaints that things are difficult—things are difficult for everyone, this does not mean that we have to respond to every request by setting about its fulfillment. There is a great deal that is important, interesting, and significant.

[Medvedev] It seemed to me as though there was particularly strong criticism today of taxation policy.

[Gorbachev] I must say that much that we are doing today, and this includes the area of taxation policy, is dictated by the extraordinary conditions in which the country and our economy find themselves. Everything we do, therefore, is aimed at getting ourselves out of this extraordinary situation. It is natural that these measures, given that they are extraordinary, are solely for this period, and this was reflected in the economic agreement which was signed by the leaders of all republics. Now, therefore, everyone should exert all their strength, cooperating together to get themselves out of it—working with each other to get themselves out of this difficult situation. I think that we should have the kind of taxation policy that also gives a little bit more oxygen for the producer, for if the producer feels well and breathes fully and deeply, then one can expect there to be a different dynamic and different results, a different national income and different social (?conditions).

[Medvedev] I gathered from today's speeches that some people are short of oxygen.

[Gorbachev] Everyone is short of it today but even in these conditions they have to do their business.

[Medvedev] The last question, Mikhail Sergeyevich. What do you think, this new structure which is now being created, the Scientific and Industrial Union, is it not going to become a super-ministry, is it not going to become a super-organization which will trample upon these enterprises and, to a large extent, in a way, duplicating...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] Yes, I very nearly said Lord save us from yet another bureaucratic structure. No, I do not think it will be like that. On the contrary, the coming into being of these powerful associations is a sign that we are entering into the new economy and the new relationships. Organizations of this kind must not be allowed to take the place of the changing governmental structures which have to change over increasingly from command methods to economic methods—and that is taking place: such organizations must not take the places of the departing government structures. It is not just the content of the discussion that has been taking place that is important for me—important, too, is the fact that all the republics are represented here, and the sectors of the economy that have already taken shape, the state sector, the leaseholders, the mixed sector, the cooperators, from that point of view all of this is important. As you see, they are all in favor of a single economic area, of cooperation, of our new union. This is, in general, powerful support for the policy to which I personally adhere and for the country's leadership.

Gorbachev Discusses Economy With TU Leaders

LD1902190591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1740 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow 19 Feb (TASS)—There was a meeting between USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and leaders of the country's trade union movement in the Kremlin today.

In the course of their thorough, critical, and substantive talk, they discussed current problems in the social and economic situation in various regions of the Soviet Union. Those who spoke at the meeting stressed that attention should be paid to the negative phenomena that our economy abounds with today. The need to assert the normal labor rhythm of the country and to guarantee a reliable system of social protection to the workers was stressed. The opinion was expressed that it is necessary to do everything possible to prevent the profound changes that have now come to maturity—connected with the transition to a market economy—from affecting the well being of the workers and causing a drop in people's standards of living.

Gorbachev, addressing the meeting, shared with the trade union representatives his evaluation of the current stage of the life of our society. The ideas of their lofty responsibility toward the people on the part of both managers of the economy at all levels and of trade union leaders was voiced in a frank [otkrvennyy] form. Specific constructive proposals were supported, aimed at the political and economic stabilization of the economy and at active searches for civic accord.

USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov took part in the meeting.

Prime Minister Answers Viewers' Questions

LD1702042091 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1214 GMT 16 Feb 91

["Political Dialogues: Who is Who?" phone-in program with USSR Prime Minister Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov; viewers' questions are presented by reporter Igor Sergeyevich Fenusenko—live]

[Text] [Fenusenko] Greetings, esteemed comrade television viewers. "Who is Who" is on the air again. I would like to remind you that in this program we shall acquaint you with eminent state, political, and public figures of our country. And, what is very important, you always have the chance to have direct contact with them, with our aid, because this program is always live. Telephones have been installed in the studio and the numbers you will soon see on your screens. For now, I shall present our guest today.

You all know him very well. He is the lead of our government, Prime Minister Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov. I do not think that there is any particular need to present this man. A lot has already been reported about his appointment. The first telephone call has already come in, even before I have announced the telephone number. Evidently you can see it, 217-45-43. There is one number with 12 lines, so I ask you to put your questions to Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov, and I would like to say that after the announcement the day before yesterday on the "Vremya" program about this broadcast, almost all day yesterday our editors received calls, telegrams, and letters from you, and already we have several hundred questions for Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov. We shall ask him to answer them—not all of them, of course, but the most important ones, the most typical ones.

But first of all, I would remind you that Valentin Sergeyevich became head of government, chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, not long ago, just this year. But before this, he was for quite a long time minister of finances, he was a member of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. That is, this man is already an experienced leader and, therefore, his professional competence does not arouse any doubts in us and he possesses, I think, the full right to answer any questions concerning the activity of our government and the leading organs of our country.

Let us not waste any time, and let us move on right away to a question which concerns everyone, since Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov was appointed to this post not simply to replace the former head of government, but as you know, a radical restructuring of governmental bodies is taking place. Not only has Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, the former head of government, resigned, but an overall restructuring of the government is taking place. A Cabinet of Minister has appeared in place of the former Council of Ministers.

Therefore, I would like, Valentin Sergeyevich, taking account of the general interest in the country in these changes, to ask you first of all: As head of the new government, how do you see it? What do you expect from the future composition of the Cabinet? By the way, we do not yet know the Cabinet, we know only you and your deputies and not all of these, either. But everyone knows that the session of the Supreme Soviet opens on Monday [18 February] and the new candidates will be presented there, evidently. I do not wish to put you in an uncomfortable position and ask who, personally, you would like to see in the composition of the Cabinet. Evidently, this would not be completely ethical. But, at least, I would ask you to share with our television viewers some of your ideas, your thoughts about how you would like to see your Cabinet, and how it will differ from the former Council of Ministers, broader or less broad, and what its functions will be.

[Pavlov] Of course, the questions you are asking are natural, but at the same time they are not easy for such a meeting, since the issue of replacing the Council of Ministers with a Cabinet of Ministers is not just a simple formality. For the Council of Ministers was a body which was set up, in essence, 70 years ago in the conditions of those times, and it has developed logically alongside the development of our country. It reached its peak as the supreme executive and administrative body.

[Pavlov] Further, I should say that those people are correct who note that the Council of Ministers, I would say, to a considerable extent, really fulfilled the role of the Supreme Soviet—that is, of legislative power—and executive power. Its actions were both legislative and executive in character. It both commissioned the music and played it. But at the same time, evidently, it came about that such an executive role, as applied to our economy, became more and more of a dead end. Because, in principle, ideally, such a system is somewhere in the mid-seventies when each main directorate knew not only what a plant was doing, but also what equipment it had, what machine tools, in what shop they were located, what their shift task was, and what the wages were; that is, every detail. Therefore, in such a system, as the economy developed it could not fail to come to a dead end sooner or later.

[Fenusenko] And all the more so in such a vast country as ours.

[Pavlov] Of course, that is logical. Therefore, one way or another it had to be replaced, and this replacement logically springs from the general model, essentially, of administration of the national economy. It is not the national economy which should be adapted to the organizational structure, but the organizational structure should logically flow from this model.

Therefore, the change is primarily determined by the fact that the Council of Ministers can today no longer substitute for legislative power. We are moving on to a deliniation of the functions of legislative, executive, and judicial power. In this sense, the Cabinet of Ministers is becoming the executive power. At the same time, the Council of Ministers was not sufficiently timely in adopting decisions, on the one hand, and not sufficiently strict in its decisions, on the other.

In more peaceful times, one could limit oneself to a Cabinet of Ministers without linking it with presidential rule. But today the particular feature of the Cabinet is that it enters logically into the functions of presidential power. That is, it is not directly answerable to the Supreme Soviet, but answers to the president of the country. Therefore, in this sense, as the organizing and executive body, it also directly shares its functions with the president.

[Fenusenko] Excuse me for interrupting, but nonetheless the Supreme Soviet will confirm your ministers, as was the case with the previous composition, will it not?

[Pavlov] The president appoints them in consultation with the republics, in the person of the Federation Council, and then they are accepted or not accepted by the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet must express its attitude. It should either confirm or not confirm. The main thing is that the logical development of the economy and the new tasks facing the economy require, one way or another, changes in the composition of those powers which the Council of Ministers carried out and which the Cabinet of Ministers will carry out. Why? Well, one cannot put bounds around the boundless, as you understand. Therefore, the questions which can be fulfilled only by the top echelons of power began, one way or another, gradually to drown in the day-to-day operational work. That is, operational work, precisely because it is day by day willy-nilly, all the time, squeezes out work for the long term. This long term, as an unresolved task, returns to this day-to-day business with sharp corners and rapids which one then begins to stumble over each day. A vicious circle comes about. What is intended in respect of this is that we must target the Cabinet of Ministers first and foremost upon what only the higher echelon can do.

[Fenusenko] Will the structure be like that of the previous Council of Ministers, will there be more ministries, or fewer, or what?

[Pavlov] No, no, understand, Igor Sergeyevich, that in this respect the most important thing is the notion that we have a long-term structure of the Cabinet which is aimed toward the completion of the reorganization; and we have an interim structure, that is, the structure we need today, precisely by virtue of the fact that we are at an interim stage. In principle, therefore, it is not a matter of whether there are more or fewer ministries. Incidentally, there are masses of appeals, telegrams, and letters, collective ones, coming in on this very question, from organizations, from collectives and associations, we are even getting them from party bodies, demanding that the ministries be kept. There are some that say that if there is to be no ministry, then the coal miners will go on strike.

[Fenusenko] Well, here is a specific question from Valeriy Pavlovich Kasev, deputy general director of the production association Chimvolokno, Svetlogorsk: Will there be in your government, in your Cabinet, a ministry of the chemical and petroleum refining industry, or will there be a state committee, or some other financially autonomous formation? Is it too early to give such information?

[Pavlov] Well, you see, I can say that in principle we proceed from the basis that, of course, the country's government is simply obliged to be concerned with the chemical industry. But everything depends on what you understand by the government concerning itself with the chemical industry. If you understand by this that that we will allocate things...decide which raw materials to supply to whom, how much, whether to supply any additionally, what they should produce, where and how contracts should be set up between industrial enterprises that are essentially closely-linked technologically, and that we will tell one to produce more and another to produce less, then the Cabinet of ministers is not needed for such functions. Then it would not be necessary to take arms, as they say. For this reason, from the point of view that here it is necessary to fulfill the chemicalization of the country, which we have talked about many times over many years, which we have developed—in general there were some quite good programs, but every time for some reason we forgot to fulfill them—the Cabinet will concern itself with this question, and also the body which will fulfill this function is provided for in the Cabinet.

[Fenusenko] Fine. Since I am a journalist I will take advantage of my professional membership of this clan—I must ask a question from Yuriy Morozov from Moscow. He wants to know, concerning the press law, who is to become, he asks, the guarantor of the unconditional functioning of this law. Here also is a question to you, Valentin Sergeyevich. Is it proposed to transform the existing State Committee on the Press into the Ministry of the Press and Information, or not? What do you think, as the leader of the government?

[Pavlov] On the whole, I hesitate whether to confess or not, but on the whole I confess, that yes, I am putting forward such a proposal: that we should, nevertheless, have a Ministry of Information; but at the same time, we have not thought through this idea to the end from the point of view of whether this must be a ministry, or whether it should be, let's say, a national information agency. Well, something like the USIA, or let's say, the information service of the FRG chancellor—we are studying these structures carefully just now, how they function, what suits us, comparing, of course, our reality, our possibilities.

[Fenusenko] This is very good, by the way. I beg your pardon if my comment seems somewhat impolite, but the fact that you are studying foreign experience is useful: We have too often tried to re-invent the wheel, and a square one at that, and to do everything our own way rather than the way others do it, and there were not always grounds for doing so, isn't that so?

[Pavlov] You know, Igor Sergeyevich, I'll tell you that if the country wants, generally speaking, to catch up, it must never repeat the path that others have trodden; it absolutely must orient itself toward the goal which the countries ahead of it have reached. Only thus can one emerge at the same level; otherwise one will always be watching one's train pulling out of the station.

[Fesunenko] Valentin Sergeyevich, as I said, a mass of questions has come in, and the first telephoned questions are now coming. I have here a question posed yesterday. There are all sorts of interesting and curious questions, ideas, and suggestions.

For example, (Ivan Mikhailovich Aleksandrov), who lives in the town of Rodniki, Ivanovskaya oblast, has a plan for creating an absolutely new, ecologically clean engine, which is rather reminiscent of a perpetual motion machine. That's interesting. He gives his address; I will hand it to your aides afterward; they may get in touch. I don't know how interesting such a plan may be, but in our times, interesting ideas like this should at least be studied.

Economist (Fridenberg), who lives in Moscow, No. 18 [name indistinct] writes, quote: Suggest a simple method of ensuring reliable social welfare for the country's entire population, namely more effective introduction of privatization of property, as a result of strengthening the finance system and preventing the development of the economic sabotage virus. The measures I suggest could give the economy several hundred billion rubles, he says. This all seems to be a bit fantastic, if one remembers that our total turnover is about 150 billion rubles, I think. However that may be, though, he insists on you inviting him for a personal conversation.

Messages like these are coming in, which testifies to the interest of television viewers, the public, our people, in today's program. For the moment, though, I think we should put aside ecologically clean engines and miraculous ways of reorganizing our economy.

If you have no objections, let's start by talking about a subject of concern for the whole country over the last few weeks—our meeting with you cannot fail to mention this, without doubt—namely, an event which shook the country—we will not exaggerate—the event with which you, in effect, began your activities as head of government. Of course, I mean the exchange of banknotes which took place with such giddy speed and which caused, in general, of course—let's look the truth in the face—massive inconvenience and unpleasantness, and gave rise to shock and stress, and so on and so forth. Questions are coming in and came in yesterday, too. Was it all done properly? How do you assess the exchange campaign carried out, for example? Some comrades—for instance, Comrade (Telechik), from Kamchatka; (Broyovko), from Kharkov, the chairman of the soviet of a labor collective, he doesn't say which; and a number of other comrades—I won't quote them all for it would take too long—ask: Why was the very first stage not organized very well, sometimes organized downright badly? Pensioners were surprised in the evening and in the morning rushed to the savings banks, but on the first day the savings banks exchanged virtually none of the old money for the new. It was only toward the end of the first day, and the second day, that they started to exchange it. People pushed, and shoved, and so on. Give us an honest and self-critical answer: How do you assess all of this?

[Pavlov] What can I say, Igor Sergeyevich? There is, of course, a great deal to be said on this, and I probably know more than anyone else among those who was doing the dispatching and the telephoning, and that is quite natural, because all this information is being collected for us. I would be acting against my conscience were I to say that when we were preparing this...

[Fesunenko, interrupting] This measure.

[Pavlov] Measure? I don't like that word.

[Fesunenko] Operation. There's a splendid word: operation.

[Pavlov] Yes. So, we, of course, knew that we would be causing certain categories of the population a few unpleasant hours, to put it bluntly. We were quite aware of the costs. In the case at hand, I would simply ask people to understand, because we understood that these costs were unavoidable. The fact is that we were compelled to carry out the operation at such a speed. I am sometimes asked the following double question: Why did you not exchange the 25's and 10's...

[Fesunenko, interrupting] Yes, indeed, that question has been asked...

[Pavlov, interrupting] And are you going to exchange them, too?

[Fesunenko] Yes, Yes, quite right, you are anticipating a question I have here from very many people.

[Pavlov] Because they...[changes thought] I have been asked this question, too, so I guessed that I would be asked it in one way or another. First, I should say that we did not exchange the 25's and 10's not because it would in our view be wrong, for example, nor because there was no need to do it. There were two main reasons here. The first reason: We were working within a very strict time limit, because—I would like simply to stress once again—this operation was not in itself carried out in pursuit of the aims of confiscation, as some people are trying to convince us. This is easy to understand. What sort of confiscation is it is one ruble is exchanged for another for you. This is not confiscation, and certainly not a reform. The strict time limit did not allow us to prepare for the exchange of 25 and 10 ruble notes. About three times more notes than we managed to print should have been printed. This is essentially why, in some places, we were unable to provide ready money in the required quantity. At the same time, however, I should tell you that these were not the only reasons—nor even the prime reasons—for the social costs that our people had to suffer in certain places. I must point out that not everyone, probably, is aware that, in many cases, the delay in carrying out the exchange was caused by resistance.

[Fesunenko] You mean, when people came to the savings bank in the morning and stood there until five in the evening...

[Pavlov, interrupting] They were told: No!

[Fesunenko] That there aren't any.

[Pavlov] No. Why? Because, for example, when through our own channels we gave our...

[Fenusenko, interrupting] Instructions...

[Pavlov, interrupting] Instructions in the evening on how and what to do. Decisions came out in parallel, let's say. For example, the Finance Ministry of the Russian Federation, the minister, then sends out a telegram: Be there, but do not do anything until you get special instructions. There were such decisions to refrain from carrying out the exchange until receiving special instructions in several regions of the Baltic.

[Fenusenko] I had not heard of that. It is curious.

[Pavlov] That is to say, why? Yes, and in the Russian Federation, for half of the first day they didn't know whether to carry it out or not. There were transparent, so to say, open instructions, and there were ones that were not. The decision of the Russian Federation on carrying out the exchange was adopted at the Council of the Federation only half way through 23 January. But, our regions are not homogeneous today from the point of view of their attitudes toward, let us say, the center - or the centers. Where the directive was accepted for fulfillment without question, there were either no problems or very few of them. But, where the center gave ambiguous instructions and people didn't know which of them to carry out and sat and waited for supplementary instructions, that's where there were holdups. That, I may say, applies fully to Moscow city. I must say that here there is completely indisputable information that it was different in different places, but in Moscow there were certainly more banknotes than needed. Why? Because Moscow is one of the supply centers for practically the whole territory.

[Fenusenko] As a mint?

[Pavlov] As a mint. Moscow printed the new 50-ruble notes, and the whole order was made up in Moscow. There was more than enough money in Moscow.

[Fenusenko] But, people suffered on the first day, especially poor retirees.

[Pavlov] You know, it wasn't that poor retirees suffered especially, but that it was only them, because the whole problem was connected exclusively with people who got their money at savings banks or at the post office. As for the exchange in the production collectives, as a rule no question arose there. In that sense...[changes thought] for some reason, everyone now is carefully avoiding and keeping quiet about the general aims of the exchange. Again, somehow we are avoiding them. But, I must tell you that...

[Fenusenko, interrupting] Actually, there is such a question. You spoke of the aims of the exchange, in particular, in TRUD. I have literally just received a note from (Tamila Yakovlevna Rezitskaya), from Moscow, who would like to have some more detailed explanations on this article. Is there any additional information, she asks, on the subject of the figures that appeared in your TRUD newspaper interview on the objectives of the exchange?

[Pavlov] I must say that, in that time, I have met—to deal with other matters, of course, but we did not sidestep this issue—anyway, I have met all the heads of our gold extracting industry, such as Yakutalmaz, Severovostokzoloto, or with such collectives as our motor vehicle giants: the Volga and Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Works and the Kama and Zaporozhye ones. That's to say, collectives—and the chemicals and tractor building collectives—collectives where there are between something like 50,000 and 100,000 workers. All of them with one voice gave me one figure: During the exchange, their collectives collected and handed over money worth about 12-13 days' wages. That's to say, the workers didn't even have two weeks' worth of pay. The question arises: Who is it then, in that case, who still has not brought us at least 8 zillion by today? That is the amount that simply has not been handed over. Then, there is another 21 which have to be investigated.

[Fenusenko] 21 billion?

[Pavlov] Yes. Today, we are always saying and appealing to certain persons who should show their civic character and courage in this matter to look into this affair very carefully.

[Fenusenko] I suppose you couldn't give an example?

[Pavlov] I knew this would crop up, so I brought it all with me. Who is it aimed against? It is always easy to understand something with a specific example. I'll try to look at different regions, so as not to offend anyone.

Since Moscow usually reacts very painfully to our words, I won't touch it. Let's take Moscow oblast. We have, in Khimkenskiy rayon, for example, a public organization called (Investrazvitiye). It has average daily receipts in its till of 100 rubles, but they exchanged almost, dammit, 1.6 million. MZHK [expansion unknown] building cooperative, in Khimki, has 200 roubles floating [limit sredney vyruchki].

[Fesunenko] What does that mean? Let's explain to ordinary television viewers. What does floating mean?

[Pavlov] Any organization has in its till a sum of ready money which it usually spends daily on...[changes thought] if someone has to go on a business trip or someone has to go to the shop to buy something for the organization, there are transport expenses to be paid, or someone has to go on leave.

[Fesunenko] This building cooperative had 100 rubles, you said? Per day?

[Pavlov] Two hundred, I think. Two hundred for its daily operations. In the morning, it brought us 118,000.

[Fesunenko] Where did it come from?

[Pavlov] We have to ask people, looking them straight in the eye. No one will say anything if there is a reasonable explanation. I haven't any questions. But, let them look people in the eye and ask, and they will tell their own kind. We aren't sending prosecutors to them or anything. Let them look their own people in the eye. How will this all look?

Or take another, perhaps not very good, example: In Mogilev, Shop No. 11 has a float of 3,000.

[Fesunenko] Per day?

[Pavlov] Per day, 3,000. It handed over 180,000 rubles in 50- and 100-ruble notes. Or in Bendery, for example, the Park of Culture and Rest has a float of 200 rubles per day. It handed over 21,000, and all of it, for some reason, in 50- and 100-ruble notes.

[Fesunenko] That's to say, they were lying around somewhere in money boxes?

[Pavlov] I wouldn't say they were lying around. I would say they were servicing a completely different turnover. I don't want to make premature accusations, because one shouldn't second guess, because after all there are actual people involved, but there are examples where specific people can be named, where everything is already absolutely clear. For example, we have the (Sergaliyskiy) section of the savings bank, which was headed by Comrade (Yeldashev), for example. He carried out the exchange, but predated it, and with his salary of 200 rubles he tried to exchange 3.8 million.

[Fesunenko] Personally?

[Pavlov] Personally. I think you can judge for yourselves who it was aimed against and draw your own conclusions. I can tell, too, many stories about this, but I think that if anyone is interested he can take part in the work of the commission in his rayon and call in and ask how (?they are getting on).

[Fesunenko] Valentin Sergeyevich, this is clear; these are all quite convincing examples. But, tell us please, I think everyone wants to know this: Why was this ceiling of trust, so to say, so low? Why could a pensioner exchange only 200 without having to explain and an employee only their average monthly wage and not more then 1,000? For all the rest of the money which people keep temporarily just in case, they had to write some kind of explanatory note? Some two weeks and a few days ago, before the exchange, I received 2,500 in payment for a film, in notes, and I also had to sign a piece of paper to show I am not a swindler, to sign a piece of paper that I [word indistinct] I don't remember exactly. I had all this money returned, but a lot of people didn't. For example, the workers at the Scientific Research Institute for the Timber Industry in Kirovskiy rayon are asking: When are we finally going to get the money we handed in for exchange? I am wondering now. Let's discuss how many bank and office workers and employees throughout the country were engaged [words indistinct] in this terrible, exhausting work of reading all our explanatory notes? This one was saving up for a motorbike, that one for a set of furniture? After all, it is purely a formality if a person has 1,200 and has to justify those extra 200 rubles. Surely, the ceiling could have been raised to 5,000 or 10,000? The ceiling of trust?

[Pavlov] A ceiling of trust is, generally speaking, a relative concept. Therefore, our criteria were purely economic. We made our calculations. Today, as you no doubt know, wages are in the region of R280.

[Fenusenko] Approximately, yes.

[Pavlov] Yes, but, of course, an individual cannot use all this R280 for his living expenses, because he has to pay taxes and the costs of travel on trams, commuter trains, or buses. He also has to pay for municipal services, and so on. On average, about 25 percent of his pay goes on things like this. Hence, in practice, he remains with about R200-210. Some have more; others have less; but, the figure is around R200.

[Fenusenko] Then, he goes to the market, and half of that disappears!

[Pavlov] Yes. But, let's assume he has R200 left. He has to live on R200, but he also has to support others out of this sum. In our country, the family coefficient is around 3.2-3.3. In other words...

[Fenusenko, interrupting] Excuse me. What do you mean by the family coefficient?

[Pavlov] Each salary supports 1.5 individuals.

[Fenusenko] I see. That's your technical term.

[Pavlov] Yes. After all, you cannot forget the family. They may be getting smaller in our country—at any rate, in the European part and the Baltic republics, etc. We have very many families where there is only one child.

[Fenusenko] Yes.

[Pavlov] Therefore, the family coefficient is roughly of this order. One child is supported by two working parents. That figure is averaged out, of course. But, basically, R200 has to support 1.5 individuals.

[Fenusenko] I see.

[Pavlov] You can work out from this how much an individual spends, even if he does not save anything. He spends roughly R120- 140. It's within that range, without going into detail. Today, his subsistence minimum, so to speak, his usual day-to-day spending, comes to this.

[Fenusenko] R120-140 a month?

[Pavlov] A month. That is how the real situation is developing today. You can't hide from the figures. You can't get away from them. Judge for yourself. What is R500? R500 is three times the face value of this sum. If you take retirees, you see that the average old age pension is currently R95. For retirees, the figure we took is five times the face value of their pension. In other words, it represents almost six months pension, in real terms. Is this a lot? Or a little?

Naturally, the question of what today's criteria really are arises. Everybody judges whether this is a lot or a little by how much he, himself, receives. But, if you take the majority of the country's population, you will see that the question did not arise at all for the majority of the country's population. Remember what I told you earlier. The Likhachev works collected funds amounting to only 12 days' pay. Also, it should be pointed out that the entire exchange was completed on the second day. Then, people sat around for another day, waiting for the next opportunity to exchange banknotes. Admittedly, by the end of the day - if my memory serves me right—the amount of money exchanged there was about R12 million on the first day. Then, there was an interval of roughly 24 hours. By the end of the second day, some people who had got left out, let's say, or who were late, brought another R7 million.

[Fenusenko] Valentin Sergeyevich, one viewer suggests—quite sensibly, I think—that the answers should, perhaps, be shorter, so that more questions can be asked.

[Pavlov] Fair enough.

[Fenusenko] You do not mind, do you?

[Pavlov] Let's give it a try.

[Fenusenko] In that case, to wind up this topic, we will round off this problem, the problem of the banknote exchange. After all, the exchange was completed. You can't bring back the past. The banknotes have already become museum exhibits. But, let's say a few more words about savings books, about savings deposits. There is a large number of questions. When will the money credited to savings accounts be returned? That is a question I have just seen. It refers to those depositors who have gone over the limit. Many institutions credited these sums to savings accounts. Also, people are worried about the fate of deposits at savings banks, in connection with this R500 limit. It is only for six months, admittedly, but people are afraid that this may be followed by some kind of new reform, which might see the withdrawal of R5 or R10 notes, or some other sum.

[Pavlov] Igor Sergeyevich, to conclude this topic, I would say that we really do not intend to return to this question. When I spoke about this, I said that, if it had been technically feasible to organize the exchange of R10 and R25 notes, we would have done this. I quite deliberately stated that we were restrained by the time factor. The time factor did not allow us, on the one hand, to prepare for and tackle the question of exchanging these notes. Basically, it did not allow us—let's put it this way—to give painstaking thought to some organizational aspects of the exchange which we conducted. There were some points which, maybe if we had had more time, we would have handled. But, we were very much afraid that there might be another leak of information. Those who say that around November and December there was a leak of information are right. In this sense, it was very localized; it was short-lived. Therefore, clearly it undermined confidence in a way, on the one hand. On the other hand, we managed to extinguish it, using our own methods so to speak.

[Fenusenko] Incidentally, there have already been questions about this. Just a moment, I can't remember where I put it. Weren't the people responsible for the leak punished? Weren't they identified?

[Pavlov] Unfortunately, I cannot say anything about this at the moment.

[Fenusenko] All right.

[Pavlov] But, the point is that, if we had delayed yet again, the entire package of prepared measures could have become meaningless.

[Fenusenko] That's clear. Now, there's a whole series of questions about your interview for TRUD, in which you also justified the exchange of banknotes by referring to our foreign economic ties, to pressure and threats from foreign banking systems, and so on and so forth. This question is asked by [name indistinct] and a number of other viewers. If it's no bother, would you mind giving further information about your quite interesting and, I would even say, sensational remarks which were published in TRUD last Tuesday.

[Pavlov] First, Igor Sergeyevich, many people are now trying to dissassociate themselves from this, saying they were not involved, that nothing of the kind happened. In the first place, I can always counter this with a simple piece of Russian folk wisdom: If I'm not involved, I say nothing and...

[Fenusenko, interrupting] Keep quiet.

[Pavlov] I keep quiet. At any rate, if I know nothing, if I'm not involved in such business, why should I poke my nose in? That's the first thing. Second, I think that tourism in our country has developed to quite an extent, especially with the CEMA countries. Several million of our citizens have visited the socialist countries. I don't think I need remind you what happened there and what is happening now, from the point of view of exchanging Soviet money.

[Fenusenko] In other words, they exported money and left it there.

[Pavlov] That's not all. I can tell you, as a practical example, that open banking institutions are there. Exchange rates are on display there, for the benefit of purchasers and vendors of Soviet money. These are found on central squares. They are official offices, not something under the counter. They are found in Vienna. There is now a completely open market in Bratislava and Prague. Some say the same thing happens in Warsaw, Poland.

[Fenusenko] Why is our Soviet money sought after in Prague or Vienna, when our money is constantly losing its value, the exchange rate is falling because of inflation, and so on?

[Pavlov] That is the question. Everybody is now demanding to know who wants the Soviet Ruble if it is not worth anything. After all, we are in favor of perestroyka; we are seeking support for the new exchange rate. Therefore, it is absurd to talk about malicious plots. But, the world of business is quite a brutal one, to put it bluntly. Nobody involved in it does anything out of love for art, so to speak. If these notes were not worth anything, I'm afraid you would not get a single cent out of any businessmen for them. Therefore, since they are being bought up, they are being bought up for a quite specific reason, above all, to make a profit. It is no coincidence, therefore—I think everybody knows this, anybody who has ever seen this going on—that these notes are being bought up for next to nothing. They are being bought at, basically, the black market rate, at the computer rate. Such a term exists. This is a reference to the difference in the price of computers or video recorders abroad and in the Soviet Union. They are not being bought at the real rate, which reflects the relationship between prices for the overall mass of goods, above all for raw materials. Have you never asked yourself why, on so many occasions, there is such a booming trade in jewelry outside customs posts? Such a thing crops up there from time to time.

That is due to the fact that, even with our prices for the precious metals and gems which we keep here—it should be said outright that they are even a bit higher than world prices, than those generally accepted in retail trade—nevertheless, we cannot placate the market at all. Why is that? A normal, free working person cannot afford to buy such things. Everybody knows that.

[Fenusenko] That is clear.

[Pavlov] But there are gigantic queues. So, somebody has sums of money on hand which make these prices look like nothing. The questions arises: Naturally, if I buy Soviet rubles, then for me these goods are goods which I can sell for a profit. It is quite obvious that this money, in one way or another, will return to the Soviet Union and that the goods leave the Soviet Union. I will give you the following simple example. The Turkish authorities, in a business connection, asked the Soviet Government to help them organize the servicing and use of Soviet television sets.

[Fenusenko] Splendid.

[Pavlov] Splendid, apart from one small detail: The Soviet Union has never sold television sets to Turkey.

[Fenusenko] Has never sold television sets?!

[Pavlov] When we asked what volume of servicing was required, on the whole, there turned out to be two million sets there.

[Fenusenko] Where did they come from?

[Pavlov] Yes, a very interesting question arises, does it not? But, there is just one answer: smuggling.

[Fenusenko] Smuggling, and quite considerable.

[Pavlov] When we speak about it, as it were, about that aspect of the question, we should remember this. When we say that banks have joined in here, then the initial period of exchange, when ready money was exchanged, has recently been reinforced by exchange in a more civilized form, when exchange by means of bank documents has been added.

[Fenusenko] [Words indistinct] (?big) banking operations.

[Pavlov] That is to say, as I was saying, banking structures got involved in this business. First, our commercial banks began to seek various joint enterprises, differing so to speak, from the new...

[Fenusenko, interrupting] To seek a new outlet there...

[Pavlov, interrupting] Structures to seek an outlet there. Work has already begun here which is evaluated at tens of billions of rubles.

[Fenusenko] Could you give a specific example? We journalists are, on the whole, always very precise people. For instance, (Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Zholger), from Kiev, asks upon what you have based, so to speak, or are maintaining that the West, Western banks, are trying to undermine our economic system, or perhaps even our commercial banks mentioned above? Do you have any concrete material? Or isn't it worth publishing yet?

[Pavlov] Igor Sergeyevich, believe me, there is, of course, material.

[Fenusenko] There is?

[Pavlov] I have to say that, in such matters, in commercial business on the whole, it is not customary to reveal the sources of such confidential information. Why? Because it is very easy to follow them up, and the person or the organization which has [words indistinct].

[Fenusenko] [words indistinct]

[Pavlov] Well, you may think he has taken cover. But nevertheless, I realize that if I give you such a simple answer, the television viewers and you will say, well....

[Fenusenko, interrupting] We won't say anything, but we will think it.

[Pavlov] You will think it. Therefore, I will accept that example. There you are, even the last one now. Well, there is a Swiss firm called (?SISS) consultants which proposes a deal for the sale of 10 billion rubles at the rate of $6.85, there you are.

[Fenusenko] 10 billion rubles? Yes, indeed.

[Pavlov] But take the obligation of the Russian commercial bank to pay on demand R100 million. A letter of guarantee is given....

[Fenusenko, interrupting] Well, yes, that's right. And there are probably other firms, too?

[Pavlov] Well, take a Turkish-Chita firm offering R9 billion, the Austrian firm (?Stallecher] and company which offers the (?I coop) joint venture in the city of Lvov, it offers it R1.5 billion and so on and so forth. And so, one can—I have got a whole list here, but I don't think there's any sense particularly in making any more information public and, besides, there isn't the airtime for that.

[Fenusenko] That is true. So let's go over to the next, the second large group of questions.

[Pavlov] Igor Sergeyevich, you know, I would say to you that I was very surprised by the reaction of some quite serious banks. All of a sudden they began to say and to state that this was not the case, that they had nothing to do with that at all, that this was impossible. Let's be frank. That amazed me somewhat because we hadn't named banks or—we simply said that we knew of major deals which had led to the transfer of rubles through some countries. To where? Well, we know, let's say that French citizens have addressed and organized several deals to redirect, as the saying goes, through Hungary, to the Netherlands, and from there to Switzerland. But not a single banking cooperation or company was named anywhere. For some reason they began to disassociate themselves very actively in advance. That only makes me suspicious.

[Fenusenko] Fine, Valentin Sergeyevich, thank you. I now propose that we go on to the next set of questions. There was a whole host of notes, I can see, yesterday and today. That is what concerns every Soviet person, concerns me, and of course, concerns you because all of us—me, you, and all of us—live on our wages, on our labor earnings and well, what is happening with prices now cannot but concern every Soviet person, regardless of whether he receives R100 a month or R1,000. But, naturally, it is of greater concern to those who receive R100 a month. We received a huge number of letters asking for explanations of the price reform which is beginning. People do not quite understand. On the one hand, it has been said already on more than one occasion that the price reform, but well, price reform is understood as price rises, seemed somewhat to be a matter of the more or less distant future. On the other hand, there literally has been a recent landslide of prices increasing, rising—be it contractual prices, commercial prices, and so on and so forth. There are also a whole host of statements from official representatives of the government, of the Ministry of Finances, of various levels, to the effect that there will be compensation for our greater expenditure. It is even a question of preliminary compensation.

And well, just look, naturally I won't read out all the telegrams, but I would like to mention Semen Pimenovich Kondyukov from Murmansk who asks directly what is the point of raising the price of products and giving compensation at the same time. Well, it would seem that one would consume the other. That is a question from an ordinary television viewer. Valentin Nikolayevich Furmanov, chief of planning department from Murmansk, asks whether the living wage will be taken into account when compensation is being calculated, and what is the living wage at present? How is that question being decided for northerners? Well, Gennadiy Petrovich Nikitin has just sent a question in from Moscow: Why haven't the president or his cabinet of ministers not yet brought themselves to raise prices, but are trying to place that decision upon the republican structure of power? And he asks further whether that is not reckoned to produce the Prunskiene effect in the republics; that is to say, the heads of republican ministers may roll because of that, and so on and so forth. Pikareyvich from Odessa, Lozhnikov from Moscow, Postnikov from Moscow. Comrades, I won't read out the whole host of questions on this theme. And so, to summarize: Nevertheless, when will the reform of prices, truly organized by the center, by the government, by you, begin, and how will that reform, so to speak, be tied to compensation?

[Pavlov] Well, what should I say to you, Igor Sergeyevich? The first thing is that people should understand quite clearly that apart from 15 November last year when the decision to raise the prices of gold, precious metals, crystal, carpets, expensive furs, and some other items of that kind was adopted, the central government did not adopt a single decision on raising prices, apart from the decision of the State Committee for Prices on matches. Therefore, everything should have been done in an honest way. But, one must also see the other side of the question, that on the one hand there is, I would say, a very great wave in our country which on the one hand is engulfing our shop counters and on the other hand does not make it possible to balance in a real way the budget of our local soviets—by dint of the fall in the general volume of production, by dint of the growth of losses connected with completely different reasons, but one of the reasons is the lowering of discipline. And well, in one way or another, today is the economic background to the adoption by the local soviets which deliberately exploited that resistance or that confrontation which has been dubbed "the war of laws" when every subordinate states that his decisions take priority over those of higher bodies of power, be it a body of soviet power, so to speak, legislative, executive, or any body of economic leadership.

But this has become an everyday practice. So, in these conditions a great many local bodies, enterprises, and associations are committing what amounts to direct violations. This has become a mass phenomenon. But I think you don't have to go far. No decisions to raise prices have been made by anyone in Moscow except the Moscow Council. We [changes thought] No one in any of the country's territories has taken the step of reforming rents. The Mossoviet is making those decisions, and considers that this is within its competence and that it has the right to do so. Well, the fact that we're raising the mark-up on vodka and not the price of vodka itself—we're adding 300-400 percent—makes no difference to the purchaser. What matters to him is how much he pays to the cashier. So, this is actually a general question I would say of legislative discipline and order. Such a movement promises nothing good. It is one more reason, actually, for the decision to reform prices to be made, and made as soon as possible if only to put these matters in order. But from this point of view, it only makes sense to make this decision if one condition is met, if the confrontation ceases. After all, the main condition that follows from the notion of the need to preserve a single economic space in the union dictates the necessity of uniform pricing. I'm not talking about sameness of prices, but about uniform pricing. And that also presupposes preserving what, as a matter of fact, we've always had, uniform principles in the approach to social security.

[Fenusenko] Valentin Sergeyevich, I do hope you'll excuse me. I'm terribly afraid of seeming tactless, but a note has just been brought, a very intelligent note I think, from Olga Filippovna Lebedeva of Moscow, who says we've got to think about getting on with our lives in the present, and not talk about what is past.

[Pavlov] Well....

[Fenusenko, interrupting] Anyway, what are we going to do about prices and compensation?

[Pavlov] You know, I don't want to justify, as it were, this whole situation which has arisen. I want to say that practically what we're talking about today is that unless all the republics agree among themselves that they will pursue a uniform price policy and a uniform policy in the sphere of wages and social security, it is impossible to carry out universal measures to reform prices because this will engender disproportions which will create, I think, an exceptional situation for speculation. I just want to remind you that you know what the experience of 15 November showed.

[Fenusenko] Yes?

[Pavlov] When they were made on 15 November some of the republics introduced....

[Fenusenko, interrupting] You're referring to the duties on gold?

[Pavlov] On gold, yes. Well, so in the Russian Federation it was, as they say, declared only from 1 January and not from the 15th.

[Fenusenko] So the speculation began.

[Pavlov] Well, so then, in that time, from the reserves that existed in the retail trade network, a billion rubles' worth of these articles were sold at the old prices. True, I'm not sure that this did any great favor to any of the workers or retirees, but all the same a difference of a billion rubles somehow disappeared. So we would not like to create such zones at the state level.

[Fenusenko] I think it's obvious that within the framework of a single state there must be a single price system, otherwise there'll be no state. But will the Federation Council tackle this?

[Pavlov] The Federation Council has already examined this question twice. And it would seem that in principle, they're all agreed. They all agree to everything, but every time a special opinion emerges, above all on the part of the Russian Federation. And the second part of the question: A special opinion emerges in the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus. What's the significance of this? The fact is that we have today come up against a position of independence, a position of using budgets and incomes in the territory of each republic and in the territory of the kray and oblast. This gives rise to the following matter: With the alteration of retail prices, incomes will be generated in the territory where it is predominantly the production of finished goods for the population that has been developed.

[Fenusenko] I see.

[Pavlov] Whereas those that supply raw materials will be importing their goods. In other words, they will find themselves paying, while the proceeds will be obtained by whoever makes this glass, although the labor that goes into that glass is not at all proportional. Ninety percent of it may be the labor of other regions, and only 10 percent that of the person who made the finished product and packed it and sent it off to the shops. And in connection with this, there is a very serious fear that the republics which supply the raw and other materials—this applies not only to the republics—and even within any republic—take for example the Russian Federation—there are, after all, whole regions that only supply raw materials. Well, take Tyumen oblast. They find themselves without sufficient funds to pay compansation if they are confined within the framework of their own resources. On the contrary, they only lose. And now, in connection with this, the question has arisen: How, in the whole territory of the country can we adopt a uniform approach? Well, we came up against precisely this closure: Those who see that they'll get the money don't want to hand it over to others, with the idea of either protecting their own people better, or insuring themselves, or for other reasons. And here the group—well, perhaps it's not a good term to use, but at present there's no other.

[Fenusenko] Group egoism.

[Pavlov] Group egoism can be clearly discerned, plus the fact that that group egoism has been reinforced legislatively by all sorts of declarations of sovereignty and independence. And it's here that we are quite unable to find common ground. Although, in the end the upshot of all this has been that all are agreed on the first question, on the need to carry out price reform, but fundamental divergences arise regarding the forms and methods of compensation. We, as the union government, consider that in general we need to adopt a uniform approach throughout the territory of the Soviet Union, from the viewpoint of the forms and methods of compensation. We consider that we must review wages, we must review pensions and scholarships. Well, there's more or less detailed information on this in today's papers, how it is viewed from the standpoint of the Committee on Labor, though not everyone on the committee agrees on everything, but it is set out there in more detail. But the important thing in this regard is that we consider that in order to level out the positions of those territories which produce raw materials and those which turn out the finished product, we've got to centralize part of the funds which come into the territory of the republics, krays, and oblasts that are, as we say, exporters—that is, which export.

[Fenusenko] Magadan, Kazakhstan, Central Asia—is that what you mean?

[Pavlov] They need to be evened out, too. And within the Russian Federation, too, we've got to even out everything to do with [changes thoughts] so we'll certainly have to compensate Tyumen oblast.

[Fenusenko] Well, yes, that's clear.

[Pavlov] Or we'll certainly have to compensate the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. It extracts gold and diamonds and that's it. And all the rest of what it needs, practically 90 percent of it, is imported. How can it compensate at home for the retail price increases? It has to come from somewhere. And so far, unfortunately, we can't get agreement to such centralization.

Although, in principle, everyone is agreed. This matter was discussed today, prior to my meeting with you, at the Federation Council, but we came up against the fact that the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation gave its approval on the 8th, and on the 11th I received a letter from Comrade Yeltsin where the writes that the Russian Federation—that, he's writing as chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium—that they don't agree, that he doesn't agree. I don't know to what extent, so to speak, he was expressing the will of the Presidium, and to what extent he was expressing his own personal point of view, but the fact remains that such a piece of paper was laid on my table.

[Fenusenko] So nothing specific was resolved as yet at the Federation Council today regarding price reform?

[Pavlov] No. In principle, everyone agreed on one thing, that the reform has to be made, made uniformly throughout the country, and made in the shortest timespan.

[Fenusenko] So it will, nevertheless, soon come about?

[Pavlov] And so, I personally was given a few days to try, after all, to reduce the disagreements with the republics to a common donominator, although I can say that the Ukraine signed, Belorussia Signed, Kirghizia signed. These agreements, well, I can't remember all the republicans now, but....

[Renusenko interrupts] That's OK. It doesn't matter. I can see, Valentin Sergeyevich, three questions have come at once: Vasilyev from Moscow, Galina Petrovna Popova from Moscow, and Boris Ivanovich Stepanov from Moscow. They are asking us to return to the question of deposits. They are reproaching you for not giving a clear reply, in their view, to the question of deposits. Will they touch our deposits in the savings banak or not? Will there be any transformations with them that are dangerous for depositors, or not?

[Pavlov] Well, you know, I would like to give a very simple reply to this question. The state has in general always protected depositors. This is true of any state, and ours even more so. I would like these comrades to pay attention to one detail, which all of them, for some reason, kept quiet about. You see, no one checks deposits, regardless of their size, and so on. That is, we already, as it were, presuppose that if you have deposited money with the state then you trust the state, and so the state, too, should consequently trust you, and we haven't placed this money in doubt. That's first thing. And as for the second thing, to get to the point, I think that even under the pricing reform we will protect deposits.

[Fenusenko] You have just said, I would like—excuse me if it perhaps sounds a bit rude—to pick up on that. You say the state protects the interests of depositors, but permit me to disagree with you here because these tiny interest rates which we are paid at the savings bank—2 percent for ordinary deposits and 3 percent for fixed-period deposits—are totally out of line with the rate of devaluation of our money. In effect, if a deposit lies there for three, four, five, or 10 years, then it loses its value. I know that abroad, and you know very well, interest rates on deposits are actually much higher, especially in such countries like ours where money loses it value very quickly.

[Pavlov] Igor Sergeyevich, I'm going to pick up on you too.

[Fenusenko] Yes?

[Pavlov] Your're a bit behind the times.

[Fenusenko] Perhaps.

[Pavlov] We have already changed this system, and today deposits, depending on the period they are maintained, are divided up according to the level of interest rate, and these are not 2 percent and 3 percent, but 5 percent, 7 percent, and 9 percent.

[Fenusenko] Yes, that's very good.

[Pavlov] And so, I can tell you that after the decision was made more than R13 billion were reregistered in the savings banks for longer deposits periods, mainly up to five years, over the course of three months.

[Fenusenko] Ok. Let's close this subject now concerning deposits, monetary reforms, compensation, and so on. We could talk about this endlessly. There's a mass of other questions. Incidentally , still on the matter of monetary reform, not everyone by a long way was critical of it, both in our country and abroad. Very prominent specialists, say the Nobel Prize winner Wassily Leontief called this step, for the exchange of banknotes, a good measure. Professor of Economics Thomas Naylor said we have here a quite unusual creative approach. There were such positive responses on the part of very authorative people, specialists, economists, and so on. But nearly all of them, even if they didn't crtiticize but made a positive assessment of the exchange of banknotes, nearly all of them still said unanimously that this was the first step, that some kind of new reforms were needed, and steps of some kind in this direction, and so on. I am not asking you to return again to how things will develop with finances. I just want to invite you to say a little, to reply to a question which has been put very well by Yuriy Ivanovich Potanov from Stravropol: What are the most substantial reforms in the economy that will be carried out in the immediate future to help extricate our country from deadlock? Are any radical economic reforms planned? I have in mind privatization of enterprises, attittudes toward ownership, agriculture, and so on. And, what is planned? Let's actually recall that last year the only thing we all did was talk about the 500 days plan, the Shatalin-Yavlinskiy plan, arguments about which plan was better, Is any compromise plan emerging, but now it seems there's nothing. We just about patched together a budget, or something like a budget, for this year, but how will we go on living from here.?

[Pavlov] Well, I do not like the words "something like," of course, but still....

[Fenusenko, laughing] I'm sorry!

[Pavlov] You see, indeed—let's make ourselves clear—nevertheless [sentence as heard] What is the actual basis of our life? This basis is material production.

[Fenusenko] Certainly.

[Pavlov] But all the programs we are dealing with here, and the propaganda, and the discussions, the whole time, or well, I think over the last year in particular, and not for the first year, the whole time they lay the emphasis on distribution relations, and they logically approach the form of property which then predetermines the completion of the restructuring of distribution relations. Well, this is natural. To whomever property belongs, the results of labor also belong. And so in this sense, excuse me, but in the reforms themselves we have for some reason forgotten, generally speaking, about what, in itself, the market, privatization—this is, after all, not the aim, and cannot be the aim, or cannot be an end in itself. [sentence as heard] Nevertheless, in the final analysis the aim is bringing about a turnaround in the structure of production, from the point of view of people as its final aim.

[Fenusenko] That is, people should live better.

[Pavlov] Like human beings. Let's put it like that. And so, for this we need to bring about a structural restructuring of our economy, get away from the cumbersome structure of a militarized economy, to a normal, people's economy.

[Fenusenko] What would you propose doing, specifically, to achieve this?

[Pavlov] It is for this reason that we say that we need to implement very major changes in our production process. One of them is conversion. For some reason it has now again receded to the background. Secondly, we need to remove the colossal disproportions which have taken shape in the economy precisely as a result of its being narrowly blinkered in just one dimension. And so today we get a situation in which our economy, so immense and powerful, cannot currently provide light industry with raw materials because there was always a shortage of resources in our country for light industry. So, it was fed from abroad the whole time, right down to the soles of our shoes. And today it has turned out that we are directly dependent on supplies from abroad in order to clothe and shoe ourselves, and so on. So, we can't live the whole time—excuse me—on loans. After all, loans are given for a period of time, but we need to live, and after us people have to live. And so, what is at issue is that we need to resolve the problem of removing these large disproportions which have been generated in one way or another in the economy. I would even say that we need to create a modern chemical industry without which we will never resolve our standard of living, which is borne out by world experience. We have to resolve the question of our structure-forming economy, primarily resolve the question of metallurgy, transport, forestry, and when they talk about consumer goods, they all forget. Take anything. What is this pen, what is this glass? If we are to speak of their value as a result of some labor, then the actual assembly of the pen isn't the most important thing. The main thing is this steel, this nickel. This is where the key to the standard of living lies, generally speaking.

[Fenusenko] That is, you are again now returning to the need for the production of the main....

[Pavlov, interrupting] I mean that we have to have a balanced economy, in equilibrium, that should be correctly used not for making more tanks than anyone else in the world, but for making consumer goods, so we need not urge, but to restructure this economy. We need, say, to commission a mill 2,000 [as heard] at the Chelyabinsk—er, Magnitogorsk—so as to produce cold-rolled sheet, and something like 3.5 million tonnes of cold-rolled sheet will provide for our motor vehicle industry. It will be able to work absolutely smoothly entirely on domestic materials. Then we can say that we and you can supply Yelabuga, and that we will get cars.

[Pavlov] But, for all these processes to proceed efficiently, we have at the same time to change the economic mechanism as well. That is, this restucturing process in the economy—technocratic, if production is actually understood from the substantive, material standpoint—is possible only in the event that a person to carry out his work from top to bottom as he would directly for himself. That is why we need a market economy, as a means which correctly determines who is who. We only say that one lies as one works, but in actual fact, our assessments, all the same—I'm sorry—are far from always objective. Moreover, one can say that sometimes they are 90 percent subjectives. So, for this reason we need a market economy. For this reason we need privatization. There cannot be, let's say, the same type of destatification, privatization, on the Kharkov tractor plant, or, let's say, the baking industry in the city of Moscow. Completely different things and tasks. One truth should not be forgotten. You see, today, approximately three-quarters of output, basically is being produced—industrial output I mean—by 5,500 enterprises in our country. That is just over 10 percent.

[Fenusenko] Valentin Sergeyevich. It is not for nothing that I have brought this folder. The thing is that the idea of this broadcast, a meeting with you, gave rise to enormous interest. Beforehand, besides calls and letters and telegrams from ordinary television viewers, we also received a load of letters and, as it were, questions for you from, so to speak, people connected with the state, from heads, directors of works, from heads of departments, and naturally, I won't turn this into some kind of works meeting now. I will pass this huge folder, containing many letters of this kind, over to you. The folder came from Tekhmashimport. They sent it to me. I hope you will subsequently issue instructions to your staff, get them to examine these letters on business topics, these requests, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, in the near future.

[Pavlov] Do you want me to return the folder?

[Fenusenko] No. You can keep the folder as a memento of this program. But there is one of these letters on the business theme, an inquiry really since it was communicated over the telephone, which I wold like to read out. I myself am from Zaporozhye and this question came from Zaporozhye, from Comrade Chervonov, Ivan Fedorovich, head of a laboratory at a factory in Zaporozhye. You'll find out which one in a minute. He asks: When does the government expect to settle the debts to foreign countries arising out of equipment which has in fact already been to us? Among other things, he says that for a year now the Zaporozhye titanium and magnesiaum combine has been in possession of equipment which it cannot use because it has not been paid for. It was delivered, but still hasn't been paid for. The combine's losses have reached one million rubles and consumers still have not received an extremely important product. There are other questions of this kind in this folder, Your assistants can study these later.

There is another question I would like to raise in connection with this delivered but not paid for equipment. This was published in our press. It concerns the results of the recent meeting of the Soviet-French commission. Pierre Beregovoy, the minister for economy, finance, and the budget, is complaining that last year alone French exports to the USSR fell by a quarter. French businessmen are worried about the nonfilfilment of signed contracts. Timetables for payments are not being adhered to. The Zaporozhye titanium and magnesium combine is an example of this, is it not? No doubt ther are many examples of this sort of thing. So, to sum up, this is my question. Obviously this must be one of the priorities for your cabinet, checking on our ties with the Western world, with Western firms, Western, governments. I mean economic, scientific, and technical ties, supplies of equipment and so, because very serious manifestations of crisis are also beginning to emerge in this area, judging by these letters and reports in the press.

[Pavlov] Igor Sergeyevich, you are right. I cannot dispute in any way the manner in which you have raised this question because, two weeks ago, I myself issued instructions to the Gosplan, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and other interested ministries and departments, together with the republics. Basically, these instructions boil down to a reminder that we need to make a sober assessment of what we really can manage. Why? Because we have become very accustomed to living on credit.

[Fenusenko] Yes.

[Pavlov] Unfortunately.

[Fenusenko] That's our misfortune.

[Pavlov] We have all become used to borrowing money, believing that it will be reimbursed by some mythical state. But the state is, basically, all of us taken together. Therefore, we have borrowed quite a lot. We have borrowed, mainly, on the strength of money earned through sales of petroleum. But last year alone oil production fell in our country by 60 million tonnes. Well, as a motorist, I think you can appreciate quite well that we ourselves have not exactly lived it up within the country despite the oil boom.

[Fenusenko] Thank God.

[Pavlov] Not to mention all those shortages of fuel during the harvest, and so on. Everybody knows about that, I think.

[Fenusenko] There's no arguing about that. But, after all, for us oil is just about the main source of hard currency.

[Pavlov] It's the source from which we make our payments.

[Fenusenko] Yes [words indistinct]

[Pavlov] Therefore, it is no longer covering our payments. Now, there's nothing with which to settle our debts. That's the first thing, but we carried on borrowing. Secondly, as they say, deadlines for payment have arrived, but we are still stuck in the groove of thinking that these revenues will materialize. Furthermore, as we have just been saying, our economy is structured in such a way that one set of people purchases things, while another set pays for them. Take light industry for example. Almost half the wool from which our suits are made is imported, not to mention the chemical fiber and thread. So, our light industry relies on imports, not to mention things which we cannot produce without imports, like paint. We import zinc. There are many other commodities like this where we simply cannot dispense with imports. Why? Because this was a deliberate policy, a deliberate policy. The structure of production was built up in this way. As a result, we are now in a situation where we must realistically decide what we really can buy and pay for, and what we cannot. We must say honestly to ourselves and to the people: Esteemed comrades, we cannot do this for the time being. We cannot do this. If it becomes possible, we will buy it. If it is not possible, we will not buy it. We will take steps to learn how to make it ourselves. Such an approach is, I think, more honest than trying to evade our responsibilities. That's the first thing.

Second, it is the honest way of treating the business world. After all, you can't deceive business. No matter how much you may insist that you are a good chap, nobody will believe you if you cannot pay for what you have received. You have to pay on the nail.

[Fenusenko] Yes.

[Pavlov] Therefore, we are working on this area, where interstate relations are concerned, trying to get the work done as quickly as possible. We will have to adopt corresponding decisions on what we can do and what we cannot do with the aim of bringing our balance of payments into indisputable conformity with our real possibilities. But, there is another problem here. Throughout the world, for a very long time—in fact this is still the case—we have been regarded as a single, large state, which acts entirely as a single purchaser and a single payer. They still cannot get used to the fact that, in this instance, we act like any state in the capitalist world, that our enterprises now have access to the foreign market and can conclude contracts, not on behalf of the state and not under state guarantee, but under their own guarantee, taking their own commercial risks.

Western businessmen are, in this sense, very often still coming up against this problem. They are concluding transactions and are asking for guarantees from the Vneshekonombank, but the Vneshekonombank in this case is presenting itself as an agent of the state and saying that we as a state will not give you any guarantees. Well, someone asks for this guarantee beforehand, and let us say he finds out that we are sorry but the state will not give any guarantees here—there are very many partners who simply sign and deliver goods and then experience difficulties in obtaining payment for them. That is, there is also this second side to the issue, which in general means that our businessmen need to learn how to behave properly as well, if you don't mind my saying so.

[Fenusenko] Valentin Sergeyevich, we were both sportsmen during our youth. We have already established this; we played basketball. Now, I am expressing myself in the language of our youth. We are aproaching the finish line. I would like to read out one more question and I would ask you, as it were, for your short and clear answer. This is not a question. It is a cry for help. And a cry for help from a person with whom one would very much like to sympathize. Although you are a financial expert and have recently become the prime minister, now an agricultural question. All the same, an ordinary Soviet private farmer is appealing to you as the head of government, a private farmer who is just beginning, Ivan Ivanovich Pomysov from the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR], Priluzskiy rayon, the settlement of Loyma. First, he congratulates you on your appointment to this high post. And further he asks: How can agricultural machinery be obtained now, before the beginning of spring field work, by private farms there in the Komi ASSR? From where can we expect help? Machinery is needed by us in the same way as by the state and collective farms. He has 100 hectares of land and nothing with which to cultivate it. I ask very strongly that you help with machinery. He needs two MTZ (?89) horsepower tractors. I understand very well that he cannot get hold of them now like Emil Kio [Soviet magician] pulls rabbits out of a hat. You cannot send these two tractors directly from here, from Ostankino. But at least say where this man can turn, this enthusiast, one of those who are supposed to feed the country, as we say. Where should a private farmer, a lessee, turn, people who to their own grief or to our fortune attempt to undertake this terribly difficult business?

[Pavlov] Well, I think that a specific address to which he should turn in Karelia....

[Fenusenko, interrupting] In the Komi ASSR.

[Pavlov] Oh, it is in Komi?

[Fenusenko] Yes, in Komi, well do we nevertheless have in the republic....

[Pavlov, interrupting] Well, in principle, all of the supply in our country to private farmers is carried out along the same lines as the supply of collective and state farms. But specifically where they should turn to, if you are handing this over to me. I will try to help him and give a specific address without making a statement full of loud promises.

[Fenusenko] Ivan Ivanovich Pomysov from the village of Loyma, I am handing the prime minister your question. Let us hope that he will send you an answer of some kind.

[Pavlov] Well, I think it would be better than an answer if he were told where to get tractors.

[Fenusenko] Help the person and this will be a specific contribution by our program to good deeds.

[Pavlov] If we speak of principles then I must say that the issue existing here today, as it were, with tractors is very serious. At the same time everything is linked, as if by a chain. The Chelyabinsk tractor factory is constantly operating with stoppages. It recently stopped, at one time for a shift, now it is stopping for whole twenty-four hour periods already, due to a lack of metal. There is no metal because there is no coke.

[Fenusenko] And so on. There is no coke because....

[Pavlov, interrupting] If we fail to understand one simple thing, Igor Sergeyevich, which unfortunately you know today has spread throughout the whole country. Internal barter exists in our country. Everyone says if you need something, give something. Everyone demands from everyone else: Give something. One, from another, from a third. If we up to now....

[Fenusenko, interrupting] What can a hospital or a doctor give? What will the producer of, let us say, nuclear reactors give? He cannot enter into an exchange with a collective farm for milk.

[Pavlov] That is the point. If we have not understood what Khodzha Nassredin [Central Asian folk hero] already understood when he rescued a drowning man, the first thing which needs to be said is that if you give something, someone will at that time give you something, will understand this matter. Therefore, the whole question is a matter of reviewing the philisophy and establishing discipline in supply. I am not speaking about the responsibility for this matter. Therefore, the whole question is a matter of reviewing the philosophy and establishing discipline in supply. I am not speaking about the responsibility for this matter.

[Fenusenko] When we were preparing this broadcast, we met two weeks ago, on a Sunday, in our free time as it were, without jackets and ties and we spoke, as it were, about life. You uttered a phrase which I very much liked. A principle of life can be sensed in it. My colleagues and I asked you about your assistants, the people with whom you work, about your relations with them, and you mentioned there, among other things, the reference. Such a phrase was uttered: I try to look less at the form and not to pay especial attention to the form. I try to look people in the eye. Now, as our program has come to an end, I would like to ask you—there is our camera, you are looking our Soviet television viewers, our people, in the eye, several dozen or perhaps a couple of hundred million will watch this program —answer for them a question which is tormenting us all and which has been put very well by Valentin Kuzmich Buzikin from Moscow. Do you personally have confidence that you and your cabinet will be able to prevent the economic catastrophe which is moving toward us? Can you now—I will give you two minutes - say a few words of encouragement, hope, confidence in the future to our fellow countrymen. If you please.

[Pavlov] Igor Sergeyevich, I would say that yes, I really do have confidence, but I only have confidence in the fact that the country will be able to extricate itself from this crisis into which it has fallen, not the cabinet. The cabinet alone, by itself, without the people, will not be able to do anything. We have reached too serious a situation in the whole of our economy. If today every fourth train from the city of Moscow or to the city of Moscow arrives empty; if today railway workers are already receiving more than 30 percent less cargo, then there is nowhere further to fall. We here, whether it is one cabinet or another, cannot resolve this issue by ourselves. Today, it is a matter of the whole people facing things and to take upon themselves the responsibility of getting out of the crisis. Everyone should understand that getting out of the crisis depends on him. It is not necessary to wait for manna from heaven or a hero. It is necessary for things to be done.

[Fenusenko] We need less debate and more work.

[Pavlov] Things need to be done, Igor Sergeyevich.

[Fenusenko] Splendid, with these words of yours I would like to place a fullstop at the end of our dialogue, or to be more exact, your dialogue with television viewers. Dear friends, permit us to end on this the latest issue of the program "Who's Who?" I would like to tell you that the next issue of our program is planned for 2 March. Our next guest will bed Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan. We have already announced this. On Monday I will leave for Alma-Ata and we will prepare this program. We already have the agreement of Comrade Nazarbayev, for which the writers of this broadcast and those taking part in this broadcast thank him.

Well now, on your behalf, I would like to thank our guest today, Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov, and wish him succes in his work, which is so complex and difficult. Speaking frankly, I admire you Valentin Sergeyevich, for the fact alone that you have taken on this post so hard and difficult at this time and so terribly difficult for all of us. I wish you success.

[Pavlov] Igor Sergeyevich, thank you. I have always, we always resolve all issues unambiguously. If I do not do it then who will?

[Fenusenko] That is right. I wish you success.

[Pavlov] Thank you.

Isakov on Working Group Drafting Union Treaty

LD1902215191 Moscow TASS in English 2139 GMT 19 Feb 91

[By TASS legislative correspondent]

[Text] Moscow February 20 TASS—These days representatives of a number of republics, united into a working group, have been engaging in preparing a draft new Union treaty, which is based on the document presented by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of November 1990.

The working group is to determine a structure of the future Union, decide on issues concerning the delegation of powers by the republics to the centre and prerogatives of the subjects of the treaty.

"The working group has succeed in agreeing upon a whole number of important provisions and making considerable headway," Vladimir Isakov, member of the group and head of the council of the Republic of the Russian Federation Parliament, told TASS.

The agreed upon provisions of the draft treaty have been signed by representatives of eight Union republics—Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan and Turkmenia.

Judging by Isakov's remarks, the main achievement of the working group as of today is the coordination of articles regulating the relationship between the centre and the republics.

Representatives of the republics have determined matters which will be the prerogative of the Union and which will be under a joint jurisdiction of the centre and the subjects of the treaty.

The defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, the ensurance of the state security of the USSR, and the pursuance of an all-Union foreign policy are being placed under the Union's jurisdiction.

The joint powers of the centre and republics include the adoption of a constitution of the USSR, the determination of a state security strategy, and military and foreign policies.

Isakov said that the draft treaty which had been submitted to the working group took into account many proposals by the Union republics. He believes that the draft treaty did not express any one-sided position but was "rather balanced".

The group continues to work on the draft Union treaty. Its next meeting will be held soon, Isakov said.

Pugo Briefs Journalists on Crime Rates

LD1902191491 Moscow TASS in English 1736 GMT 19 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Borisov and Igor Gvritishvili]

[Text] Moscow February 19 TASS—More than 2,786,000 crimes were recorded in the Soviet Union last year, 13.2 per cent more than in 1989. This is the highest indicator in the post-war years. The growth of crime was observed in all Union republics, USSR Interior Minister Boris Pugo told a news conference here today. He met journalists for the first time since his appointment to the post.

The minister noted with particular concern an increase in grave crimes, the number of which in 1990 topped 422,000. The grave crime growth rate is higher than that of crime growth in the country as a whole, he emphasised.

The year 1990 saw more than 265,000 economic crimes, Pugo said. He drew attention to the fact that the number of uncovered instances of embezzlement of socialist property in large and particularly large amounts grew by almost 20 per cent.

Over 330,000 crimes were committed on the country's streets last year. They account for every second case of theft of citizen's personal property items, every third case of robbery with violence, and every ninth murder and rape, the minister said.

This is what prompted the presidential decree on joint patrolling of streets by militia and army men, Pugo emphasised. He believes that the measure was an essential one but that it should be viewed only as an additional step to intensity the fight against crime.

The minister said that in 1990 more than 7,000 crimes were committed in the country with the use of firearms, with a 12 per cent increase in the number of armed attacks on militiamen. The outcome was that 193 militiamen were killed last year in the line of duty.

Pugo believes that the stabilisation of the situation in the country to a large extent is dependent on the efficiency of the fight against economic crimes. He expressed serious concern over the mounting wave of insolent crimes involving foreign-exchange currency, securities, banking operations, unlawful credits, the establishment of false share-holding societies and coopevatives and frauds at the international level.

Over the past year, 265,000 economic crimes were uncovered, he said. The minister admitted that on the whole Interior Ministry agencies proved unprepared for substantial changes in the character of economic crimes.

Asked what measures are expected to be taken by law enforcement agencies to check up joint ventures in the country, Pugo said: "At present there are more than 3,500 joint ventures in the Soviet Union. Of course, neither the Interior Ministry nor the KGB intend to carry out indiscriminate check-ups of such ventures. Check-ups will be carried out only when law enforcement agencies have noteworthy information about lawbreaking there".

'Centrist Bloc' Urges National Salvation Committee

LD1602151791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1352 GMT 16 Feb 91

[Text] At the conference now taking place in Moscow the Centrist Bloc of Parties has proclaimed the idea of setting up a Committee of National Salvation. Let me remind you that this bloc is made up of the Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union, the Russian Popular Front, and a number of other organizations.

The Centrists regard setting up an alliance with ruling state structures as their task. The bloc enjoys the support of the Soyuz deputies' group.

Our correspondent reports that representatives of democratic movements are being subjected to sharp criticism at the conference.

Leader Views Situation

LD1702083691 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1311 GMT 16 Feb 91

[Excerpt] In our afternoon broadcast we started a discussion on the all-Union conference of the Centrist Bloc of Political Parties and Movements. I promised then that we would have a more detailed and serious conversation about it in the evening. Here in our studio now we have our special correspondent Yevgeniy Stankevich. Zhenya, could you tell us briefly, where the conference took place and who attended, and we will then listen to the recordings you have made there.

[Stankevich] The conference took place today in the central house of tourists: Some 170 people were in the audience, among them only about 100 delegates; the rest were journalists and guests. I shall start with the program statement by Vladimir Voronin, chairman of the Centrist Bloc. Here is an excerpt from his speech:

[Begin Voronin recording] The interethnic conflicts which at intervals are flaring up in one region after another lead us to believe, that these conflicts involve only a tiny amount of enmity between the ordinary people, the working people. A political aspect is outlining itself ever more sharply. Egoistic political ambitions of certain political operators are merging with the corrupt and mafia-related structures, and for the sake of achieving their dubius goals they are drowning whole nations in blood. This is the chief cause of the artificially contrived so-called interethnic conficts. Decisive consolidation of the legal foundations of our country and strengthening of the executive power—this is the way to fight this phenomenon. From now on it is necessary, in the opinion of the Centrist Bloc, that only political methods should be used in resolving any conflicts, including in the foreign policy of our state. It is particularly impermissible to involve the armed forces of our country in the settlement of civil conflicts.

During a comparatively short period of activity of the Centrist Bloc, due to the remarkable energy of the bloc's leadership, talks and meetings have been held at which the positions of both sides were stated. These included meetings with officials of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, with former USSR Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairmen of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet, USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov, and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Prime Minister Ivan Silayev. We have had an unofficial meeting with USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, and will hold an official meeting with him.

The Centrist Bloc participated on its own initiative in the 28th Congress of the CPSU, in the congress of the Russian Communist Party, the congress of the USSR Trade Unions, the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, meetings of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and congresses and conferences of other parties, unions and movements.

The situation in the country was continuing to deteriorate when the Centrist Bloc took a decision and created on 15 November 1990, within the framework of the bloc, the public Committee of National Salvation, and endorsed the first members of the committee. The course of events is showing that the need for such a structure exists now. It is necessary to take a number of urgent measures for stabilizing the situation, up to introducing presidential rule; for a start, in the particularly hot spots of the country. [passage omitted] [end recording]

'Vzglyad' Future Discussed at News Conference

LD1502220191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2030 GMT 15 Feb 91

[Excerpts] A news conference has been held in the House of Culture at Moscow University by the program "Vzglyad" in which the program announcers, Vladislav

Listyev and Aleksandr Politkovskiy, took part. Our correspondents were at the news conference. Here is a report.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] Could you tell us, has anything changed in the life of the "Vzglyad" program in the past few weeks.

[Unidentified speaker] Nothing has changed in the life of "Vzglyad" in the past few weeks, excluding the fact that the prosecution is examining our application to the procurator's office of the Dzerzhinskiy rayon in Moscow. We do not know how long it will take. Nor do we know whether the examination is to be followed by the Procuracy instituting legal procedures. After all, history does not know any precedents—that is, the precedent of the law on the press being implemented, as envisaged by those who have adopted it. What we have done so far is that we have outlined "Vzglyad's" position and drawn up a draft agreement between us and the administration.

[Correspondent] So, what do you think the outcome will be?

[Speaker] We hope that the outcome will be normal, that "Vzglyad" will be able to go back on air to represent various viewpoints. We argue with them, you argue with us, while we argue with you. That is absolutely normal and natural.

[Oleynik] I am Dmitriy Oleynik, a forth-year student at the Geography Department. An appeal to the president has just been read out. Why? So as to enable the mass media represented in the hall to find out what students and lecturers at the State University of Moscow think about the situation in television and generally in the mass media. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] During the news conference an appeal was adopted by the students and lecturers of the State University of Moscow to USSR President Gorbachev. [end recording]

Broadcasting Company Director Interviewed

91UN0898B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 6, 13 Feb 91 p 3

[Interview with A.G. Lysenko, director of the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent A. Baklanova; place and date not given: "An Information Blockade?"]

[Text] [Baklanova] Anatoliy Grigoryevich, how can you explain the stubborn refusal of the USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] to hand over one of its channels to Russia?

[Lysenko] It is absolute nonsense that Russia has not had its own radio or television so far. Viewers as well as subscribers should have a freedom of choice. Instead we have a monopoly on providing information. Georgia has nine hours of republic TV broadcasting daily, Moldova has 11 hours, Uzbekistan has two programs... But Russia has only—just think about it—3.5 hours a week. A week! Altogether, Belorussia has 16.4 hours of radio broadcasting, the Ukraine has 32.6 hours. Russia—and you have to take into account the huge territory of the republic—has the total of 5.5 hours on program three daily. The areas in the north do not receive program three at all. I would qualify this as an information blockade.

The leader of every republic can address the people on his own channel. Why does Yeltsin, leader of the largest republic, have to beg for air time from the Gosteleradio? According to Boris Nikolayevich who spoke about it from the podium, the president of our country promised four times to give the second channel to Russia. Meanwhile, the television budget contains a big share of Russian revenue.

[Baklanova] How would you use the Russian channel if it were yours?

[Lysenko] We are told that the second program is the channel for interethnic communication. Therefore, we are ready to give three hours daily to "Sodruzhestvo" [Concord], instead of the three hours a week it has now. Let us air a 90-minute digest on the Baltics, for instance, or on Kazakhstan. We will be able to find a common language with the republics much faster than the center does. We are ready for it. But we are not ready for the situation in which management and planning continue to rest in the hands of the Gosteleradio. I was in charge of "Vzglyad" for three years, and there was not a single occasion that we went on air at 2200 as scheduled. Somebody necessarily had to appear at that particular moment...

Comrade Kravchenko said recently: We cannot give you this channel because hundreds of people will lose their jobs. That is insincere to a large degree. Everybody knows that we are not going to fire anyone. We are even prepared to pay more than the government rates.

An interesting process is going on. Well-known journalists come to us from their established positions at the Gosteleradio where they had reliable jobs. The absolute majority of them are centrists. We have thrown out the "party affiliation" entry from our job applications. We have other criteria—professionalism, decency, and the feeling of responsibility for one's words. Nor are we going to introduce the position of a political censor which exists now in the television news service.

[Baklanova] How is the Russian legislature reacting to all of this?

[Lysenko] Emergency measures are being designed at present to help to protect the information sovereignty of the republic. I think that these measures will enable us to break the blockade in some way. But we are going to appear on air in any case. If we look for support in our history, ISKRA was published on the territory of Switzerland. I would not want to make such revolutionary parallels. I think that common sense will triumph because we are trying to decide whether or not the radio and television broadcasting of the largest republic is going to exist. No mention of equal rights is possible when a considerable number of taxpayers do not have their own radio or television.

Cabinet Discusses Situation in Metal Industry

PM1902165191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Cabinet of Ministers Sitting"]

[Text] At its routine session on 14 February the USSR Cabinet of Ministers continued the examination of the situation in the base sectors of the national economy. The discussion centered on the stabilization of the work of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgical enterprises.

In 1990 ferrous metallurgical enterprises recorded a shortfall of more than 3 million tonnes of rolled metal, 250,000 tonnes of steel pipes, and 620,000 tonnes of coke against the plan which they had themselves adopted. Nonferrous metallurgical workers far from fully realized their potential last year. The plan for the production of alumina, aluminum, copper, zinc, and other important products was not fulfilled. The metallurgical industry continued to work unsatisfactorily in January and February this year.

The pace of the modernization of production and the introduction of progressive equipment and technology has slowed down in this complex recently. There has been a perceptible lag in the production of economical types of metal products. The number of accidents and above-plan equipment down-times has increased.

At the same time it was noted at the sitting that the metallurgical complex is in a great frenzy because of the serious shortcomings in the work of miners, who have sharply reduced deliveries of coking coal, causing a chain reaction of disruptions throughout the metal working process. Machine builders have run up big arrears, too: They are not producing the necessary quantity of modern, high-productivity metallurgical equipment. The situation is aggravated by the fact that in 1990 the sector was short more than 9 million tonnes of ferrous scrap metal.

As Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov noted, urgent and concrete measures must be taken to stabilize the sector's work. In particular, the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy and the "Norilskiy Nikel" concern have been instructed to develop a program for the retooling of enterprises taking into account first and foremost the improvement of metal output quality, the expansion of the range of economical types of rolled metal and pipes, and the broad introduction of resource-saving and ecologically clean technologies. The USSR State Planning Committee and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations have been instructed to examine and resolve the question of incentives for the export of supplies of metal output, a question raised by leaders of metallurgical enterprises. Instructions have been issued on improving the remuneration of labor and on a series of financial problems on whose solution the creation of normal conditions for the work of enterprises, the stabilization of labor collectives, and the raising of the living standard of workers of the sector and their families depends.

The expediency of pooling the resources of enterprises through the creation of joint-stock companies and the broad use of credits was confirmed. The proposal of enterprise leaders that the metallurgical industry be preserved as a single complex under USSR control was supported.

Girenko Against Referendum 'Simplifications'

PM1902135191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 91 p 1

[Statement by CPSU Central Committee Secretary A. Girenko; date not given: "'We All Want To Secede From Such a Union'"]

[Text] The upcoming referendum on the future of the USSR is being discussed both orally and in the press.

But to ensure an accurate and useful debate the bone of contention itself must be studied carefully and thoroughly. At times you can hear it said: The wording of the referendum question is too complicated. Maybe it should be simplified?

Let me ask a counter question: But is it possible to simplify the situation itself in the country, or the complexity of the period which we are going through?

There is no doubt that we must get rid of the present Union's supercentralism and virtual unitarianism, and turn the sovereignty declared by republics into reality. Can each of them attain genuine democracy and independence on its own? I think it is easier to do this when—of its own volition and in its own interests—a republic transfers some of its rights to the Union.

Moreover, everything in our country is so intertwined—economics, culture, destinies. So people in the Baltic region tried to exercise their own—let me stress—legal right to secede at a moment's notice, without taking account of reality. And they found out for themselves that such a policy runs into opposition from a considerable part of the population.

That is why I am against simplifications like: Do we want to live in the Union, "yes" or "no," period. With such an approach the whole point is neutralized, because we all want to secede from such a union as exists now! A renewed, federal union that is really equal is another matter! The wording of the referendum question must take this fact into account.

Otherwise the same will happen as with the results of the poll in Lithuania. Who does not want to live in an independent and free state? But let us be precise: As part of an independent and free union—or outside it? You will agree that the amplification is important.

I do not doubt the conscientiousness and best intentions of the academics whose letter entitled "The Question, of Course, Is Interesting..." was published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA the day before yesterday. But I want other arguments and other opinions to be heard and given consideration too.

Sociologist: Republics Want Union Preserved

LD1802174191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1011 GMT 18 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow, 18 Feb (TASS)—The upcoming all-Union referendum reflects the objective need of most republics for the single state to be preserved. On the other hand, it reflects the ambition of the center to strengthen its power. Sergey Kozlov, deputy director general of the Sociology Center of the USSR United Nations Association and candidate of philosophical sciences, expressed this viewpoint in an interview with a TASS correspondent.

The upcoming nationwide poll is above all a political act. It is not a public survey. This is the angle from which it should be considered, the scholar said.

"When assessing the formulated question", he said, "I would not try to identify the interests of the country's leadership and the interests of society. To meet the public demand, in my view, it would be enough to ask: 'do you support a federation of sovereign republics?' There is no doubt that with the exception of the Baltic and Trancaucasian republics, and also Moldova, which have adopted a special position, the idea of a federation would be supported by the absolute majority of those taking part in the vote. In Russia, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan, the number of those speaking in favor of it may approach the figure of 80 percent."

However, the scholar noted, it is not only important for political leaders to obtain support for the idea of a single state, but also the right to and license for certain actions. "After all, the wording of the question will determine that the 'yes' answer to the idea of a federation may be regarded as support for local soviets as a form of state power, socialist choice, and the right of the leadership to apply the harshest measures to resolve interethnic conflicts."

Thus, the referendum could substantially strengthen the state power. This will enable the USSR president and the leaders of most republics to act more decisively. What is important however is that the efforts should be geared to speeding up economic reform. So far, however, we have been witnessing lethargy and inconsistency in their actions which confirms the continuing disintegration of the national economy.

With regard to additional proposals made by the repubics, the combining of the all-Union and republican referenda could save a great deal of resources.

However, the insistent public demand is that the wording of the questions submitted at the referendum should take account of the real interests of the electorate, not only of political groups.

The upcoming referendum has of course all the peculiarities of the transitional period from a totalitarian society to a democratic society.

Let us remember at least that for the transition from virtual appointment by prescription at the local soviets to the principle of election, both an experiment with participants with many mandates and the retention of places at pubic organization were needed. Thus, the referendum—whatever the formulation of the question might cost—is nonetheless a step forward in the democratization of society, following the example of a number of civilized countries, Sergey Kozlov stressed.

Maritime Social Groups Urge Referendum Campaign

PM1502165791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 91 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Calling the Public"]

[Text] The collapse of the Union will result in a return to the oppression and exploitation of small peoples and national minorities and leave them defenseless in the face of the terror imposed by chauvinists and nationalists, an appeal to the public adopted by the Soviet "Peace to the Oceans" committee aktiv and the Soviet Association of Maritime Law says. In the time remaining until the referendum, the document stresses, every organization should be actively involved in preparing for it, explaining to the people the essence and significance of the referendum, and exposing the actions of destructive forces seeking to break up the USSR. The meeting participants urged the Soviet public at this difficult time for the country to pool their efforts to defend the multiethnic, renewed USSR.

Political & Social

Railroad Official Discusses Fare Hike

LD1402221691

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1600 GMT on 14 February carries a three-minute interview with Viktor Fedorovich Predko, head of the

USSR Railways Ministry's Financial Directorate, by correspondent Yuriy Korotkov.

Predko says: "To date, based on the new wholesale prices, rail transportation will suffer a loss in passenger transportation of 2.2 billion rubles in the space of a year. That is why the question has arisen of raising passenger fares which, by the way, have not been revised since 1948."

Predko adds that passenger fares will "definitely" be raised. The question of when this will happen will be decided by the government or the Supreme Soviet. "This decision will be made simultaneously with the reform of retail prices in the country. This increase in fares will be taken into acount in the compensation that the government envisages in connection with the reform of retail prices," he adds

According to Predko, "an average 70 percent increase in fares for long-distance passenger transportation is intended. As regards suburban passenger transportation, the proposal is being submitted to grant the railroads, in agreement with the local authorities, the right to decide the issue. The condition is that these fares must not be loss-making."

Predko concludes that if wholesale prices for materials, fuel, and electric power remain stable there will be no further increases in passenger transport fares.

Statistics Show Decrease in National Income

LD1402212491 Moscow TASS in English 1941 GMT 14 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Turanov]

[Text] Moscow February 14 TASS—The national income produced in the Soviet Union in January is six per cent down as against January 1990. Industrial output went down by four per cent. This information, which is far from optimistic, was supplied to journalists today by Igor Pogosov, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Statistics.

Although trade turnover went up by 18 per cent in comparison with last January (because of price growth), the sales of some types of foodstuffs and manufactured goods were reduced by 10 to 30 per cent. Pogosov believes that the depreciation of the ruble is one of the reasons for this situation. On the one hand, producers refrain from selling their products, on the other hand—separate regions resort to trade isolationism and barter exchanges. The reduction of imports also contributed to this situation. On the whole, the volume of the production and sales of consumer goods were increased a little thanks to conversion.

In January the volume of "hot" money went up by nine billion—the sum by which the incomes of the population exceeded spendings on goods and services.

Effects of Prices, Wages Reform Explained

PM1902143391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 91 Second Edition p 2

["Topical Interview" with V.K. Senchagov, chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices, and V.I. Shcherbakov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, by PRAVDA political observer Aleksandr Nikitin; date and place not specified; first three paragraphs are editorial introduction: "Price Reform: Inferior Trump"]

[Text] The bank notes exchange seems to have brought to the surface of public life the rumors about price reform, shortages, and compensation which had been restrained for a while. This may have happened because dealers ruined by speculation and other "price manipulators" have increased their pressure on prices as if in revenge for the confiscation of millions of large-denomination notes. State prices seem to have been lost amid the wild fray of first "contract", then "free" prices that shock the population.

The latest editions of the newspapers have brought huge front-page headlines to all ends of the country proclaiming: "No Reform, Prices Rise," "There Are Commodities, There Are No Prices," or "Immediate Price Hike Needed." Or simply: "Price Reform: Inferior Trump." It cannot of course be denied that such problems do exist. Nor did they appear yesterday. But the nearer they come to being resolved, the more terrifying the rumors. How is the situation actually developing?

PRAVDA's editorial office yesterday asked the leaders of two state committees for explanations.

[Senchagov] You are right, strange rumors are spreading and there is a great deal of confusion in the press...

[Nikitin] Why is this? Perhaps you yourself and your personnel are not very bothered about providing timely information. Is this information really secret?

[Senchagov] I think that your question smacks of one newspaper's rejoinder regarding my reluctance to deal with journalists. That is not entirely true. I gave interviews and a detailed exposition of the price reform program at the USSR Supreme Soviet session last December. Not only deputies but all viewers and readers have been acquainted with it. Price reform has become inevitable. Moreover people are morally ready for it. I think that they are now interested in the details and minutiae of the reform itself: How much will pork cost in their city? There are plenty of questions like that.

[Nikitin] Perhaps price reform is still not completely ready, perhaps the details—which are just as important as the concept itself— have not been worked out?

[Senchagov] These suspicions have been a real torment to us. All the details of the reform that we and the scientists could have foreseen have been thought out. It has been better thought-out than if it had been introduced two years ago. It was different then, precocious. That is why the idea that we are two years late with reform must not be considered incontrovertible. It is now 98-percent ready.

[Nikitin] It looks as though all that remains is to insert the key and turn.

[Senchagov] Yes, that is virtually right.

[Nikitin] Who has the key then, and why are they delaying?

[Senchagov] It is with the Federation Council or, to be specific, it depends on the decision it makes. Under the new political structure in our society, this collegial organ alone can decide what is to happen and when...

[Nikitin] It is, after all, well known that most republics have already spoken in favor of price reform.

[Senchagov] That is not the only point. The Federation Council has on several occasions provided clarification on some of the reform's provisions, its mechanism, and the dates for its implementation. The task is to adopt decisions that have been agreed with the republics to ensure the functioning of the all-Union market. Meat prices, say, should be linked with bread prices, and so on. That would make it possible to avoid speculation and an interrepublic "price war." Only cooperation between the republics and the center and among the republics will make it possible to elaborate a common pricing policy. A clear accord has been reached between the republics on this issue.

[Nikitin] So, there were secrets?

[Senchagov] No, it is not a case of secrets. I am sure that the sundry premature forecasts and games with preliminary, rough figures fail to clarify the situation and only lead to confusion and unnecessary rumors. They sometimes affect certain deputies' positions and the mood in society.

[Nikitin] In that case, is it better to publish a list of goods or groups of goods that will be subject to price hikes?

[Senchagov] That is obviously what we will do.

[Nikitin] Readers are asking: On what basis is the rise in state prices by a factor of 2-3 on average to be calculated—on the basis of state prices or, more often, on the basis of current prices?

[Senchagov] The state can influence any prices via state prices above all. State prices will rise for many commodities to the level of contract prices, which will make it possible to drastically reduce—but not totally give up—subsidies, as people have tried to do in Lithuania. Otherwise prices will soar out of sight altogether. At central level the state will set limits for price hikes for meat, milk, eggs, vegetable oil, sugar, and bread, along with footwear, linen, everyday clothing, and most children's goods. The republics are entitled to set lower prices in view of regional aspects of production, consumption, and the market. The process of price liberalization has also been coordinated with the republics. Goods for which contract prices in the full sense of the word are permitted have been determined: Between producers and trade outlets. But the volume of these prices must not exceed roughly one-third of industrial goods.

[Nikitin] On what are you calculating? It will not, after all, prove possible to extend commodity production straightaway?

[Senchagov] Purchasers themselves have stockpiled some of these commodities. According to some estimates, people have created a reserve worth roughly 100 billion rubles [R]. Price reform will to a certain extent render the consumer more exacting and for that reason his purchasing power will, naturally, be reduced at first. The special feature of the reform is to balance the change in prices and incomes. The main aim is to normalize the consumer market, and specifically to balance supply and demand and boost people's interest in business.

[Nikitin] How will compensation be expressed in rubles? Who will receive it directly?

[Senchagov] I think that another state committee has a better knowledge of these questions...

[Shcherbakov] The main point I would like to make is that price reform necessitates wage reform. It is impossible to resolve the important problem of not only economic but also social stabilization without considerable social support. Provision has been made for such steps to be taken in advance.

[Nikitin] Could you tell me the most important steps?

[Shcherbakov] The burden of additional expenditure on enterprises will be appreciably eased. The reduction in tax payments to the state budget is first. See for yourself: Profits tax will be cut from 45 to 35 percent. Wage rates will rise by R60 on average, the salaries of military regulars (officers and men on extended military service) will rise by R70, and in the more impoverished nonproduction sphere by roughly R120-160 per month. Furthermore, all enterprises have been authorized, without restrictions or sundry "ceilings", to raise workers' wages if they have the requisite funds. Special steps will be taken to provide cushioning against inflation to ensure that the former reserves—money deposits, say, certificates, and securities—do not vanish. The pensions of all nonworking pensioners and invalids will automatically be raised by R65 per month, and other social subsidies will be introduced.

[Nikitin] Where is the guarantee that their standard of living will be preserved in conditions of price reform?

[Shcherbakov] To put it simply, the republics have agreed on a maximum price level for foodstuffs and industrial commodities. Furthermore, all money obtained from price hikes for these commodities will be reimbursed in full to people in the form of compensation. The USSR sets minimum payments depending on population categories. The republics and local soviets can raise living standards either by not raising prices or by increasing the compensation payments.

[Nikitin] Take children, specifically. How will their parents' fate change under the new conditions?

[Shcherbakov] For children under six the monthly subsidy will rise by R40. Special subsidies will be introduced for children under 16 who did not previously receive subsidies and pensions. In short, provision is made for the social protection for all children. Plus an annual subsidy due to the increase in the price of children's goods. These subsidies of R200-280 will henceforth be paid directly to families with children rather than to industry where they seemed to disappear as if in a bottomless pit.

[Nikitin] Where is this compensation to come from now? Obviously, redirecting former centralized subsidies was not enough?

[Shcherbakov] The bulk of the compensation is to come from the increase in the prices of children's goods. This is the first time that this has happened in our country, unlike elsewhere. Incidentally, it will finally prove possible to raise wages for teachers, medical personnel, and cultural workers from the price hikes for other types of commodities.

[Nikitin] By the same R120-160? Is that enough?

[Shcherbakov] This is just a direct rise which allows the level of their wages to be raised to the average Soviet level. But leading categories have far higher wages than people in other spheres. Teachers for example earn up to R350, while a highly qualified surgeon earns up to R460 roughly, or maybe even more. What is more, a number of other changes in taxation have been outlined aimed at reducing it.

[Nikitin] Excuse me, we have almost forgotten the students...

[Shcherbakov] We may have forgotten them in this lightning interview. But the state and our committee have not forgotten them. Grants for young men and women studying at VUZ's [higher educational establishments], technical colleges, and vocational and technical colleges will rise on average by a factor of 2-2.5 or up to R120-80-40 [figures as published]...

[Nikitin] I now see, Vladimir Ivanovich, why your colleague V.K. Senchagov gives interviews more infrequently than you do. He, as it were, "takes away" the money, while you give back a considerable amount to people. Tell me, our readers are asking: What is the point of raising prices and then immediately providing compensation for this?

[Shcherbakov] I think that our conversation contains the social subtext of the coming price reform. In conditions of transition to the market, it is important to provide material protection and support for, on the one hand, the impoverished strata of the population and, on the other hand, the honest workers and to help them find their feet in the changing situation. This will make it possible to gain the confidence that is so necessary for constructive creative activity and social peace.

[Nikitin] In short a considerable amount of time and space is needed to talk about all this in detail. I think that these lines will give an idea of the social nature of the reform and will show that the state is not abandoning its citizens at a difficult time or unloading all its difficulties onto their shoulders.

Agricultural

Official Outlines Problems if Farms Not Helped

PM1502145591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 91 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with N.V. Krasnoshchekov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Purchases, by correspondent K. Lysenko; place and date not given: "Alone With Their Fields—That Is How Peasants Risk Finding Themselves This Spring, and Once Again We Will Find Empty Shelves"]

[Text] The potential consequences of such a situation could be unpredictable, thinks N.V. Krasnoshchekov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Purchases. In an interview with our correspondent he said:

"The information I have available does not inspire optimism. In previous years industry has not lavished very much attention at all on the peasant, but this year, it seems, an unprecedented situation is developing. It is expected that in spring tens of thousands fewer tractors will be working in agriculture than in any of the preceding 25 years. Farms will have at their disposal 20-25 percent fewer of such essential implements as cultivators, plows, and harrows than a year ago. Industry as a whole received 1.4 billion rubles less toward the production of agricultural machinery than was proposed last fall. There is a very complex situation with the supply of pesticides. Our chemical industry is not producing essential preparations, while deliveries from abroad are declining considerably. Machinery has never been so badly prepared for the season. Sixteen percent of tractors and one-half of combines have still not been repaired. A serious backlog has been allowed to occur with the repair of sowing machines, cultivators, and motor vehicles. The main reason for this is a lack of spare parts. Their production volume has been scheduled at half a million rubles less than last year. There is a most acute problem with the supply of grain crop seed to farms. Kazakhstan and the Ukraine are keeping them at home in contravention of established interrepublican ties.

[Lysenko] In your opinion, what could the consequences of all this be?

[Krasnoshchekov] The results last year, which I repeat was a better one in many respects, give an impression of the consequences to be formed. Then, almost 6 million hectares of grain crops and hundreds of thousands of hectares of potatoes and vegetables were simply not harvested. There have long been no homegrown potatoes in Moscow; the city manages solely on imported potatoes. Since last year 20 million hectares of fall plowland have remained unplowed and over 4 million hectares of winter crops have not been sown. This and much other work will be carried over into spring, and the volume of spring work will be one-fourth more than the usual amount. And if the peasant is not given guarantees of help, he will simply fail to sow grain or plant potatoes and vegetables in their former quantities. Such warnings are coming in from everywhere. And the first confirmations of this are here already. In January the state purchased 230,000 tonnes of meat, which was 12 percent less than last January, and 625,000 tonnes of milk, down 13 percent.

[Lysenko] What do you see as a realistic way out?

[Krasnoshchekov] There is only one way out: Industrial enterprises, local organs of power, and the country's entire population must clearly realize that, if they do not turn toward the peasant, the situation could take an unpredictable turn in the near future. And it is surprising that practically no one—not the newspapers, nor television, nor radio—is devoting any attention to this problem. I am convinced that they will stir themselves only when it is too late. But the problem requires the greatest attention right now, before all is lost. And if it does not prove possible to solve it, the first to suffer will be the very citizens and industrial employees who are now refusing to help the peasant.

Deficiencies Affect 1991 Crop Preparations

914B0088A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 13 Feb 91 p 1

[Report by Nikolay Osychkin: "Sowing Time Is Approaching"]

[Text] Following a short period of cruel frosts it has warmed up again. In some zones in the country there may be "February windows of opportunity"—harbingers of the mass sowing work in the spring. This is why during these days it is important for the farmers to direct their efforts toward successfully completing preparations for sowing and creating the conditions needed to obtain a good harvest in 1991.

But favorable conditions are not being created everywhere and in everything. And if the difficulties are not handled with the skill and craft of the farmers, agronomists, and agricultural scientists then not only are crisis phenomena possible, but in the event of drought catastrophe also in supplying the population with produce from crop farming.

And the "baggage" we are carrying as we approach the spring! Because of the wet fall some winter fields were not sown, and the area sown to spring wheat has been increased to 144 million hectares. Land plowed in the fall for spring sowing is 20 million hectares less than last year, and swaths and straw shocks still remain on 14 million hectares. Perhaps even more winter crops have been lost or damaged. In short, the volume of spring field work is increasing considerably, and the quality of soil preparation and preparations for sowing are probably deteriorating. Field workers in the non-Chernozem and Chernozem regions and in many oblasts and republics of the Povolzhye [Volga Region] must deal with particularly great complexities in their work.

The agricultural weather situation is not helping the farmers everywhere. Moisture reserves in the soil are mainly good and satisfactory, but last year's good harvest was accompanied by major depletion of soil nutrients. And it is not so simple to replace them. Last year, there was a shortfall of almost 4 million tons of mineral fertilizers in deliveries to the countryside. In some places the warehouses are empty. True, the Agrokhim State Association does plan to increase supplies of mineral fertilizers somewhat, but things are still moving very slowly. Moreover, the prices for some kinds of chemical fertilizers are exorbitant. Some farms, and small farmers in particular, are abandoning the use of mineral fertilizers, thus harming the future harvest.

Providing kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] and the peasants with plant protection agents remains a bottleneck in our farming and is holding back the assimilation of intensive technologies. Harvest losses from pests and plant diseases and weeds is estimated to be 20 billion rubles [R] each year. Protective preparations being produced by Soviet industry are often ineffective, toxic, and difficult to apply, and some kinds are not being produced here at all. Because of this they are imported each year, and quantities have recently been halved because of hard currency difficulties.

The shortages of fertilizers and plant protection agents can to some extent be made up by better schedules and high-quality working of the soil and good sowing work. But alas! failures have also been seen in these directions. Because essential links between industry and agriculture have been broken, last year deliveries of new equipment to the countryside fell eight percent, and this year it will reach 10 percent. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes are not receiving one-fourth of their orders for plows, harrows, stubble plows, seeding machines, many tractors, and other equipment. Vehicle operators are having to patch up old equipment, but this does not solve the problem. The load on working machines is growing 40 percent, and at many farms in the Central, Central-Chernozem, and Povolzhye regions the load has increased by factors of two or three.

In order to mitigate the situation it is important in the time remaining before the spring to bring all equipment to readiness. Unfortunately, in the Russian Federation the plan for the repair of tractors has still been fulfilled 87 percent, but in oblasts and republics such as Kaluga, Nizhnegorod, Belgorod, Chita, Amur, Tuva, Mordova, and Kalmyk, according to figures from the USSR State Committee for Statistics the figure is one-fifth. In the workshops they are still citing shortages of spare parts and assemblies. Yes, the situation with them is critical. The position with respect to piston sets and cylinders, and mold boards for plows is particularly strained. A number of enterprises are not concluding contracts to manufacture spare parts. For example, the Porshen Plant (Alma-Ata) has earmarked only half of 700,000 piston sets for delivery. The leading collectives at the repair enterprises and workshops are finding a solution to this situation by reconditioning parts, and thanks to this are bringing equipment on line on schedule.

The attention of leaders and specialists at farms and in agricultural organs should, as before, be focused on the grain fields. Last year almost 240 million tons of grain were harvested in the country. Now, given all the complexities, it is important to consolidate and surpass this record result. The state of the winter sowing is now mainly good and satisfactory. In some places, however, plants are overgrown, with weak hardening and a low sugar content, which, if the cold returns, may lead to thinning and even loss of some sowings. This is why it is very important to establish careful control over each field of winter crops and insure prompt additional fertilization and carry out the entire set of measures to protect plants against pests and diseases. These measures are being reported to the editorial offices from the Kuban, the Don, and the southern Ukraine.

The state of seed stocks for the spring sowing is a cause of great concern. In all, 17.1 million tons of seeds have been given to the farms—95 percent of requirements. But only 14 million tons are rated as top class. Farms in Kirghizia, Moldova, Latvia, Bashkiriya and Chuvash, and Nizhnegorod and Ulyanovsk Oblasts have very many poor seeds. The state will not abandon them in their misfortune. It is planned to release 2.3 million tons of seeds from state reserves. But that will obviously not be enough. This is why at the local level it is important to select the best grain from the marketable batches, clean it, and use it for possible re-sowing of damaged winter crops. There is also a need to accelerate interrepublic transport of seeds from the Ukraine and Kazakhstan to farms in the Russian Federation, which are experiencing a need for good sowing stock. There is now a possibility to fully satisfy the farms' requirements for corn seed. Adequate alfalfa, sainfoin, and sweet clover seeds are available, but little clover or grasses.

Analyzing the situation on the eve of the spring sowing, one encounters the dangerous tendency to reduce sown areas for virtually every crop. Take sunflower, for example. There is virtually no sunflower oil for sale. This means that it is necessary to increase the production of oil seeds. But what is happening in fact? According to the experts, the area sown to sunflower is being reduced by 500,000 hectares and yield is falling, and consequently the quantities of vegetable oils being processed are declining. But there is still no sense of alarm about this. And indeed why should there be when even the state order for the sale of oil seeds has not been set, when the existing economic mechanism for providing incentive has been destroyed, and when return sales of oil cake, oil, equipment, and construction materials to farms have been canceled. In short, with this kind of disdainful attitude toward a valuable plant crop it will scarcely be possible to fill the store shelves with oil.

During the fall and indeed in the winter many problems have arisen with respect to potatoes and vegetables. There are not many of them and prices are high. Proposal has followed proposal to expand the sown areas and improve the storage base. But now, on the eve of the spring, fears have been calmed somewhat. Meanwhile, a new reduction of 266,000 hectares is expected in the areas sown to potatoes in the public sector. Little is being done to improve yield, even though in many places it is less than 100 quintals per hectare. Areas of plantations are being reduced, which will lead to a deterioration in the supplies of vegetables for the population.

Time presses, farmers! In just a week or two the plowed fields will be busy in the south of the country. The tractors will start to rumble, and the grain growers, cotton growers, and sugar beet growers will go out into the fields... Doing the spring work at the best times and in a high-quality manner means laying a solid foundation for the new harvest and insuring adequate foodstuffs for our country's population.

Kirov Hosts Non-Chernozem Conference

914B0088B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 8 Feb 91 p 1

[Report by V. Tatarenkov: "Problems of the Non-Chernozem"]

[Text] Kirov, 7 February—The work of a seminar-conference organized by the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Ministry of Agriculture and Food started here today. It was attended by about 300 representatives from all 29 oblasts and republics of the Russian Non-Chernozem—farmers, managers of agricultural and agro-industrial formations and organizations, consumer cooperatives, and local organs of executive power, and also from scientific institutions.

The focus of their attention was problems pertaining to the efficient operation of the agro-industrial complex in the region under market conditions and fulfillment of the program for its socioeconomic development, and implementation of the reform. The guests also familiarized themselves with the experience of leading farms and visited an exhibition in the House of Science and Technology which was showing the best models of technological sets insuring a high return in various sectors of the agro-industrial complex.

Officials from the ministries and departments of the Russian Federation and the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee are taking part in the seminar-conference.

Scientific

Report Analyzes Chernobyl Disaster Causes

LD1902192291 Moscow TASS in English 1839 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow February 19 TASS—Physical and constructional faults of the reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant were the major cause of the breakdown, says a report by a commission of the Soviet State Committee for Safety in Industrial and Nuclear Power Engineering.

The report analyses all the data pertaining to the disaster.

In addition to gross violations of operating procedures by the staff, the commission revealed about ten deviations from regulations and rules of the reactor's exploitation.

The reactor's control and back-up safety systems did not meet the necessary safety and constructional requirements. It also had poor physical characteristics.

The commission noted that the reactor's designers could not estimate possible consequences of its instability, while the plant's personnel failed to foresee the results of their violations.

The commission stressed the need to continue studying breakdown situations in order to work out safety measures for nuclear power plants.

Military

General Shkadov Dies in 'Line of Duty'

LD1902133591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1308 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, 19 Feb (TASS)—It is reported here today that Army General Ivan Shkadov, a prominent military leader, died tragically on 15 February in the line of duty.

The obituary, signed by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and by other leaders of the country, notes that Ivan Shkadov gave all his strength, knowledge, experience, and organizational abilities to the cause of raising the troops' combat readiness, to training and educating officer cadres.

Ivan Shkadov was repeatedly elected a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet and was a delegate to a number of CPSU congresses.

General Rodionov Cited on Defense Documentary

LD1902152291 Moscow TASS in English 1439 GMT 19 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovsky]

[Text] Moscow February 19 TASS—Colonel-General Igor Rodionov, chief of the military academy of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, said that a full-length colour documentary "From the Positions of the Defensive Doctrine" made at the film studio of the USSR Defence Ministry "rebuffs all kinds of demagogues who use the media for unbridled anti-Army campaigning". The general gave an interview to TASS today in connection with the film's showing at the academy to military attaches accredited at foreign embassies in the USSR.

General Rodionov said the new film "impresses one with a broad view of the problems of war, peace and the army in the present conditions, and convincingly represents the heroic history of the country which often had to [words indistinct] freedom and independence."

Rodionov said that the "Soviet military doctrine which objectively has always had a defensive character" has played a remarkable role in the solution of this task. This is shown clearly by processes of switching the Armed Forces to a new defensive structure and clearer defining the focus of troops's combat training.

"The USSR-U.S. treaty on the elimination of two classes of missiles, as well as the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan have become the first priority steps of military reform stipulated by the military doctrine," Rodionov said.

The general said the film reflected many of the Soviet leadership's specific initiatives for the consolidation of the Soviet Union's security and confidence-building in Europe and the world. The general noted that this task was specifically promoted by the Vienna seminar to compare the military doctrines of the USSR and the U.S., of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, and the exchange of military delegations at different levels.

"Problems of ensuring the Soviet Union's security at the present stage are broadly covered in the film," Rodionov said.

Military Prosecutors View Reform's Impact

PM2002123191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Maintaining the Rule of Law"]

[Text] A 14 February session of the expanded collegium of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office was devoted to the rule of law situation and the crime rate among troops and to the tasks of the military prosecutor's office's organs in strengthening the prosecutors' powers under the conditions of the current military reform.

The decision adopted proposed that all military prosecutors shift the emphasis in their work to officers' discharge of the law, first and foremost in connection with the protection of servicemen's lives, health, rights, and statutory interests.

N.S. Trubin, USSR Prosecutor General, and Army General K.A. Kochetov, USSR first deputy defense minister, and representatives of the USSR KGB and the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], participated in the collegium's work.

Officials View Moscow Troops' Housing Shortage

PM1302132591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Mamchur report: "Servicemen Without Apartments Come to Moscow Soviet"]

[Text] A meeting was held 9 February at the Moscow City Soviet with representatives of servicemen without apartments from the capital's garrison, attended by Army General K. Kochetov, USSR first deputy defense minister; senior officials from the Main Quarters and Utilities Administration; members of the Moscow servicemen's United Housing Committee; and representatives of housing commissions.

Opening the meeting, Moscow Soviet Chairman G. Popov attested to his readiness to back good undertakings and steps designed to ease servicemen's housing problem and seek new, unconventional approaches. Thus, according to G. Popov, agreement has been reached with U.S. firms on building a plant near Moscow to produce 15,000 houses a year. Of these the Soviet side will be allocated roughly 10,000 at first. It is envisaged that at first all this output, or at least two-thirds of it, will be used to meet servicemen's housing requirements. The most important thing, the Moscow Soviet chairman stressed, is to begin joint work with the military. To this end the Moscow Soviet has set up a standing commission on military questions and emergency situations.

Today in Moscow more than 10,800 families of officers without apartments, 500 of whom fought in Afghanistan and endured Chernobyl, have found themselves virtually in the position of refugees. Many families have been homeless for four or five years. This situation predetermined the sharp nature of the speeches.

Army General K. Kochetov urged the gathering not to take the path of confrontation but to seek mutually acceptable solutions to this highly important social problem. For its part, the Defense Ministry is doing everything it can to achieve this. Its own construction has trebled since 1986. In 1990 military construction workers erected 113,100 square meters of housing instead of the planned 94,500 meters. Next year the construction of another 126,700 square meters is envisaged. At present that is the limit of the military department's potential. At the same time, given the Moscow Soviet's shortage of 142,500 square meters of housing, last year the Defense Ministry was allocated only 2,600 square meters—or 77 apartments. Despite the fact that the Defense Ministry regularly makes a considerable contribution to the development of the capital's social sphere and cultural-consumer amenities. Compromise solutions have to be reached with the city authorities.

Supporting this idea, S. Stankevich, deputy chairman of the Moscow Soviet, dwelt on the difficulties that the capital is experiencing due to the reduction in the total amount of housing construction and raised the question of further cutting the influx of servicemen into Moscow. It was suggested that one housing construction combine should be diverted to work on military department projects on a basis of joint efforts. The speaker also noted that there is obviously an urgent need to set up military cantonments in the capital with temporary residence permits for apartment tenants for the period of their military service.

As for the Moscow Soviet's shortfall, "it lacks and will continue to lack the potential" to make this up. This shortfall has, in the deputy chairman's opinion, been created artificially. "It arose from previous party and government resolutions adopted in a completely different situation and, to all intents and purposes, in a different country... You're out of touch with the situation if you think that we can fulfill pledges made four or five years ago." In the speaker's opinion, taking a tough line on full reimbursement of debts "will not help create a normal atmosphere in the city or, in particular, to shape a normal attitude toward servicemen."

The gathering concluded that a special working group comprising representatives of the Defense Ministry, the Moscow Soviet, the United Committee, and other interested organizations must be set up in the near future to generalize constructive proposals as regards increasing volumes of construction and improving the housing distribution system, to elaborate a concrete action program, and to submit it for consideration to the USSR Defense Ministry and the Moscow Soviet.

Stavropol Joint Patrols Arrests Reported

PM1502132591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Report from "News Service" feature: "Guarding Public Order Is Not Army's Business but There Is Shooting in Cities"]

[Text] A patrol detail consisting of Major F. Belov, an officer from the Stavropol higher military aviation school of pilots and navigators, cadets S. Gorshkov and

N. Sabanov, and Militia Lieutentant Colonel G. Yevtushenko arrested after dark two men who had stolen a "Zhiguli." One of them had three previous convictions.

In the time which has elapsed since the president's decree, during local patrolling on the territory of the North Caucasus Military District 62 violators of public order have been arrested.

But in Khabarovsk, your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent reports, they have not yet embarked on joint patrolling by the militia and servicemen. The military have everything ready for this but the local authorities are being slow to make the decision. At the same time robbers and muggers rule the city, especially at night, and moreover often enter into shooting with the militia.

Odessa Training Ground Adapted

PM1502125191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report from "News Service" feature: "It Is Not Only in Odessa That They Say There Is Nothing Like Training Ground"]

[Text] The training ground of the Odessa Military District, which for 15 years has been headed by Colonel G. Chubarev, has been equipped in accordance with the new USSR military doctrine. Several large establishments with electricity and telephones have been installed here and a battalion defense area has been created. In addition special attention is being paid to catering for the soldiers and to their daily life on the training ground. That is why this training center has been awarded a cup and certificate from the commander in chief of the ground forces. And Army General V. Varennikov has awarded Colonel G. Chubarev a valuable gift.

Baltic Republics

Baltic Military Exercises End Without Incident

LD1902182991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1600 GMT 19 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga, 19 Feb—The command and staff exercises of the Baltic Military District troops has concluded successfully, the TASS correspondent was informed by Lieutenant General Petr Chaus, chief of the district's headquarters and the leader of the exercises.

According to him, there were no incidents during the 10-day exercise. The troops and equipment have returned to their stations. As stated earlier by the leader of the district's press center, taking into account the situation that has developed in the Baltic republics, the leader of the exercises took a decision on additional restrictions on bringing equipment into the exercise areas. That is why any attempt by some media channels to present the planned activities as a means of putting pressure on the sociopolitical situation in the Baltic republics are groundless.

Commentator Sees U.S. Interference in Baltics

LD1902203991 Moscow TASS in English 2021 GMT 19 Feb 91

[By TASS international news analyst Gennadiy Petrov]

[Text] Moscow February 19 TASS—"Any foreign intervention in the problem (of relationship) between Moscow and the Baltic republics....would lead only to its aggravation" was the conclusion voiced at a meeting of the leaders of left-wing parties of Nordic countries in Helsinki.

In my view, this conclusion becomes particulary topical now that, as THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper writes, the Bush administration intends to increase political and material aid to the separatist Baltic republics. According to a report by the Voice of America (VOA), Washington is studying measures such as the opening of U.S. information centres in these republics. Since such centres cannot be given diplomatic accreditation without Moscow's consent, the possibility of setting them up with the aid of the private sector is under consideration, VOA points out.

Thus, the United States is virtually elaborating a specific plan to interfere in the Soviet Union's internal affairs by means of economic and diplomatic levers.

The plan is only being discussion [as received] but meetings between representatives of the baltic republics and U.S. Administration leaders have become frequent. According to the VOA, diplomatic contacts with these representatives on the part of the staff of the U.S. Consulate in Leningrad are intensifying.

The following question arises: How will all these measures influence Moscow's no easy relationship with the present leaders of the Baltic republics?

It seems that such stand of Washington and some West European capitals can only complicate the search for mutually acceptable solutions, since it is much more difficult to show restraint and look for compromises if one of the sides counts on material and political support from the outside.

It is apparently not fortuitous that Lithuanian leader Vytautas Landsbergis is not only urging the West to give direct economic aid to the Baltics in circumvention of the Soviet Government but also insists that for the Soviet Union itself this aid should be stipulated by a number of political conditions.

I think, plans and some actions by foreign states, which are virtually aimed at breaking up the Soviet Union, by no means accord with the strategic interests of the international community, including the West.

This has been repeatedly pointed out by sober-minded political figures who are interested in stability in the international arena and in the development of all-round cooperation between West and East.

Lithuanian Legislature Appeals for Recognition

LD1902194691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1835 GMT 19 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent]

[Text] Vilnius, 19 Feb (TASS)—The Lithuanian legislature today adopted an appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposing that it should "authorize a state delegation of the Soviet Union to embark on talks with the aim of restoring recognition of the Lithuanian Republic and concluding a relevant treaty."

In this document the Lithuanian legislature officially informed the Soviet legislators of the results of the poll on its status held in the republic on 9 February. The poll was attended by 84.7 percent of the voters, and of them 90.47 percent voted for an "independent and democratic Lithuania." As is well known, even before the referendum was held, the president of the USSR declared that it had no legal force.

In today's appeal, the Lithuanian legislature confirmed its resolve to restore the "legal relations violated in 1940 between the Lithuanian Republic and the Soviet Union." The document also contains a demand to the legislators of the USSR to declare void the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 3 August 1940 on the inclusion of Lithuania into the USSR. This is based on the connection (?between) this decision and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

[Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1900 GMT on 19 February in a similar report adds: "Furthermore, the Lithuanian legislature proposed that the Supreme Soviet evaluates the recent illegal acts of the USSR Armed Forces in the Lithuanian Republic and instruct the executive authorities of the USSR to return immediately the state facilities seized by the USSR Armed Forces in January, and withdraw from Lithuanian territory the repressive subunits of the army, internal troops, and USSR KGB. The session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet also continued its discussion of the draft laws on privatization of state property and several other problems"]

Lithuania Receives U.S. Charity Medical Supplies

LD1702151291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 17 Feb 91

[Text] Charitable assistance to Lithuania continues. Today, a good hour ago, a plane landed at Vilnius airport bringing a contribution from a U.S. charity organization—a large shipment of medicines valued at $3 million. The medicines are escorted by a U.S. delegation, which also includes the Lithuanian Catholic religious charities consultant for medical affairs, Dr. Daiva Bajoriunaite. Americares is the first private charitable organization from the United States providing major assistance to Lithuania following the initiative announced by the White House for direct humanitarian and medical aid to Lithuania. A large part of the shipment is comprised of vaccines for the protection of infants and children free diptheria, whooping cough, and tetanus. Analgesics, antiseptics, and various other medications are also included in the shipment. The orgnizers of this medical shipment to Lithuania will be received today by Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis. He also met today with the Oslo municipal delegation that is visiting Vilnius.

Landsbergis Meets Council of Europe Delegation

LD1702122791 Vilnius International Service in Lithuania 0100 GMT 17 Feb 91

[Text] A Council of Europe legislative assembly delegation, headed by Vice Chairman Gerhard Reddemann, is currently visiting Lithuania.

Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis received the delegation today. The visitors were given documents detailing the bloody actions perpetrated in January by the Soviet military, the results of investigations by the Lithuanian General Procuracy, and also the conclusions reached by the independent Soviet military Shchit [Shield] organization.

On the prospects of negotiation with the Kremlin, Vytautas Landsbergis said that as long as soldiers remain on the premises of the occupied buildings the prospects for negotiations remain slim.

The head of the delegation, Gerhard Reddemmann, disclosed that a session of the Council of Europe is being prepared for June in Helsinki, during which the problem of the Baltic countries will also be discussed and to which the deputies of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will be invited.

Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius today received members of the Council of Europe legislative assembly David Atkinson, Daniel [name indistinct], and [name indistinct]. The legislative assembly members expressed the opinion that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia may be accorded special guest status within the Council of Europe.

During the course of the conversation, position of the Western states regarding international recognition of the Lithuanian Republic, Lithuania's juridical and economic situation, and relations with the Soviet Union and Russia were discussed.

Prime Minister Gedminas Vagnorius noted that both the Western states and Lithuania are interested in the Soviet Union's stability. He also expressed the exceptional juridical position of Lithuania—Lithuania not as a part of the USSR.

Landsbergis Receives British Embassy Officials

LD1402222791 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 14 Feb 91

[Text] ELTA reports that Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, yesterday received David Manning, the head of the Political Section of the Embassy of Great Britain in Moscow, and Richard Brudge, first secretary of the embassy.

The British diplomats were informed of the current political situation in Lithuania.

Today the British officials left for Moscow.

Lithuania's Vagnorius Returns From Tallinn

LD1602104291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 15 Feb 91

[Text] Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius returned today, from Tallinn, where he participated in a government consultation meeting. This already marks the fourth Baltic state and certain Union republic meeting of government heads.

The consultation committee signed protocols on development of foreign economic relations, customs cooperation, and other questions of economic existence. Coordination of price policy was also discussed.

Lithuanian Supreme Council Approves Appointments

LD1402225791 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 14 Feb 91

[Excerpts] The second session of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania continued its work today.

At the morning plenary sitting, a decision was adopted about the changes in the economic commission of the Supreme Council. As Gediminas Vagnorius has been appointed to the post of prime minister of Lithuania, he has been released from the economic commission. The session complied with the request of deputies Algirdas Brazauskas and Romualds Rudzys to work on the economic commission of the Supreme Council. A resolution was adopted on the coming into force of the law on education and studies.

It was decided to extend the work of the second session until 1 March 1991.

Audrius Rudys, chairman of the budget commission, submitted some amendments to the law on taxes of the Republic of Lithuania. An amendment to the law on land taxes was adopted. [passage omitted]

The parliament released Gediminas Vagnorius from his duties as member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council on his appointment to the post of the prime minister of the Republic of Lithuania.

The Supreme Council decided to partially change its resolution of 5 June 1990 and, in place of Kazimiera Prunskiene, instruct the deputy of the Supreme Council and the prime minister of the Republic of Lithuania, Gediminas Vagnorius, to represent the Republic of Lithuania in the Baltic Council.

In replenishing the permanent commission on land defense and internal affairs of the Supreme Ozolas as member of this commission. Deputy Jonas Liaucius was elected chairman of the permanent commission on land defense and internal affairs. [passage omitted]

Lithuania Denies Blocking Central Press

LD1402212891 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 14 Feb 91

[Text] Republican Minister of Communications Kostas Birulis has made the following statement to ELTA:

On the Vremya program of 13 February, Bartosevicius, an administrator appointed by the captors of the House of the Press, was complaining that he was unable to print the Soviet Union's central newspapers because of limits on sending the text of these newspapers from Moscow to Vilnius by telegraph. I declare that the communication enterprises of the Republic of Lithuania have not introduced any technical limitations on this means of communications. After the seizure of the House of the Press, the personnel of the workshop for receiving texts of the newspapers were chased away and so long as this situation prevails, the workers of the state telegraph enterprise cannot return there, and the telegraph equipment remains without supervision.

This was a statement by Republican Minister of Communications Kostas Birulis.

Shenin Addresses Lithuanian Party Aktiv

PM1902114591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 91 Second Edition p 6

[Report by correspondent Yu. Stroganov: "'No' to Confrontation"]

[Text] Vilnius—The sociopolitical situation in Lithuania today may be assessed as exceptionally complex. The republic's Communist Party is being actively attacked by forces seeking to wrest it from the family of Soviet peoples. Calls are being heard to declare the supporters of Lithuania's development within the USSR as criminals.

"Some people believe that the Communist Party of Lithuania has now switched to the defensive, that confusion and uncertainty reign in its ranks. Have you seen such a situation in Lithuania?" I asked O.S. Shenin, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who has arrived in the republic.

"My meetings with communists give no grounds for such assertions," Oleg Semenovich replied. "Today's party aktiv attests to their conviction and devotion to their cause..."

At the meeting on Sunday [17 February] between the republic's party aktiv and O.S. Shenin, there was a businesslike, frank talk about the reasons for the complex sociopolitical situation in Lithuania and ways out of it. Addressing the gathering, Oleg Semenovich drew special attention to the need to renounce the confrontation between different political forces in Lithuania without losing the communists' main principled positions.

"As the January (1991) combined plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Committee noted, the current moment should be assessed as a critical phase of perestroyka," O.S. Shenin said in particular. "The crisis processes are continuing and growing in the economy and in the social and political spheres, especially in interethnic relations.

"The January plenum stated resolutely and clearly that there could be no question of any renunciation of the perestroyka which has been begun or of any 'backsliding,'" the CPSU Central Committee secretary said.

"This turn society's mood and in the party's combat capability obviously did not suit and does not suit the nationalist, extremist, so-called "democratic forces" eager for power. On the far-fetched pretexts of the danger of dictatorship and a right-wing coup they have mounted a powerful coordinated campaign against the party and against the results of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The tragic events in the Baltic were a kind of shot in the arm for these forces, and they used them in an attempt to substantially destabilize the situation, to seriously complicate the party's position, and to fuel anticommunist hysteria.

"The events in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in January showed graphically that the so-called 'Baltic crisis' which began two years ago has entered a new, extraordinarily dangerous phase. Today it is already perfectly clear that we are dealing not with a fortuitous coincidence but with a wide-scale, thought-out, well-coordinated, and consistently implemented plan of action having the ultimate goal of changing the socialist system and correspondingly separating these republics from the USSR. This explains to a considerable extent the intentions and actions of political forces and, recently, of organs of state power of the republics, which have been assigned the role of practical executors of this plan.

"At the same time," O.S. Shenin noted, "the problems which really exist, particularly the economic problems, are being aggravated. The volume of industrial and agricultural production is falling. Social programs have been ruined. Under the slogan of sovereignty there is a virtual stifling of the future market. Hence the destruction of existing economic ties; the provocation of interethnic conflicts; the declaration that enterprises, banks, and other institutions and organizations under Union subordination are republican property; and a number of other destructive actions.

"Calculations by specialists show that the destruction of economic ties will bring mutual damage of billions of rubles to the republics and will put them back decades, thus dragging them into the creation of their own infrastructure. For republics with a small economic potential, that damage will be simply fatal.

"Having proclaimed the supremacy of their own laws over the laws of the USSR," the CPSU Central Committee secretary continued, "some people are trying to create autonomous financial and credit systems and to resolve on an individual basis questions of money circulation, right up to the production and issue of money. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are pursuing vigorous activity in this direction. Last year the Estonian Government placed an order in the West for the production of Estonian crowns. These actions undermine the trust of the developed countries and Western bankers in economic reform and our banking system's potential for the economy's financial recovery.

"The people's vital interests and their rights and freedoms are directly linked with the future of our Union. This indeed is the main purport of the Union treaty and its function," O.S. Shenin said. "Right now over one-fifth of the country's entire population lives outside its national-state formations. There are hundreds of thousands of interethnic families in each republic. The position of millions of people living outside their own national-state formations could change fundamentally. At best, they will become citizens of a new country as national minorities; at worst, they will become undesirable foreigners. The growth of migration is inevitable, accompanied by the breakdown of human destinies, material losses, and huge expenditure on the provision of facilities for resettlers, which no republic can sustain. There is only one way out of the situation which has taken shape: retaining the Union and finding a correct division of powers in the leadership of the country's economy, ensuring the fullest use of the strong aspects of centralized rule and the republics' sovereign rights. That thought was heard convincingly in USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's 10 January address."

O.S. Shenin then noted that "The objective reality is such that, under the conditions of economic chaos and the political, social, and national polarization of society that is being aggravated with every passing day, acquiring the form of a split in that society, those political forces which operate on the principle 'the worse, the better' are emerging increasingly impetuously to the fore in the life of the Baltic republics. They are primarily national-radical groupings which have won key positions in the leadership of the people's front, parliaments, and governments and are also the most extremist organizations. The spectrum of these forces' operation is very broad—from the adoption in the republics of anticonstitutional, antidemocratic laws which encroach on the political and social rights of citizens and substantial groups of the population, overthrow democracy and glasnost, and implant an atmosphere of intolerance toward dissent, to provocative actions against servicemen, communists, 'traitors to the nation,' and inhabitants of nonindigenous nationality. The most dangerous thing is that paramilitary structures created in the Baltic republics and also the politically immature section of the population and, which is particularly offensive and painful, young people are being enlisted increasingly frequently into these actions. All kinds of emissaries of people's fronts and other so-called democratic organizations from Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldova, Moscow, and Leningrad and also from abroad are influencing the aggravation of the crisis in the Baltics. Essentially what is being formed is a coalition of antisocialist forces which does not conceal its intention to play the 'Baltic card' and on that basis to undermine the integrity of the USSR and presidential power and to plunge the country into a state of uncontrollable elemental chaos.

"At the same time," the speaker said, "we believe that the difficulties of the Baltic Communist Parties are being aggravated by the lack of unity among the progressive forces in the republics as well as by our own organizational and cadres weakness, the party committees' errors in assessing specific situations and the deployment of forces and in their tactics, by their lag in propaganda and mass political work, and by their leaning toward the administrative side in resolving urgent problems. Until recently political support from the Communists of Russia, the Ukraine, and other republics was inadequate.

"It should be said," O.S. Shenin noted, "that the West is not taking such a kind view of the positions of Landsbergis and his team. People there believe that the results of the poll in Lithuania only give moral support to the Lithuanian leadership, but they do not bring closer but could on the contrary complicate the solution of problems both within the republic and in its relations with the center. People abroad believe and, I think rightly, that the poll will not influence the position of the president, who firmly intends to preserve the Union as a single renewed state or federation.

"We believe," O.S. Shenin said, "that in the present conditions the USSR Government ought to place the emphasis on the lack of proper legality in the Lithuanian authorities' activities. All acts issued since 10-12 March 1990 by the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet are legally invalid, since they are the result of an illegal initial action and are based on it. Accordingly, the only basis on which talks could be held with Lithuania is the USSR Constitution and the Lithuanian SSR Constitution. I should also like to put the following question to the Lithuanian delegation: Is the Lithuanian side aware that disregard for the realities of Lithuanians joining the USSR in 1940 and nonobservance of the procedures laid down by the law for secession from the Union are equivalent to a renunciation of all the territories that were not under Lithuanian jurisdiction on 10 October 1939—that is, before the conclusion of the "treaty on the transfer of the city of Vilno and Vilno Oblast to the Lithuanian Republic and on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania"?

"The Lithuanian leadership's violation of Soviet legislation may ultimately require the center to adopt measures to protect the population of certain territories from the one-sided influence of Lithuanian separatist forces. One such measure is the introduction of presidential rule in the aforementioned territories, with their final status to be established at a later date on the basis of the results of properly conducted referendums. In view of the concern Soviet citizens and the foreign public feel about the safeguarding of peace in Europe, it is important to state that the fundamental condition of any version of Lithuanian secession from the USSR is its strictly enshrined pledge to respect the Soviet Union's military security needs and to prevent Lithuanian territory from being used for any actions against Soviet interests.

"The CPSU Central Committee believes," O.S. Shenin said, "that the strengthening of mutually beneficial international links with communists and the progressive public in the Baltic area should be a most important area of the practical work of the country's communists now and in the future."

On the basis of assessments of the situation in Lithuania, the CPSU Central Committee secretary recommended certain practical steps to stabilize it and made suggestions about republican Communist Party tactics.

"The moment of truth has arrived," O.S. Shenin said in conclusion. "It is the task of Lithuanian communists and all democratic forces to struggle for genuine democracy, to explain the strategy of socialist renewal, and, by analyzing and correcting mistakes, to proceed toward the main goal—the renewal of our Union and creation of a humane socialist society. "

O.S. Shenin's speech was ardently endorsed by the meeting participants.

"Our children do not have the hard life that we once had to live," A. Vilkitskene said. "The legislature wants to take us back there, however."

Questions connected with the economic situation in the republic and the country and with unresolved tax problems as a result of the "war of laws" were raised by G. Kruk, director of the Klaipeda "Baltiya" plant. Lithuanian SSR Prosecutor A. Petrauskas also talked about the "war of laws" and about the undemocratic nature of the Lithuanian legislature's activities.

"The time has come to stop being silent. We must defend ourselves and our ideas," said Ch. Vysotskiy, second secretary of the Shalchininkskiy Lithuanian Communist Party Rayon Committee. "We must firmly uphold our choice."

In these and other speeches the meeting's participants voiced agreement with the fundamental tenets of the position set out by the Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary. There was repeated criticism of B. Yeltsin. A statement on the results of the debate was prepared and read out.

M.M. Burokevicius, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, participated in the meeting with the party aktiv.

Proceedings Instituted in Shchit Arrest Case

LD2002093191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Text] Criminal proceedings were instituted on 19 February at the Lithuanian Republic Procuracy regarding action exceeding authority by Belous, Vilnius City military commandant, on 12 February. This is the date on which Yevsigneyev, Melkov and Bychkov, independent military experts of the Shchit [Shield] Organization, were illegally apprehended at the city's railroad station.

Initial investigation is being conducted by the Criminal Investigation Department of the Lithuanian General Procuracy [words indistinct].

'Open Letter' From Prunskiene Published

LD0802141091 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 25 Jan 91 p 2

["Open letter" from former Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene to the Lithuanian people: "I Am Working for Lithuania"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The ex-prime minister and deputy of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic, Kazimiera Prunskiene, has left for abroad on business for the organization

"Assistance To Lithuania." She left an article with the TIESA Editorial Office, which we are presenting for the attention of the public.

Dear People of Lithuania,

The misfortune that has befallen Lithuania continues to bleed like a deep wound. The sacrifices experienced by people in their defence of independence assert more firmly than any referendum could our resolution to restore a free state. The majority of the Lithuanian people are living under the stress of a major concern—to hold their ground against the aggressive forces destroying the state from the outside as well as from within. Any daily difficulties or physical discomforts pale in the face of this common danger. However, even in this respect, we must remain not only strong, but also honorable and we must be guided by truth. Only the truth, and not lies or duplicity, slander or toadyism, can withstand evil and also aid Lithuania and goodness to grow in strength. No matter what great sorrow or worry assails us, we must not be guided by emotions alone, accumulate within ourselves hatred and revenge and jump to conclusions in search of the just and the culpable and heroes and traitors. Unfortunately, this has not manifested itself either in pickets or meetings, or in free discussions in the course of deliberating appeals and declarations of one shade or another.

The immense political tension, either consciously or unconsciously inspired, that could by no means have been experienced to the same degree by all, culminated on 8-15 of January and spilled over with blood and tears and physical suffering and sorrow, inflicting terrible consequences upon Lithuania and its near future.

During this difficult period each one of us can and must bring our offering or useful contribution. To remain inactive or to fail to utilize the existing possibilities to overcome difficulties would be at the very least immoral. Having at one's disposal official state duties creates preconditions for effective activity, however, only the preconditions are created by that. Exactly in the same manner as before, having already left the official state duties behind (I am refering to myself, in this instance), I do not plan to lose that which belongs to Lithuania or to me, and plan to accomplish whatever is possible, but not by sitting down. Broad international relations with the governmental structures of many states, parties, international organizations, charitable foundations, known politicians, scientists, journalists and clergy representatives and especially, with the Catholic church in European countries, may be utilized for the good of Lithuania. I have already begun to become actively engaged in this, not through state structures, but through an international organization, "Aid To Lithuania," which was established in 1990 through a joint initiative by me and Liucija Baskauskaite, pro-rector of Vytautas the Great University in Kaunas, and which has been successfully functioning for several weeks already. Liucija herself is a most valuable assistant who could not have gone unnoticed by the Lithuanian people while she was was involved in work for the English broadcasts by Kaunas Television.

I think that discussing with the political world subjects related to support for Lithuania and organizing various support endeavors: people's education, international analysis of various areas of Lithuania's existence, subsidies for vital needs of a humanitarian nature etc., putting to use the political authority acquired during the past several years, is as significant, as working within governmental structures, where sometimes, unfortunately, much time is lost and without any useful result.

Due to great emotional tension for political figures and people in general, political work has become highly complicated in Lithuania. There are those who for one reason or another continue striving very furiously to compromise former government leaders and myself, specifically. Others, being lost, or powerless to adequately appraise the situation, are withdrawing into an existence of inactivity; others still toss about, failing to find effective solutions—the maturing of which calls for a calm businesslike, objective analysis of the political situation and a discussion that will have to begin anyway and lead to a logical conclusion. As I understand it, this will take a long time since a common, acquiescent political emotional environment has evolved to accept officially presented evaluations without criticism. A superficial concept of unity is prevalent, causing those who think otherwise, or hold their own opinion, supported by authentic experience, a knowledge of facts and a logical analysis of events and actions, to be labeled as wreckers, or even traitors. That is, an accustomed norm of Stalinist traditions. It appears that certain officials and free listeners and supporters of one single truth are involved in the propagation of the treachery and enemy of the people version. Any statement of mine (and to remain quiet would be no less criminal, than to weave intrigues or upheavals) is accepted with one's own interpretation, in whatever manner happens to be convenient for one, often being interpreted with one tendency or another, as was done by the "Vremya" program, or other television broadcasts, which showed one fragment of a news conference. For this reason, but by no means because of any ambitions, I will for the time being work in an independent environment—in a manner which in my estimation will be the most useful for Lithuania. Thank you all, who with your letters and statements have expressed understanding and support.

I firmly believe, nevertheless, that Lithuania will be able to encounter a political strategy, leading it out of an impasse into statehood and will be able to clear things up with itself as well as the world. Only after leaving behind confusion and emotional tension and comprehending the essence of the situation, ourselves as a full-valued nation and Lithuania as a European State, its dramatic past, complicated present, consolidating ourselves for the future, we will be able, with the help of the world, to become victorious against aggression and aspire toward a dialogue and peaceful coexistence with other civilized nations.

I remain always with you, Kazimiera Prunskiene

January 23, 1991

Council of Europe Delegation Holds Latvia Talks

LD1602165991 Moscow TASS in English 1451 GMT 16 Feb 91

[Text] Riga February 16 TASS—Anders Bjork, chairman of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe and head of its delegation visiting Latvia, has stated that the reason for the trip was the "striving to find a solution to the Baltic problem." The guests visited the Latvian parliament today.

Members of the delegation met leaders of the Popular Front Parliamentary Group and the Equality Group. They had conversations with Minister of Justice Viktor Skudra and heads of national-cultural societies.

The visit will end on February 17 with a visit to the Latvian Foreign Ministry.

Spring Call-Up for Army Continues in Latvia

LD1602231991 Riga International Service in English 1830 GMT 16 Feb 91

[Text] The spring call-up in the notorious Soviet Army is still going on. Latvian youths have two opportunities: First, to serve the regular military service in the Army of USSR, or to choose the alternative one in order to work for the benefit of Lativa.

The representatives of USSR Armed Forces have announced that about 200 boys chose the military service. They also declared that no enforced call-up would be carried out. In contrary, the alternative service commission of the Council of Ministers of Latvia said that there are several facts at their disposal when youths were invited by the Soviet Army commanders to pass the medical examination but instead they were immediately transported to the Army's barracks.

Autumn Call-Up Complete

LD1802232291 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 2030 GMT 18 Feb 91

[Text] The Military Commissar of Latvia, Colonel (Steiners) has announced that the autumn call-up in Latvia has been completed. Since the resolution on the extension of this calll-up, 300 more youths have gone off to serve in the USSR Armed Forces. According to (Steiners), a third of these are Latvians. (Steiners) also asserts that all those called up in Latvia will remain to serve in the Baltic Military District.

Latvians Serving in Baltic Military District

LD1802102191 Moscow TASS in English 1008 GMT 18 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga February 18 TASS—All youths inducted into the Army from Latvia this year are serving in the Baltic Military District, according to Colonel V. Teymers, deputy chief of the republican induction service.

Last autumn, only a quarter of all youths due for military service reported to induction stations. President Mikhail Gorbachev had to issue a special decree extending the induction period in some areas, including Latvia. The commander of the Baltic Military District promised that all conscripts will do their stints there.

Of the 300 youths inducted since then, every third is Lettish. A total of 170, or more than a half, were previously registered as doing alternative service.

The induction in Latvia has now been completed in strict compliance with the law, Colonel Teymers said.

Riga Militia Demand Interior Ministry Changes

PM1902102991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent I. Kuzmin under the "Direct Line" rubric: "The Militia's Demands"]

[Text] Riga, 7 Feb—Since the bloody events in the center of the Latvian capital on the night of 20 January, personnel from the Riga militia garrison have met three times. As at the two previous meetings, they discussed replacing the present leadership of the republic's Internal Affairs Ministry which, according to the overwhelming majority of the personnel, says it is in favor of depoliticizing Internal Affairs Ministry bodies but in practice follows the same policy of politicization—the one difference being that now it is in favor of the People's Front.

The minister himself, A. Vaznis, plays no small role in this. That is why those present at the meeting once again demanded that the republic's government and legislature "immediately replace the Latvian Internal Affairs Ministry leadership." The speakers were unanimous that the ministry must be led by someone who enjoys general confidence. Moreover, the situation in the republic is being considerably aggravated by the existence of so-called special detachments of the voluntary people's militia answerable to I. Bishers, first deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers. Many instances show that these detachments often perform functions independently of the militia and are outside its jurisdiction. This still further exacerbates and confuses the already complex crime situation in the republic.

The participants in the meeting reaffirmed their loyalty to the USSR Constitution and the Latvian Constitution and their solidarity with the special militia unit which has recently been the focus of incredible fabrications and rumors; they also strongly advocated immediate reforms in the republic's Internal Affairs Ministry system.

We will soon know whether the demands made by representatives of the Riga Militia Garrison meeting are going to be met.

Baltic Republics Reject Union Cultural Bodies

LD1502105591 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0800 GMT 15 Feb 91

[Text] Latvian First Deputy Minister of Culture (?Nelija Jenovs) has returned from Moscow. She participated in a meeting called by USSR Minister of Culture Nikolay Gubenko, to which the ministers of culture of all republics were invited. Latvia and Estonia did not sign any documents. The Lithuanians did not take part in the meeting at all. The other republics signed a cooperation agreement between the USSR and republican ministries of culture.

The ministers of culture of the Baltic republics announced, through the mediation of their representatives, that they decline to function within the framework of the Cultural Council formed by the USSR Ministry of Culture. In the view of Latvian Deputy Minister of culture (?Nelija Jenovs), the broad all-Union programs offered for adoption by USSR Minister of Culture Nikolay Gubenko are framed in the style of earlier years.

The representatives of Latvia and Estonia emphasized that cooperation in the field of culture will continue horizontally. It is intended that Russian Minister of Culture Yuriy Solomin will soon arrive in Riga to sign cultural treaties already prepared between Latvia and the Russian Federation.

Latvian Citizens 'Uneasy' Over Money Exchange

LD1402203391 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1200 GMT 14 Feb 91

[Text] Although the question of exchanging money is emphasized as the main topical issue today, people's minds are still uneasy. As the deputy chairwoman of the Bank of the Republic of Latvia informed us, altogether 830 million rubles have to be changed in the republic. At the moment there is not that much money in the republic, but the prognosis for the future is optimistic, and the bank staff promises to exchange at least an average month's earnings as early as next week.

Latvia Centralizing Public Order Units

LD1502180291 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0530 GMT 15 Feb 91

[Excerpt] The structures for the maintenance of public order are being centralized. The Government of Latvia has adopted several resolutions centralizing the activity of the previously disparate public order protection units. It unites four or five varying structures, including the units of volunteer order guards of the Republic of Latvia, various public organizations' order guards, and more. They will come under the Department of Public Security, whose head will be (Janis Aivars Baskis). [passage omitted]

Latvian Legislature Views Delayed Rehabilitations

LD1502140591 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0630 GMT 15 Feb 91

[Text] At the sitting of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, there was discussion of the question of why there are delays in the rehabilitation of unjustly repressed persons. It turns out that the reason for this is the inaction of the Procuracy of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, as ever since the division rehabilitation cases have not succeeded for the Procuracy of the Republic of Latvia. This was also reported by Chairman of the State Security Committee Edmunds Johansons, in asking the Supreme Council and the government to find a solution to this question. Evidently this is not being handled by the Supreme Council group of deputies headed by Linards Mucins. Edmunds Johansons asked the Presidium of the Supreme Council to examine and settle the status of the State Security Committee in the Republic—to finally attain clarity about the fate of this organization and its activity in the Republic of Latvia.

Also before the Presidium is a submission from the leader of the Defense and Internal Affairs Commission, Talavs Jundzis, requesting the abolition of the resolution of the Supreme Council of 8 January this year on the absence from work of young men doing alternative service. The resolution envisaged excusing this on the grounds of the tense political situation in the republic and the real threats to limit the freedom of these young men by the USSR Armed Forces. The Presidium of the Supreme Council resolved at its plenary sitting on Tuesday to examine this question.

'Livonian' Territorial Division Formed in Latvia

LD1502155691 Riga International Service in Latvian 0530 GMT 15 Feb 91

[Text] a Livonian territory has been formed. In order to ensure the conditions for the preservation of the Livonian people and their development in Latvia, as well as to protect the last place inhabited by Livonians in Latvia, the government has formed a special Livonian cultural-historical territory to be protected, in Ventspils and Talsi Rayons, on the coast of Kurzeme Province.

The borders of the territory have been defined by reference to historical information about the location of Livonian lands. In this territory it will now be forbidden to conduct many kinds of economic activity. According to information from Elder [Vecaka] of the Livonian Association of Latvia [Latvijas Libiesu Savieniba] Ieva Neilande, there are about three hundred people in Latvia at the moment who regard themselves as Livonians.

Radio Rossii Heard in Latvia

LD1602210491

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 1113 GMT on 16 February, in a report on the opening of a congress of the Peasants Union in Riga, by correspondent Valentina Bochkova, notes:

"The technical services of Latvian Radio have made everything possible to ensure that the programs of Russia's Radio [Radio Rossii] can be heard in republican territory. It must be mentioned that they have done a splendid job. Processing can be heard clearly and, what is no less important, on frequencies that are familiar to our listeners."

Estonian Independence Day Rally Set for 24 Feb

LD1902104391 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 0700 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] The Republic of Estonia's Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Republic of Estonia's Government invite everybody to take part in the festival hoisting of the Republic of Estonia state flag on top of the PIKK Hermann tower [in Tallinn] on 24 February, Estonian Independence Day. Choirs and combined brass bands will perform at the festive ceremony. Estonia and its people will be blessed by Kuno Pajula, archbishop of the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church.

Edgar Savisaar, government leader, will make a speech. [passage indistinct] The event will start at 0720. [passage indistinct]

Council of Europe Official on Estonian Poll

LD1602170291 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 16 Feb 91

[Text] The Council of Europe's attitude to the USSR as a sovereign state does not depend on the results of the referendum on 3 March on the issue of restoring Estonia's state independence. This is what Miguel Martinez, vice president of the assembly of this international European organization and representative of Spain, told journalists. The Council of Europe delegation has arrived in the Soviet Union with the purpose of looking for possibilities of assisting in resolving the conflict between the republics and the center. Common sense, Martinez believes, must prevail. A path acceptable to both sides will be found.

Interregional Council Urges Poll Participation

LD1502210991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Feb 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The Interregional Council of Estonian People's Deputies and representatives of labor collectives today appealed to all people to take part in the republican referendum and to give a resounding no to the restoration of a bourgeois republic.

Committee Meets in Tallinn on 'Horizontal' Ties

LD1402200891 Moscow TASS in English 1843 GMT 14 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn February 14 TASS—A meeting of the consultative inter-governmental committee opened here today. The committee is a body set up late last year at the initiative of the Estonian Government to coordinate horizontal relations between Union republics.

According to the BALTFAX News Agency, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, and Kazakhstan did not reply to the invitation to participate in the meeting.

The prime ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia will hold, also today, a separate meeting. The cabinet heads will discuss economic cooperation between these republics.

Since Latvian Prime Minister Ivar Godmanis could not come to Tallinn, this republic will be represented by his Deputy Anris Kalnyns.

Statement of Tallinn Human Rights Meeting

LD1402201191 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 13 Feb 91

[Text] Participants in the 11-13 February international human rights meeting in Tallinn have issued a statement which we will read out to you now:

Keeping in mind Article 1 of the international pact on citizen and political rights, which provides all nations with a right to self-determination and according to which they can freely establish their political status and freely ensure their economic, social, and cultural development, having listened to arguments from the Estonian Government and different political forces, we express our recognition of the way Estonia is striving for its self-determination. The resolution on holding a referendum in the presence of international observers can be regarded as an appropriate step by which the Estonian people can freely establish their political status and ensure free development of their eocnomy. We rate the recently signed Estonian-Russian treaty as a promising step in implementing human rights. We are naturally in favor of any kind of international cooperation in the sphere of human rights, and we support the possibility of some kind of Estonian institution, outside the government, acting in the international arena.

The participants regard the Tallinn human rights seminar as one of the possible forms of cooperation. Any other future joint activity of the Baltic states, Russia, Nordic countries and central European human rights organizations will be similarly regarded.

RSFSR

Yeltsin 19 Feb Moscow Television Interview

LD1902182491 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1550 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Interview with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, by Oleg Poptsov, chairman of the All-Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, and television announcer Sergey Lomakin; in Moscow—live]

[Text] [Lomakin] Good evening. I am glad to welcome in our studio Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. Welcome, Boris Nikolayevich! I also have the lucky opportunity of introducing to you, esteemed television viewers, my colleague, journalist Oleg Maksimovich Poptsov, chairman of the All-Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Company; he is a people's deputy of the Russian Federation. Well, we shall not waste time; I promise we shall be brief and to the point in our questions so as to give you, Boris Nikolayevich, the opportunity of having your full say. I will not conceal the fact that I have a lot of of questions, many of which I have taken from mail sent to our editorial office.

Well, to get started and finish this short introduction, I suggest we start right away with the questions. I think we will start with the first, and probably most burning question at present, namely the question of the proposed, anticipated reform of price-setting. As far as I know, Boris Nikolayevich, you at one time gave a negative response to the Union Government's proposal to carry out such a reform; that is, as far as I understand, you effectively laid the whole responsibility for carrying out this operation—one which is, of course, unpopular, but no doubt essential—upon the government's shoulders. Perhaps you can explain your position?

[Yeltsin] Yes; I simply think one must be consistent. The program that was laid down in Shatalin and Yavlinskiy's 500 days program, that program of price reform, looked quite different. It was not in first place. It was not predicated upon starting economic reform with price reform, so that Pavlov and others could ride into the market upon that, upon the shoulders of the people. Pavlov probably thought up this reform back when he was chairman of the Prices Committee and then in the Ryzhkov government.

Last May Ryzhkov made an attempt to put it through, and the people voiced their attitude about it. Then there was an about-face. It was said there would be no such price rise. Finally, the same thing again. That is, the new government is carrying out reform in the old way.

It is my opinion that such price increases will lead to an impasse, since the rise in wholesale prices brought in from 1 January—without consultation with the republics—and the fact that compensation will be included in wages, will have a knock-on effect on production costs, which will lead correspondingly to another increase in wholesale prices, another in retail prices: that is, this first spiral will lead to a second and third spiral of rising prices.

This will, of course, really lead to a situation where producers have no interest in raising the quality and quantity of output; peoples' standard of living will fall; consumption of food produce, which is already pretty meager, will fall even further. Let those who drew up this document sign it themselves.

[Lomakin] We agree with you, Boris Nikolayevich, but the point is that it is an absolute fact that at the time a number of economists called for the market to be absolutely free, unregulated, to let prices float, and why should one hide it? This rise in prices is, after all, already taking place before our eyes, for all intents and purposes. In Moscow, for instance, without agreement with the center and the republic, this increase, this hidden increase of prices, is being carried out.

[Yeltsin] That is another issue. Allow market prices, free prices, or regulate them in the state sector, only in the state sector—but people are also buying from the market and the cooperatives, and other places. Therefore, precisely this will deal the biggest blow to the population.

[Poptsov] I think that psychologically, too, this is not very good either. Because, starting from an increase in prices, this means altogether scaring people away from the idea of the market. Not having stabilized the monetary unit, not having stabilized the goods market, this will instill a terrible fear in our citizens. After this, changing over to and talking about the market will be even more complicated.

[Yeltsin] Oleg Maksimovich, I would like to return, nevertheless, to the 500 days program. It was torn to pieces and thrown out, even though this was a good piece of work. History is still to judge this and will probably remember who initiated its destruction. There this problem was drawn carefully and elegantly in all its details: 150 of the most needed items—consumption foods, foodstuffs, and goods—are frozen; the others are gradually released onto the market. Then, when the market is being formed, out of the 150, a proportion is gradually released onto the market: That is how this problem was resolved, and not simply by a first mighty thrust in one go, increasing prices several times.

[Lomakov] I agree with that.

[Yeltsin] After all, people may not be able to bear all this.

[Lomakov] Yes, I agree with you, I agree. But all the same, what, then, is Russia's stance in this situation? I feel that it is impossible to conduct a price reform—or not to conduct a price reform—in the country without taking account of the requirements of one, two, or three republics. There have been examples. You remember, Estonia raised prices, and residents of Estonia dashed over to Leningrad and swept everything up.

[Yeltsin] Yes, I understand. I understand that a situation has now developed in which we perhaps cannot manage without it. But once again I say—I mean, let the initiators, the drafters, sign it—but our task, the task of the Russian legislature, leadership, and government, is to protect the population of Russia to the greatest degree possible.

[Lomakov] But is there already some kind of program for the protection of the population?

[Yeltsin] Yes, there is such a program, and I do not understand the address yesterday by Prime Minister Pavlov when he said that we envisage less than the Union Government seems to give. First, the Union Government is not giving us anything for compensation. It is we who are allotting to the Union Government a certain amount of money—23.4 billion rubles from the budget. So I do not understand his figures or where he got them, although he ought to know them.

We oppose compensation being carried out in a centralized manner, because Russia will then lose as a result of it. We will take the task of compensation upon ourselves. All the same, there will not be 100-percent compensation, and the people must not be deceived. They must not be deceived. There will not even be 85-percent compensation; they must not be deceived about that either.

[Lomakin] I agree, Boris Nikolayevich, but let us go back to the question of where the money is to come from. Forgive me, but the question is extremely important after all, it seems to me. So far it has not yet been thoroughly explained. I would like to return to the problem...I do not want to call it the Filshin affair, or the 140-billion-ruble affair, but in actual fact...on the "Vremya" program yesterday, Pochinok said something about the conclusions of the legislatve commission on this business...in actual fact the situation at the moment is still not clear to most viewers, and it is not clear to me either. Only one thing is clear: rubles were sold at black market prices for dollars—one dollar for 18.5 rubles—so accordingly the problem arises that, once the deal is concluded, we would all be forced to pay superprices for food and goods which the foreign firms would have supplied us. That is to say 150-180 rubles for a kilogram of meat. Excuse me, quite incomprehensible prices, and further more...

[Poptsov, interrupting] Let us allow Boris Nikolayevich to answer.

[Lomakin] Yes, of course. I just want to stress that I read the conclusion of the commission, and it turns out that the Western partner is a company registered in South Africa, and in fact we do not have the right to have any economic dealings with this firm. After all, we observe the international UN treaty on sanctions against South Africa.

[Yeltsin] First, I would like to remind you that this deal has not so far been made, and neither the rubles nor the dollars have left anywhere or gone anywhere.

I think that Kryuchkov, the KGB, has many deals which have been concluded already and he will always find such a deal at the necessary time. What is necessary now is to compromise in some way the Government of Russia to prevent Russia's foreign economic ties from developing directly with other countries. This alleged deal cropped up very nicely.

I do not vindicate Filshin. He really did sign such a guarantee and then did not see it through. Therefore, it cannot be said that he is innocent. But he has no direct participation in this deal and the deal itself has not taken place, and the fact that it was seized by the KGB at a very critical moment of course gives rise to serious suspicions: Where did the firm come from? Why is there just one person in the firm, and where did that one person come from? Why was he already under suspicion, and why was he already on the register, and so on and so forth?

I have another question to ask you, Sergey Leonidovich. Why has not television, among others, put on its list such questions as where the gold from the Russian Federation is going? In just over a year, 200 tonnes of gold has gone abroad, and a load of diamonds too.

[Lomakin] You have in mind the case of the sale of gold and diamonds?

[Yeltsin] No, that was a trifle. I have in mind more than 200 tonnes of gold. Who will answer for this? They were taken from the Russian union gold reserves, the gold fund, and went abroad. For what purposes? Where is it being kept? Who is responsible? What did it pay for? Nobody knows, nobody knows...

[Lomakin] Do you know, Boris Nikolayevich?

[Yeltsin] I know that it has gone and from where; I know the point from where it has gone, and I know how much has gone, but I do not know where.

[Poptsov] I believe this will be of great interest, perhaps, for television and for a legislative investigation. But I would like to change the subject somewhat since, whether we want it or not, it is somehow becoming one-sided. We are, on the whole, speaking about instability now, and instability is in evidence, indeed. It seems to me that finding a scapegoat is our constant concern, and now the main scapegoat has been embodied in the person of Yeltsin, as it were. Yeltsin is the initiator of instability and Russia, too, since Yeltsin personifies it as its leader at the moment. Yeltsin is dismantling the Army—a lot is being said about that today, too,—and Yeltsin and Russia are starting the so-called war of laws. It seems to me that these are super-fundamental issues. What is your opinion, Boris Nikolayevich?

[Yeltsin] No doubt, they are fundamental, but I think that to accuse me is not new, this is already...[changes thought] You see once a cliche has been formed, it is easier to use it in connection with other cases later on. It has become quite customary for a number of bodies, including central bodies, the leadership and, incidentally, certain media, especially those belonging to the party, to accuse me for more than a year, for several years and especially of late. Therefore, one can get over it somehow, more or less. But I absolutely cannot agree with the specific formulation of the issue alleging that it is Yeltsin who has started the war of laws. Where does the war of laws—if one may call it such—originate? It originates from the fact that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet is more radical than the Union Supreme Soviet and the president who issues decrees. When we see that they have not brought these reforms to a certain level of radicalism, we must revise them.

Let us, for example, take the law on the tax rate on profits, which the Union law defined at 45 percent. After studying international practices and so on, we arrived at the conclusion that at 45 percent, half of our enterprises would slow down. They would lose interest in increasing production right away. International practices shows that this tax rate on profits should be 35, 36, 37, or 38 percent at the most. We set it at 38 percent. In order to prove that this is no war of laws—and sometimes it yields positive results, too—here is the following fact: It is written in the draft law or, to be more precise, the draft decision that the Cabinet of Ministers has submitted now, that 38 percent should be set.

[Poptsov] Pavlov said even 35 percent.

[Yeltsin] That is, the same rate as in the Russian Federation. Even 35 percent—that is, what we examined—is being considered now. Indeed, the figure may even be reduced to 35 percent. You see, this is one example, and one can quote quite a few such examples. Further, if an obvious violation of the Russian Federation's sovereignty is taking place, should the Supreme Soviet, as Russia's supreme legislative body, defend its sovereignty or not? How? There is no army, no Committee for State Security. How are we supposed to defend it? We must defend it through our laws. The Supreme Soviet responds accordingly to those laws which encroach upon the Russian Federation's sovereignty. That is the first part of the question.

With regard to the second question, about the Army, yes, there have been attacks upon me, and incidentally this campaign has been developing in a very impetuous way in the Army. There are special questionnaries, and I visited a tank division in Kaliningrad and it is interesting, they showed how they approach this platoon by platoon. The platoon commander signs then all the rest of them sign a protest against Yeltsin, saying that he is against the Army, so to speak. In the first place, I have never been against the Army. I am against the Army being used against the peaceful population in the resolution of certain ethnic conflicts, against blood being spilled and the Army afterward being accused of having taken part in these operations. In our country the people have always a very respectful attitude toward the Army, and now they have gradually begun with these actions, pushing the Army into such actions against the peaceful population. Well, here and there the people have begun to waver. This process has begun to take place in the Army itself.

[Lomakin] This is correct, Boris Nikolayevich. However—excuse me for interrupting you—it seems to me that, on the whole, the credibility of a politician and his commitment are tested by the consistency of the policy he adheres to. So I have the following question which bears upon the Army—sorry, but since we have touched upon this topic... One time at a news conference after the Lithuanian events, you said that under such conditions Russia will have to think about creating armed forces of its own. At a meeting with servicemen in Kaliningrad Oblast, you said that neither you nor the Russian legislature had a single thought about creating your own army. Perhaps lack of understanding stems from the fact that there are certain statements of yours that are contradictory? What is your view, after all?

[Yeltsin] It is good that you have traced all my statements on this account.

[Lomakin] This is my professional duty. I have prepared myself for this meeting.

[Yeltsin] I understand, Sergey Leonidovich. This is not a reproach.

[Poptsov] But you are not accurate here.

[Yeltsin] I will clarify the point. There was a discussion at the news conference, as always. The discussion led to the following point: If things go the way they do, if, indeed, such pressure is brought to bear upon us as to encroach upon our sovereignty, if, indeed, we have nothing to defend ourselves with, then we should think about our defense and, perhaps, an army. But it was not a question of proposing this to the Supreme Soviet or making a definite decision. It was only a subject to ponder upon. Incidentally, as for pondering upon, it is not necessary to create a Russian army here. Why could not one of the ideas be as follows—by the way, this could be envisaged in the reform of the Army—to carry out the initial stage of training a home guard [opolcheniye] at young men's places of residence in the Russian Federation?

[Lomakin] Boris Nikolayevich, are you not thinking of the creation of the Lithuanian Department for the Protection of the Country or something of that kind? Excuse me, but a sort of similarity springs to my mind right away. A home guard in Russia and...[changes thought] An army is a nationwide body; it has always been a nationwide body.

[Yeltsin] I understand; I, too, am in favor of the Army being, on the whole, a state-wide body and protecting the Union. I have never had any doubts in this respect. But as for reform in the Army, there are several approaches, and the version of a Russian national guard, some part of it, is possible. But of course, nobody is speaking about some sort of strategic, major, nuclear, or other weapons.

[Lomakin] Boris Nikolayevich, can you really seriously believe that this can be a subject for discussion? I think that it is, well, unlikely even in the conditions of Army reform.

[Yeltsin] I think that, for the time being, this is at the discussion stage. Therefore, I said that...[changes thought] Who knows what will happen in 15 or 20 years? We do not know whether there will be a Russia or what shape the Union will take; that is not known, either.

[Poptsov] I would like to speak about one issue, since I attended that news conference. It seems to me that we are creating a problem that does not exist, for literally the following was said: If things continue going the way they are now, a situation may arise in which we will be urged toward the idea that we need to create our own army. That is precisely what was said at the news conference, and all the interpretations relating to this matter were intended for spite. Each hears what he wants to hear.

[Lomakin] Oleg, I agree, I withdraw the question. Let us stop here. I do not think this is the main topic of today's interview.

[Poptsov] Yes, I agree.

[Lomakin] I beg your pardon. It seems it would make sense to move on to an event that will be of great importance both for Russia and the Union as a whole. I mean the all-Union referendum and, incidentally, the Russian Federation's referendum will be held on the same day.

As far as I know, you have your own point of view on formulating the question for the all-Union referendum and the two questions which Russia is bringing forward.

[Yeltsin] Yes, our legislature and I have our own points of view, not only on the referendum but also in regard to the discussion of this question here in the studio. I am requesting today to speak on television before 17 March, and I hope that the way here will not be as rocky as it was this time, and I shall have an opportunity on that occasion—before 17 March, immediately before the referendum, to talk in greater detail about the referendum.

[Poptsov] Boris Nikolayevich, now I have, I think, in a way a very serious, key question: On the whole we know about certain discomforts in your relations with the center but, speaking objectively and honestly, the seven months of the new leadership of Russia were not cloudless; mistakes were probably made, and indeed they were made. What is your assessment of the miscalculations that the legislature, the government, and maybe yourself have made—how do you see this, what do you think in this regard?

[Lomakin] Excuse me, Boris Nikolayevich, just in addition to this—I thought that you would certainly touch upon this question—I think that many people are worried about the situation that is developing in the relationship between the two leaders, between you and the president. One has a feeling that there is a certain mutual mistrust, certain animosity, maybe even of a personal nature. I, for example, have a kind of gut feeling that for each action of the president, there is a counteraction from Russia.

[Yeltsin] But maybe it is the other way around?

[Poptsov] Then I—I do not see this—shall not put this into the category of mistakes. One would like after all...[words indistinct as all three talk at once] I just want to find out Boris Nikolayevich's opinion on this matter. The people are tired of this, you understand. This is very important—the constant confrontation.

[Yeltsin] Well, regarding the mistakes. Regrettably, there were mistakes. For such a relatively short time, seven months, the mistakes were made by the Supreme Soviet as well as by the government and by me personally. And not simple mistakes. First, I think that I demonstrated, I should say, too much trust or, rather, credulity, and believed that the 500 days program was really supported by the president, among the others. When it was crushed and thrown away—recently in KOMSOMOLKA [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] there was a cartoon: the mausoleum, and in place of Lenin it is written 500 days, and there is a long queue. That is, it was put in there already—such is its value. I mean that first we should have put up a fight for it for some time, to invite the republics. Second, we should not be upset for such a long time that it was not adopted—we have lost three months on this.

That is, we were relying on this program. When it was not adopted, we were actually in such a situation that we were left without a solid program. What was left were the principles, and we worked according to these principles. But, in fact, we were left without a program.

[Poptsov] Do you think that Russia could have carried out this program?

[Yeltsin] No, not on its own, because there exists one currency throughout the Union and one market throughout the whole Union. No, not on its own. Yet it could have carried out some of the principles. But they should have been put separately, and then there could have been a kind of separate program. But this is certainly a very difficult thing, because then all the republics will implement their own programs. This is, generally speaking, not a market.

This program was practically signed there by all the republics with the exception of Estonia.

I think that the mistake lies in the fact that we permitted wholesale prices, without having agreed on them with the republic, to be arbitrarily implemented throughout the national economy of Russia. I consider it a mistake that, after wholesale prices on grain were increased by the Union, we, in Russia, in order to save animal husbandry—and this was, nevertheless, a mistake—brought in, enhanced wholesale prices on meat to R8 (?a kilogram).

[Poptsov] And the Ukraine started to bring in (?livestock).

[Yeltsin] Yes, you are absolutely right. This was, of course, a mistake. The Union spread it to all the republics, because it was such a good opportunity not to be lost. Well, I think that there were also a number of other mistakes that can be regretted.

[Poptsov, interrupting] Well, Boris Nikolayevich, I think that..

[Yeltsin continues] They certainly, I would say, worry me personally. Nevertheless, what has happened has happened.

[Poptsov] I think the fact that our legislature has been constantly spending its time on all sorts of political jabbing can also be considered one of our mistakes. When the legislature to some extent steps aside from its work of making laws and is forced to issue statements on every occasion—this consumes a terrible amount of energy and effort. This is also probably a great mistake.

[Lomakin] Oleg, forgive me for interrupting you, but Boris Nikolayevich, I would like to clarify the situation around a very small piece of information that appeared recently. I think it was reported in PRAVDA that a meeting took place, among a small group, of the leaders of four republics...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] Five republics!

[Lomakin] Five republics, yes—who discussed some current problems. Generally speaking, it was practically impossible to understand anything because the report was extremely short. But the essence of it was that there was an idea, an initiative put forward by you, to create a union of four republics made up of three Slavonic and the Kazakhstan republic. Is this so?

[Yeltsin] The fact is that this was...

[Lomakin, interrupting] Do you exclude the possibility that the Union Government could take part in this as an equal partner?

[Yeltsin] I would like to say once again that this was a meeting of the leaders of five republics: of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. We got together after the Federation Council meeting, since we had no time to work through the draft decision on the structure of the Cabinet of Ministers, because it was received only quite recently.

[Lomakin] That was quite recently?

[Yeltsin] Yes, this last Saturday. For this reason we decided to examine this question. We decided to examine the question regarding the fact that we, having concluded bilateral treaties, did not have some mechanism to monitor whether these treaties were being complied with, especially regarding deliveries, contracts between enterprises. We have created such a system. That is point number one. We discussed proposals on the structure of the Union Cabinet of Ministers. That is point number two. We have agreed that these proposals cannot suit us in any way, as they provide for an even greater hardening of the center and pressure on the republics. And this is impermissible now. It is again not being taken into account that the sovereignization of the republics is a perfectly historical process that you cannot disregard. Only through the greater independence of the republics can questions be resolved more quickly.

[Lomakin] Can it therefore be assumed that the next step is a continuation of the opposition, the critical opposition, to the center?

[Yeltsin] I think that it is rather a preparation for signing the Union Treaty, inasmuch as bringing closer the positions of five republics is already a great step forward. It will be easier afterward for the center to coordinate all aspects of the draft Union treaty.

[Poptsov] Boris Nikolayevich, we have a fairly limited time; I would like to ask you, possibly, the main question. Nevertheless, where is the way out? Will we live better? How do you see the Union? And a final question: What do you believe in, and do you believe in anything under these conditions? I would like you to say this in this connection, the more so as the problem of faith for such a country as Russia has at all times been of exceptional importance.

[Lomakin] Yes, that is a fair question.

[Yeltsin] Well, taking into account that these questions were somehow discussed earlier by us, I have prepared myself very attentively for this, and I must say this frankly. The great efforts that the Russian legislature and government have been making of late: 140 laws and decisions have just been adopted. They concern above all the social sphere: These are questions of the protection of needy citizens, pensioners, servicemen, mothers and children, and young people. In the sphere of the economy, legislative acts have been adopted regarding the independence of enterprise—what we want in particular is that this departmental pressure should not be weighing down enterprises, that they should be independent: laws on entrepreneurial activity, on the tax system, etc.

A serious work-through is being conducted on questions and laws connected with the privatization of property, and these questions will be discussed at this session. Laws have been adopted in the agrarian sector on the social development of the countryside, on the farming economy, and on foodstuffs. Right now the question is also being energetically resolved at the extraordinary commission on foodstuffs. For example, we have decided to secure for everybody who has garden and kitchen-garden plots the use of them free of charge forever, and apart from that, to increase from 600 to 1,500 the size of plots for those who wish to obtain a plot for horticulture and market-gardening; and further, this year, without fail, to hand over to those who wish to run a peasant farmland of the size that they want, and moreover, to do all of this in March, a part of April, and at least before the start of the planting season. Then we will be able somehow to improve questions of food supply.

[Lomakin, interrupting] And perhaps the mechanism is ready...

[Yeltsin] And the mechanism is ready.

[Lomakin] Worked through?

[Yeltsin] Worked through.

[Lomakin] There will not be questions?

[Yeltsin] Well, this list could be continued. The implementation of the Russian legislature's plans gives an answer to the question: Will we live better? Yes, if Russia can live according to its own laws, if Russia can implement the adopted laws, if the center does not block republican bodies. All of this tells first and foremost on the work of enterprises, people's situation, and the work of local bodies. We will not be able to live better with the existing center. That is what I wanted to say. We will not be able to live with the center's constant policy of deceiving the people. In the first two years after 1985, Gorbachev inspired certain hope in many of us. In fact, from that moment there began his active policy of—I am sorry—deceiving the people. In giving promises, he—one must suppose—did not picture very well how to fulfill those promises. Having inspired people with hope, he began to act according to different laws. This has particularly revealed itself recently when it became perfectly obvious that he wants, while preserving the word perestroyka, not to restructure in essence, but to preserve the system, to preserve harsh centralized authority, and not to give independence to the republics, Russia first and foremost. His anti-people [anti-narodnaya] policy also showed itself here: This means monetary manipulation; the unprecedented Pavlovite raising of prices that is being prepared; the sharp swing to the right, the use of the Army against the civilian population; blood in interethnic relations; an economic crash; low living standards for the people; and so on.

There is the result of these six years of perestroyka for you, and this is where the main point lies. What is taking place now is a roll-back in the opposite direction. An attempt is being made to reanimate the administrative-command methods and to strengthen the administrative-command center. At the same time no desire whatsoever is being shown to see the processes taking place in the republic. After my election as chairman of the Supreme Soviet, voters voiced insistent demands that we should move toward cooperation with the leadership of the center. I will tell you frankly—and God sees—I have done a great deal. I have made many attempts, several attempts, to cooperate with him [Gorbachev] indeed. We have met several times and have spent five hours at a time discussing our problems, but unfortunately the result afterward was always the same.

[Lomakin] Boris Nikolayevich, I have to interrupt you; we don't have that much time left, so perhaps you should now be thinking about your conclusion.

[Yeltsin] Yes. We...after such cooperation, I think that my personal mistake was excessive trust in the president. By all accounts, the center is not going to allow the republics to take independent steps. Having carefully analyzed the events of recent months, I declare: I warned in 1987 that Gorbachev has in his character an aspiration to absolutization of personal power. He has done this already, and has brought the country to dictatorship, eloquently terming this presidential rule. I distance myself from the position and policy of the president, and advocate his immediate resignation, the handing over of power to a collective body, the Council of the Federation.

I believe in Russia, and I call upon you, esteemed fellow citizens, esteemed Russians, to believe in our Russia. I have made my choice, and everyone must make a choice and determine his position. I want you to hear me and understand me. I have made this choice. I will not turn off this road. I need the trust and I believe in the support of the peoples of Russia, in your support, and I hope to receive it.

[Lomakin] Boris Nikolayevich, I must interrupt you, because we already have very little time left before our live air time ends. Speaking frankly, this pessimistic note troubles me very much indeed, because it means that the confrontation between the center and the republic and between you and the president of the country will continue, and I now conclude that clearly this is only making our situation more serious. I draw the conclusion that, unfortunately, this is not leading to the stabilization of our society, but is perhaps even leading to the splitting of the nation. Neverthless, we must conclude our program, even on that pessimistic note. I am glad you came. We gave you the opportunity to speak your mind.

[Yeltsin] Thank you.

[Lomakin] I hope that there will be further opportunities. As a journalist, it was interesting for me to talk to you. I thank my colleague Oleg Poptsov.

[Poptsov] I think that the main thing, all the same, in our contact and in our movement forward is the truth factor.

[Lomakin] Yes, well, one could go on discussing that further—what kind of truth should it be?

[Poptsov] There is always only one kind of truth.

[Lomakin] There is one kind of truth, but it is interpreted in different ways.

[Poptsov] That is a different subject.

[Lomakin] Thank you for taking part in the program. All the best to you. Goodbye.

[Yeltsin] Goodbye.

Moscow Party Criticizes Interview

LD1902222791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2133 GMT 19 Feb 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Boris Yeltsin's live appearance on television is one of today's major events. He spoke after the working day was over, but nevertheless the Moscow City CPSU Committee and Moscow's Control Commission have already adopted a resolution on his statement today. It said that the Moscow party organization comes out against confronting Russia's and the Union's interests and expressed support for the president.

Deputies' Price Reform Draft Rejection Viewed

PM1502165591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 91 Second Edition p 2

[Report by Ye. Sorokin under the rubric "At the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Session": "More Amendments"]

[Text] It seems that the Supreme Soviet resolution on Russian Prime Minister I. Silayev's report will go down in history as the most unfortunate. Yesterday deputies once again rejected the draft proposed by the drafting commission without even adopting it as a basis.

There were plenty of reasons, including the fact that one deputy described the document as a "bomb under the chairman," in the sense that the government may supposedly be asked to resign on the basis of the document.

I. Silayev himself also opposed many of the document's provisions, in a quite well reasoned manner, moreover. As a result the question arose of replacing the drafting commission, and B. Yeltsin instructed the Supreme Soviet Presidium to amend the document. That was what they settled on doing.

As we can see, the efficiency of the session's "rear services"—the committees and commissions—leaves something to be desired, which is quite natural if you consider the clearly politicized nature of the Russian legislature. This was manifested with particular force during the discussion of the agenda. S. Peruanskiy, unhappy with the criticism of the legislature and B. Yeltsin, demanded that a law be adopted immediately on defending the chairman's honor and dignity. It has now become a kind of tradition to abuse the awkward mass media and perceive some kind of "information blockade." Although I do not think they have ever written, said, or revealed so much about a legislature as about this one.

B. Yeltsin informed deputies that he will be given an opportunity to speak live on television on the First Program. He also said that he has received the Union Government's proposals regarding raising prices. At the insistence of deputies, an in camera parliamentary sitting was held to discuss these proposals. The entire evening sitting was devoted to this question.

The report from the deputies' commission that is checking the deal between Russian organizations and foreign firms was also on the agenda. However, the commission was not ready to report its final conclusions: It will only be ready this afternoon.

RSFSR Deputies Beaten at Pro-Army Rally

LD1802163491 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1330 GMT 18 Feb 91

[Text] A rally has been held in Yaroslavl in support of the Soviet Army. Many deputies and military men attended. Democrats came. The only frightening aspect was that there were incidents at the rally. (Stanislav Gaylis) and (Aleksandr Tverkov) RSFSR people's deputies, were beaten and the banner which the Russian Federation has designated the state flag was torn up.

Russian Referendum Questions Formulated

LD1902202191 Moscow TASS in English 1931 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow February 19 TASS—The executive presidency in the Russian Federation and the preservation of the republic as a single federative multinational state within the renovated Soviet Union will be voted during the all-Russian referendum on March 17.

"Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Russian Federation as a single federative multinational state within the renovated Soviet Union?" and "Do you consider it necessary to create the post of the Russian president to be elected by popular vote?" are the questions that have been approved by the Central Commission of the Russian Federation for Referendums in the USSR and the Russian Federation.

The Russian referendum will be held simultaneously with the all-Union referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union as a "renovated federation of equal sovereign republics".

The decision to hold the all-Union referendum was made by the Fourth Congress of the People's Deputies at the end of 1990.

The Russian parliament discussed the all-Russian referendum in the beginning of February, but differences over wording prevented it from making any decision.

The wording of the present questions is based on the proposals made at that time by 400 deputies.

According to legislation, 355 Russian deputies have to vote for in order to hold the referendum.

Soviet of Nationalities Head on Union Treaty

91UN0904A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 13 Feb 91 pp 1, 2

[Report on interview with Ramazan Abdulatipov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, by Almira Kozhakhmetova; place and date not given: "You Can Be Left, But Not Left of the Heart"]

[Text] *Ramazan Abdulatipov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, answers the questions put by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA. The subject of the discussion is whether the signing of the Union treaty will save the state from destruction.*

"From my home," Ramazan Gadzhimuradovich said, "it is easier to get by foot onto Georgian soil than to get to Makhachkala by car. My relatives live in Georgia, and Dagestanis and Georgians have long been bound by family ties. Approximately 45,000 Dagestanis live there altogether. And I suddenly learn that a great campaign for their eviction is under way! Their ancestors had come here in the past, what is more, at the invitation of Tsar Irakliy II to protect the borders of the Georgian state. They sacredly observed all the laws and customs of the republic, and here they are now having to make ready at a moment's notice and leave. When the chairman of the Dagestan Supreme Soviet heard what the visitors from Georgia had brought with them, he grew numb at the affront. How could they say such words: take away his people?!"

It is said that it was he, Abdulatipov, who stopped his fellow countrymen when hotheads had resolved to take retaliatory action. "Even if the authorities lose their minds, the people must remember the age-old laws of hospitality."

[Kozhakhmetova] Ramazan Gadzhimuradovich, you have long been involved with questions of national relations and devoted your candidate's and doctoral theses to this subject. What do you think: Why has the biggest and ethnically most patchwork Union republic—Russia—not yet been caught up in the vortex of national fratricidal strife? Is it possible today to trace the seams of instability?

[Abdulatipov] I believe that the ballooning of the question of the indigenous and nonindigenous population could detonate Russia. I am speaking not so much of the processes occurring within our federation as outside of it. Look at the Baltics, Moldavia, and the Central Asian republics. The main line of confrontation in these regions is estrangement between those who consider themselves the owners of the land and the so-called "immigrants" and "newcomers," that is, Russian speakers. Or people of Russia because these are not only Russians but all those who live outside of their national-territorial formations—Chechen, Kabardintsy, Avars, Ingush, Tatars.... As long as they feel uncomfortable in other republics, the sword of Damocles of national enmity will hang over Russia.

I often think about the fact that in our society there is no mentality of cooperation and coexistence. Interethnic cooperation included. This is why we are increasingly today going on the warpath. It is well known that a struggle of opposites is a condition of creation, but with us it leads to annihilation. It is good that a process of national revival is under way actively in various republics. But why must some people always be injured? A tragedy occurred in Lithuania, and echoes of it are audible in Latvia and Estonia. We saw here, it would seem, only what we wanted to see.

But why is there disregard for the obvious fact that all that occurred was the result of the great confrontation between peoples, which has been going on in the Baltic for several years running? I have been there many times since 1987 and have been amazed that both sides had not started shooting at each other before now. Including servicemen, for their patience is not unlimited, after all.

[Kozhakhmetova] Yes, harassing a person with a gun, performing his military service, is not only immoral but stupid also.

[Abdulatipov] I am incensed most by the fact that this is happening in republics that have called themselves democratic. But does anyone have to have it explained that if I, for example, expand my living space by abridging the rights of another, this is antidemocracy. Because in a truly democratic state the law is on the side of every—every—individual. It is equal for all. If yesterday truth was on the side of some, but today is boasted of by others, this is simply a change of dictatorship, and nothing more.

[Kozhakhmetova] It seems at times that nothing is done here as it should be. Obedient to sound laws of economic advantage, the West Europeans are uniting. Racial and ethnic hatred is challenged at the same time also. It is as though we, however, need nothing from one another as long as we do not hear a foreign tongue next to us.

[Abdulatipov] This is like a malignant tumor gripping increasingly new parts of the body. Say we were to begin to eliminate the centers of tension in the Union republics and resettle all Russian speakers in Russia. Would we resettle 26 million? But the Russian Federation could not handle 5 million! How can we disregard, for example, the fact that in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] it is the North Caucasus which produces a steadily high unemployment percentage? In my area—the most mountainous in Dagestan—the population is approximately 30,000, but there are just 36 hectares of plowland. Where would those who return live and work?

There is one further aspect of the problem. We are seeing that potential "immigrants" who are inhabitants of cities are reluctant to move to the countryside. The preference remains large cities: Moscow, Leningrad. Against this background the appeals of certain politicians—return, we will accept everyone—appear irresponsible and absurd even. We are not ready to accept people! The Russians who live here permanently lack normal apartments, the waiting list for housing is growing, and unemployment looms. Why deceive people and summon them, inciting thousands and millions to another tragedy?

[Kozhakhmetova] As I understand it, when signing treaties with other republics the hand of the Russian leadership should be guided by economic interest also. That is, it is necessary first and foremost to discuss the future of the Russian speakers?

[Abdulatipov] Economic interest goes without saying. But we need also to look ahead and understand that millions of aggrieved people, driven out of republics on a national basis, could return to Russia. I repeat, on a national basis. According to the laws of chain reaction, the aggrieved and injured would begin in revenge to drive out all the "funny-looking ones." I was in Azerbaijan following the Baku events and saw for myself that the Baku Armenians and Baku Azerbaijanis got along with each other very well. But "crazy"—Azerbaijanis who had fled Armenia—showed up. This charge of 80,000 persons virtually detonated Baku. What if all is repeated here! Although, of course, a certain a percentage of returnees and resettlers is inevitable. But we do not have the right to turn this into another deportation of the peoples.

[Kozhakhmetova] If, for all that, we have to make room and provide shelter for Russians? Is a program for getting people fixed up being prepared?

[Abdulatipov] Everything remains at the level of pious wishes as yet. Our Soviet of Nationalities adopted a special appeal to the legislatures of the Union republics which pointed out that we welcome the process of the national revival of all peoples, but cannot remain indifferent to the fate of our compatriots. But these were just words. But as for the program itself, a mechanism which would come into play as soon as the need arose, there is none. I personally understand how the process of people's move to Russia should go ideally. But only generally. And the Soviet of Nationalities will, I believe, undertake the specification and details of such a mechanism in the very near future.

[Kozhakhmetova] Nonetheless, how do you conceive of this?

[Abdulatipov] Expenditure on the new start for each family that wishes to leave should be assumed by the republic in which the individual has been living and working of late. Let them build him a home from their own—republic—resources, let them discuss all problems with the local soviets and so forth. Lest there be a recurrence of what happened with my Dagestani fellow countrymen, whom the present Georgian Government is offering "traveling expenses" of 30,000 rubles [R] for everything and—get going. What, pray, is R30,000 for the construction of a home in a new place if the ramshackle hovel in Makhachkala is today worth a minimum of R50? Besides, for peoples that have lived together for centuries, attempts to buy them off are simply immoral.

What is happening altogether horrifies me: We are allowing ourselves to divide neighbors into indigenous and nonindigenous. Moreover, all this is being covered by democratic banners. I went to Georgia prior to the April 1989 events and in the Academy of Sciences sustained the serious onslaught of the ultra-democratic intelligentsia (this is what is calls itself, what can you do). And so, attempts were made to prove to me that the Abkhaz are not indigenous inhabitants of the Black Sea shoreline inasmuch as they came here only in the fifth century. You could go mad: 15 centuries—this is not enough for the right to a homeland! It could be explained, of course, that the ethnic boundaries of the settlement of the peoples and the present political borders have never coincided and cannot coincide. You could rummage around in books and present a mass of examples. But I would greatly like to say that tomorrow we will be ashamed of what we are doing today. [end Abdulatipov]

...Stop! It was here that I found the end of the string. This was it—the answer to the question I had been asking myself during our interview. Why did I so much want to believe this person, believe in his sincerity? He spoke normal words, human, eternal: shame, neighbors, guest. We have become tired of these blinkered politicians and people in party containers. They speak fine words about the people, but feel no pain.

I learned that the chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities was ashamed for his colleagues hooting down Colonel Alksnis at one meeting. I remember that day, the second during the present session of the Russian legislature. They were speaking about the Lithuanian events, about the offensive against democracy. But how many tubs of dirt were poured on Alksnis when he went up to the microphone. "Whatever his views," Abdulatipov believes, "he was a guest in our legislature. A person should not be 'slammed,' whoever he is—Alksnis or Sakharov. We are not accustomed to behaving like this with a guest in the Caucasus. Even when he has left, he is not discussed for a whole three days—it is not the done thing." Precisely.

[Kozhakhmetova] Ramazan Gadzhimuradovich, going back to the treaties. Russia intends to sign another—with Georgia this time. Will it specify the rights of minorities in Georgia itself?

[Abdulatipov] We need to speak, I believe, not only about the rights of the minorities but of the rights of each individual in any republic with which we build relations.

Speaking in the legislature, Russian deputies have observed repeatedly that we have no concept of interrepublic treaty relations. The concept of a treaty which suits merely one faction in the Supreme Soviet is sometimes imposed. The more aggressively, say, the movements emerging in the republics behave in respect of the official structures, the more some of our deputies sympathize with them. They perceive this as a great manifestation of democracy.

But such an approach is unacceptable. We are beginning to support chauvinist forces! The forces which, while allegedly fighting for democratic transformations, have in fact sought just one—the purity and supremacy of their race. You will most likely recall that at the elections in certain regions of the country a situation had taken shape in which the present leaders would hardly have come to power with social slogans. But national slogans were advanced and worked faultlessly. It is with these authorities that the vast poisonous fields of nationalism have flourished.

[Kozhakhmetova] Much has already been said about the slanging match between the Russian legislature and the Union center and the war of laws and budgets. But this struggle has now entered a new phase—the Russian autonomies card is being played. Can you predict who, crudely speaking, will win the tug-of-war?

[Abdulatipov] Since the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies I have been saying: "the autonomies are breathing down our necks." Any steps we take in respect of the Union would be copied at other levels. So it has been. As soon as we declare the supremacy of its laws on the territory of Russia, the autonomous entities immediately present similar demands. They are understandable, but they create the soil for a deepening of the general chaos. Tatarstan recently announced that its laws were above Russian laws. And there are already regions which are refusing to obey even the laws of the autonomous entities of which they are a part. So lest the "rope" break, the leaders of Russia and the Union should urgently sit down at the negotiating table and decide how and with what to approach the signing of the Union treaty. If we distribute authority, we can go on living, if not, we will go on arguing until we reach the end of the line. [end Abdulatipov]

...I am writing these notes and listening to how on the radio some member of the Russian Supreme Soviet is explaining to the audience: "The adoption of a radical resolution on the political situation in Russia is being impeded by the right." Named among this "unscrupulous" right is he also—Ramazan Abdulatipov. So, when we met, I asked him: To what wing in the legislature do you attribute yourself?

[Abdulatipov] A. Solzhenitsyn's thought that the interparty struggle is exhausting Russia is very close to me. I see the extreme right and left always closing ranks in their destructive influence on the people. The marketable and primitive version of the "quarrel" between Gorbachev and Yeltsin is in vogue today also. They do not hit it off, allegedly, and so forth. In fact, it is clear that there is a more deep-seated confrontation at the legislative level between the communists and Democratic Russia. Each faction hopes that the other will go bankrupt, run aground, and then....

But I see that we are so close to these shoals that the people have finally become embittered and could kick both off the ship of the legislature. Then a third force would emerge in the political arena. It cannot be ruled out that it would be corrupt and criminal. Traveling around the republics, I have noticed that thieves, bribetakers, and mafia groupings have never before felt so safe and at ease. Because it is they who are prepared to fill in the power niche which stands empty while the interparty squabble is under way.

I am by conviction a centrist and am sickened by the philosophy of extremes. But it is this that is the armament of the democrats currently. To a greater extent than the conservatives, what is more. The latter are still somehow tortured by a guilt complex over the past. Although it should weigh down on all equally because I, for example, do not know among our deputies a single one who was born in 1985. We are all from the past. [end Abdulatipov]

...We continued to speak at length about many things. About the feeling of national pride, which is rich in nuance, and about what prevents people with a dissimilar eye shape and different party cards living next to one another. And I recalled words said "near the final curtain" and with which I fully agree. The person who demeans his compatriot readily bows his head and bends his knee before the stranger. Our humiliation before the world is not a question of humanitarian premises but of ourselves. Abdulatipov described how during the Paris summit our, Soviet, citizens from various Union republics—members of every conceivable front and movement—were running around the streets, waving banners and protesting against their own head of state. It was shameful because Parisians viewed all this as an invasion of savage tribes. Well, if we continue to live this way, we run the risk of finding ourselves not on the sidelines of civilization even but beyond it. All together.

Bookstores To Write Off Political Literature

LD1502183991 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1350 GMT 15 Feb 91

[Text] [Announcer] I complete our newscast with a report from Petrozavodsk.

In Karelia's shops and trading organizations of the All-Union "Soyuzkniga" Society and political publishing house an order has arrived to write off their stock of sociopolitical books. Figuring in the list of books are also brochures about Gorbachev's visits abroad. The reasons for the write-off is simple: marketing of such literature is not possible in connection with the changes in the country's internal political life and in the international situation. Book trading organizations will receive 50 percent compensation for the books which have been written off.

RSFSR Delegation Returns From Ossetia

LD1302231891 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2045 GMT 13 Feb 91

[Text] [Announcer] The results of the mission undertaken by a group of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republics [RSFSR] peoples' deputies to Georgia in connection with the events in South Ossetia were discussed in the RSFSR Soviet of Nationalities today. A decision on this question was not achieved, since there was not a quorum. Meanwhile the situation is very serious. This is what Nikolay Rozhannikov, the deputy chairman of the human rights committee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet told me:

[Begin recording] [Rozhannikov] The commission has unanimously arrived at the conclusion that the conflict in the Tskhinvali region will be long drawn-out and there can be no hope for any solution to it in the near future. And this means that a stream of refugees from Georgia and from the Ossetian side into the North Ossetia region, i.e. to Russian territory, will inevitably follow. This is why it is absolutely essential now to adopt law on the status of refugees and migrants without any delay, so as to be able to offer these people help on the basis of this law. Besides, if the people arrive in North Ossetia territory, to the territory of the Russian Federation, this presents problems of how to feed and house them. The existing budget of North Ossetia does not envisage such additional expenditures, and this is why the Russian Government will certainly decide on the question of financial help. The possible size of the financial help is being discussed right now. This will certainly be done.

[Announcer] If this conflict has now assumed an interethnic character, does this mean that it should be examined at a Union level, and does Russia have enough authority to do this?

[Rozhannikov] Of course not. In interrepublican relations, we proceed from the premise that we are dealing with the sovereign republic of Georgia. This is why we do not have the legal right to adopt decisions which have to be adhered to on the territory of the Georgian Republic. This is the Union prerogative. If our union government is worth anything, it will of course interfere immediately. It is not clear that this exception has already been made. I think that it is absolutely necessary that the president should interfere, not in the form of a decree, as if the president is refuting the decision of the Georgian Government, but in order to adopt concrete measures. I think that Primakov is not the only man in the president's team who can be sent to a hot point, as he is now doing in Baghdad. We also need to send a man empowered with authority in order to decide the question of South Ossetia. First, the questions of offering help and creating the elementary living conditions for the civilian population. The atmosphere there now is one of fear and apprehension of the situation getting worse. I think this is well-founded. [end recording]

Western Republics

Moldova Rejects 17 Mar Referendum

LD1902201391 Moscow TASS in English 1944 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] Kishinev February 19 TASS—Deputies of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet today voted against the March 17 referendum.

In the morning the session was addressed by President Mircha Snegur, parliament Chairman Aleskandr Moshanu and Prime Minister Mircha Druk.

Parliament leaders insisted on a roll-call vote although the rules also provide for a secret ballot. The session was broadcast live by radio and television.

When the decision was found to lack only one vote, Deputy Andrey Rusnak, who abstained from voting, was forced to change his decision and say that he votes against the referendum.

Mircha Druk said "the referendum was out of question".

The session rejected the draft resolution "On a General Poll of the Population on the State and Legal Status of Moldavia", scheduled for March 10, 1991.

Moldovan Party Leader Urges Adherence to Union

PM1202121191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Aktiv Meeting"]

[Text] Kishinev, 7 Feb—The situation in Moldova and its capital is characterized by sociopolitical instability, anticommunist and antisocialist attacks, the kindling of interethnic hostility, and the drastic deterioration in the working people's living standard—that is how the meeting of the Kishinev City party organization aktiv assessed the situation in the republic.

The communists of Moldova's capital adopted a specific program of actions. It emphasizes the need for an active stance on the part of party members in the struggle against anticommunism, against outrages against Lenin's memory, and against moral terror with regard to communists. The meeting's resolution speaks of the need to counter unjustified attacks on the Soviet Army and the state security and internal affairs organs, and to categorically oppose attempts to use the administrative and territorial reforms planned by the republic's legislature for the purpose of dismantling Soviet power. Under the conditions of the transition to market relations, the document stresses, it is essential to protect the interests of the working man and the rights and security of the individual and to oppose the commercialization of culture and health care.

The aktiv meeting was addressed by G.I. Yeremey, first secretary of the Moldova Communist Party Central Committee. He stressed that under present conditions it is particularly important for all communists to adopt an active stance for the consolidation of the unity of the Moldova Communist Party, for adherence to a socialist choice, for the republic's territorial integrity and sovereignty, for the retention of the USSR, and for the holding of an all-Union referendum.

The Moldova Communist Party Central Committee first secretary stressed that in any situations connected with a possible administrative and territorial reform in the republic the party rayon committees will be retained. He said that in the very near future the Central Committee bureau will repeal the previously adopted decision on the practice of suspending party membership.

Moldova To Review Military Service Law

LD1902110391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 19 Feb 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The Moldovan legislature has set up a special commission to look into the circumstances of the death of seven soldiers called up into the Soviet Army from Moldova. Proposals are being submitted to the Moldovan legislature to review the law on service in the Army to make such service voluntary.

Banned Moldovan Deputies Regain Mandates

LD1502205191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1138 GMT 15 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Fedor Angeli]

[Text] Kishinev, 15 Feb (TASS)—The credentials of seven of the 10 deputies that represented the Gagauz population in the republic's legislature were restored at today's morning sitting of the session of the Supreme Soviet of Moldova. They were deprived of their credentials last fall after the formation of the Gagauz republic, deemed by the Moldovan legislature to be anticonstitutional. Deputy mandates were not returend to leaders of the Supreme Soviet of the Gagauz republic Stepan Topal, Mikhail Kendigelyan, and Georgiy Kalch. Konstantin Taushanzhi, one of the deputies who has had his authority restored and who spoke at today's session, stated that he and his colleagues have returned to the legislature to seek civic accord and peace and the resolving of all contentions questions by legislative means.

Belorussia Ratifies Treaties With 3 Republics

LD1402222491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 14 Feb 91

[Text] The Belorussian legislature has ratified treaties with the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. The treaties provide for priority social guarantees on the protection of human rights and the lawful interests of the populations of the republics, said Shalodonov, deputy chairman of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet. Economic relations among the sides are orientated toward granting each other most-favored trade status. Plenipotentiary representatives will be exchanged with the republics in the very near future. The validity of the treaties is set for 10 years, with the right to extend them.

Ukrainian Government To Compensate Price Hikes

PM1902112191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent S. Tsikora: "Ukraine: Social Protection Program"]

[Text] Kiev—The Ukrainian Government has published the main principles of its program to protect the Ukrainian population's living standard during the economy's transition to market relations. It cannot be ruled out that these same principles will also be adopted by the Union government. V. Fokin, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, told Ukrainian parliamentarians about the details of the transition when addressing a session of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

First of all, the concept of social justice is given new meaning. Instead of the traditional practice of leveling, the government chose a differentiated approach to different strata and groups of the population when working out a system for their social protection.

V. Fokin said that the Ukrainian Government's economic policy will aim to "abolish centralized regulation of wages and switch to flexible taxation of wage funds. The amount of individual wages must be determined solely by the labor input of the working person concerned."

The social protection system is based on a minimum consumption budget defined on two levels: For the main social-demographic groups and per family member. A minimum wage, pension, grant, and so forth will be established on this basis... Using this mechanism, the head of the Ukrainian Government stressed, will make it possible to guarantee all strata of the population a minimum subsistence level. This will not be frozen but amended every year on the basis of the index of price increases for goods and services.

The chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers went on to say that price reform is inevitable but that he will not sign any document to raise retail prices until a reliable compensation mechanism has been formed. V. Fokin said that he and Belorussian Premier V. Kebich have signed a document on price reform and the payment of compensation to the population and sent it to the USSR president.

So what is this system of compensation? A fundamental principle is that it must be brought into play before new prices are introduced. The Ukrainian Government envisages its practical application as follows: Families with an income of up to 110 rubles [R] per person will be compensated 100 percent for any increase in the price of goods which come into the category of everyday consumer items. The Ukrainian Government believes that a similar subsidy should be granted to people engaged in physically demanding, harmful, and dangerous work: Miners, metallurgists, chemical workers, and so forth...

Families with an income of R110-175 per person will be compensated 50 percent of the total increase in retail prices.

It is planned to compensate all families with children under 16 years of age for any increase in the price of children's goods, regardless of the size of their income.

As far as all other citizens are concerned, the Ukrainian prime minister said that they are highly paid anyway and so "it would be possible not to pay them any compensation at all for some time," because most of them are highly qualified specialists who will be able to step up their activity and increase their personal income under the market system.

There is also another approach to resolving the problem of compensation. V. Fokin described it as less radical, although it too has been submitted to the union government. The essence of this approach is to pay all working people, military servicemen, and pensioners compensation at a rate of R50 per person. Students over 16 years of age would get R40; dependents and children under 16 years of age would get R25.

Simultaneous Referendums Proposed in Ukraine

PM2002103791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

["Direct Line" report by Sergey Tsikora: "Yet Another Referendum?"]

[Text] Kiev—The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet has failed to agree on the question of holding the referendum on the future of the Union on the republic's territory.

The debate in the legislature lasted effectively the entire day. The deputies were presented with two versions of a resolution on holding the referendum—one submitted by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium and the other by the parliamentary majority group made up of communists.

The tone was set by the speeches by representatives of parliamentary standing commissions. Their conclusions were reflected in the draft resolution submitted by the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium. In it the USSR Supreme Soviet decisions on holding the referendum in the Ukraine were described as central authority "exceeding its powers" and as a "violation of Ukrainian SSR law and therefore having no legal force on Ukrainian SSR territory." To break the deadlock it was proposed that the voting paper should include yet another question, the purpose of which would be to establish the population's view of a Union not in its current form as a federation of republics, but in the form of a union of sovereign states, wherein "every people would decide its own future."

This Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium draft was opposed by the majority deputies' group, which proposed holding the referendum in accordance with the principles approved by the Union legislature.

When both drafts were put to a vote neither met with sufficient support. Then L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, proposed a third version. The gist of it is that there should be two simultaneous referendums—one a ballot on the question formulated by the Union Supreme Soviet and the other a ballot on the question that will be proposed by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

Oblasts To Hold Referendum

LD1702102191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 17 Feb 91

[Text] An agreement on the main principles of cooperation in the region was reached at a united session of the Ivano-Frankovsk, Lvov, and Ternopol Oblast Soviets of People's Deputies of the Ukraine. That agreement provides for the establishment of long-term and direct links in all spheres of life. A decision was also made on holding on 17 March, at the same time the all-Union referendum, oblast referendums on a question which goes approximately like this: "Do you want the Ukraine to become an independent state which decides independently all questions of domestic and foreign policy and guarantees the equal rights of citizens regardless of to which nation or religion they belong?"

Ukrainian Miners Threaten 1 Mar Strike

LD1802190691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1713 GMT 18 Feb 91

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Vladimir Yurkevich]

[Text] Donetsk, 18 Feb [UKRINFORM-TASS]—Work at the Donbass mines will stop from 1 March if no agreement is reached with the Governments of the USSR and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on increasing miners' pay. Pension legislation will have to be brought into line with such an increase. This was stated today by the regional union of strike committees of the Donbass (southeast of the Ukraine).

Nevertheless, the regional union adopted a decision to continue to offload coal to consumers, taking account of the situation which has arisen at the talks with the Ukrainian and central governments.

Ukrainian Farmers Union Established

LD1502215191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1225 GMT 15 Feb 91

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Aleksey Petronya]

[Text] Kiev, 15 Feb (UKRINFORM-TASS)—The Ukrainian Farmers Union [Soyuz Fermerov Ukrainy] was set up today at its founding congress in Kiev. Its aim is the establishment and development of farming in the republic, the provision of links among farm holdings, and elaboration of the strategy for their operations.

"At present, only 78 of the 130 registered peasant (farmers') holdings in the Ukraine are functioning," the UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent was told by Vasiliy Gordiyenko. He said: "There could be 130 holdings in each of the republic's 25 oblasts. In order to pursue land reform realistically, it is essential to set up committees to implement it that are composed of deputies, economists, landowners, and lawyers. Broad prospects are opened up by the law on ownership adopted by the Ukrainian legislature and the proclaimed equality among forms of ownership. However, it is one thing to proclaim something and quite another to take specific steps and create the machinery for effecting and promoting the establishment of new forms of ownership. Unfortunately, the farmers' holdings in the Ukraine are being oppressed by local bureaucracy. Russia is setting an example, since its government has allocated 1.2 billion rubles for the development of farmers' holdings and rural cooperatives."

Caucasus

Truck Explosion Kills 1 in Nagorno-Karabakh

LD2002120991 Moscow TASS in English 1156 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Text] Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh February 20 TASS—One person was killed and two others were injured by an explosion in the cabin of a Kamaz lorry on a motor road outside the town of Shushi under yet unknown circumstances this morning.

Soviet Interior Ministry and KGB investigators are probing the incident.

'Undeclared War' Continues in Nagorno-Karabakh

LD1502165491 Moscow TASS in English 1337 GMT 15 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Stepanakert February 15 TASS—Clashes continue in Nagorno-Karabakh region. The Karabakh events, which began four years ago under the banners of perestroyka and democratisation, have grown into a bloody undeclared war between Armenians and Azerbaijanians. It has resulted in much bloodshed, claimed the lives of hundreds of people, and driven thousands of refugees roaming throughout the country.

Armenians claim the Karabakh movement, launched on February 13, 1988, is a national-liberation struggle, while Azerbaijanians regard it as an invention to make territorial claims on their Republic. In the meantime, Soviet interior troops had to intervene in order to prevent interethnic clashes. Daily dispatches from the area resemble war-time communiques.

Armenians and Azerbaijanians in the region are living under constant strain and the military are sick and tired of the conflict. They are able to prevent large-scale clashes, but they cannot settle the conflict as a whole without political decisions.

The Karabakh reality remains grim. All motorroads leading into the region are barred and several Armenian and Azerbajainian villages in the region are blocked off. There were attempts to blow up water supply facilities and communication and power lines.

A truly unique situation has developed for the first time in Soviet history. There is no Soviet power or government in the region. This gives rise to numerous complications. There is an acute shortage of petrol and food products. Three eggs can be exchanged for one kilogram of sugar on the Stepanakert market.

There are now four principal forces in the autonomous region—Soviet interior troops, the Azerbajainian militia, and Azerbaijanian and Armenian combatants. Twenty-four people have been killed in the area since January 1st. Everybody realises "that this situation can no longer be tolerated. And talks about peace are gradually turning into concrete steps.

Conferences and congresses havz already been convened by informal organisations, Armenian and Azerbaijanian Second World War veterans were seen shaking hands on TV screens. After all, they have spilt their blood, fighting shoulder to shoulder for their common Soviet homeland. Why should their sons and grandsons spill each others blood today? But goodwill at the official and grassroot levels are needed first of all to settle the conflict. Unfortunately, there is no such goodwill, yet.

The forthcoming session of the USSR parliament, as indicated by President Gorbachev at the recent Congress of People's Deputies, is expected to discuss the Karabakh problem again. No matter how the problem will be discussed, openly or behind closed doors, no matter what decisions will be made, it is necessary to restore constitutional norms in the region, as noted by the president, and, primarily, to immediately stop the mutual anihilation, to declare a moratorium on all hostilities.

This must be unanimously decided by representatives of both nationalities. No problem will be solved as long as blood is being spilt. Every day brings new victims and more grief to Armenian, Azerbaijanian, Russian and Ukrainian families.

Internal Ministry Troops Search NKAO Villages

NC1902133491 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 18 Feb 91

[Text] The three villages in the Berdadzor subrayon [in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, NKAO] were subjected to a week-long search by the troops of the Internal Affairs Ministry. These searches were rather reminiscent of bandit raids. The villages were first isolated from each other and the troops then rummaged through houses, courtyards, fields and [word indistinct]. In Metsshen, they broke through the the door of the Astgik jewelry cooperative and smashed the equipment. While departing, they did not forgot to make off with the polished precious stones and cassette recorders. They ruined Metsshen's school and pillaged everything they could, and turned one of the classrooms into a toilet.

Searches were carried out in Yegdzahog village on 16 February. They yanked off telephone lines and cut off the natural gas.

During the course of these searches, helicopters flew, almost touching the roofs and striking fear among the population.

After completing the bandit operations, the glorious soldiers of the Internal Affairs Ministry detained seven residents of Yegdzahog and two of Metsshen—the final number is not yet clear—and took them towards Shusha.

After the searches the troops also removed the guard post on the Shusha-Lachin road.

Armenia Denies Shooting at Nakhichevan Border

NC1602123191 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1830 GMT 15 Feb 91

[Text] The "120 Minutes" program on Central Television presented a curt and impartial news to the viewers yesterday: Allegedly, the Satarak village in Nakhichevan was fired upon from across Armenia.

The press center of the Armenian Republic's Internal Affairs Ministry has stated the following: That report is a blatant lie. There are military posts along the border between Armenia and Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. They have registered no shooting incident for the last two months. Satarak is two km inside the border and it is practically impossible to fire automatic weapons at it from Armenia. It remains to assume that the tranquility at the Armenian border is disconcerting to certain circles which, being concerned with the natural short memory span of the ill-fed Soviet men, feel the need to refreshen from time to time the image of the Armenian extremists and terrorists.

Armenian Legislature Marks 1921 Revolt

NC1902153291 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 18 Feb 91

[Excerpt] (?That unforgettable day was commemorated today.) It was an unforgettable day in every sense of the word. Seventy years ago, on 18 February 1921, the Armenian people were able to shake off the heavy and bloodstained yoke of Bolshevism, and once more declared Armenia's independence. It was a daring attempt to show that people cannot tolerate oppression and slavery. After the revolt, which Bolshevism described as the February adventurism, the Armenian people continued to live in slavery for seven nightmarish decades; it lived shrouded in the deceitful words of fraternity and freedom. During these decades our spiritual and physical values were forcibly relegated to oblivion, one of them being the heroic glorious chapter of February 1921.

Therefore, it was only natural that Babken Ararktsyan, first deputy chairman of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet, opened today's full session of the Supreme Soviet with a reference to it. The people's deputies observed a minute of silence in memory of the victims of the dictatorship.

After that, Babken Ararktasyan proposed that a vote be taken on whether to include the referendum bill on the agenda. His proposal was passed by a majority vote. This bill will be discussed at the session tomorrow.

The session then resumed debate on the bill on public and political organizations. [passage omitted]

[Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian at 1000 GMT on 19 February, received with poor to very poor reception, reported that on 18 February "the National Self-Determination Association organized a rally in the Freedom Square" in Yerevan in memory of the 18 February 1921 revolt.]

Commentary Praises Revolt

NC1802185891 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 17 Feb 91

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The first Bolshevik dictatorship in Armenia lasted only two-and-one-half months. No people, and especially the Armenians who had regained their freedom after six centuries of darkness, could long endure the violence which the Armenian Bolsheviks and the so-called liberator Red Army began committing on the very first day of their rule. Thus, the desperate outburst of the people's instinctive desire to salvage the fatherland was only natural, all the more so because in these two months they had seen their best sons jailed, tortured, and shot and, in the words of Nzhdeh, their homeland fallen under the Red falsehood.

The date 18 February 1921 marked the beginning of the all too short Armenian renaissance. On that day, rebel forces occupied Yerevan and the Fatherland's Salvation Committee under Simon Vratsyan took power. The people rejoiced. Yerevan, which had become a grim and gray place during those two-and-one-half months, came to life again, and people poured into the streets and congratulated each other.

Even at a distance of 70 years, it is easy to understand their joy. After all, we too savored the same happiness when on 4 August 1990 the 70-year-long dominance of the Bolsheviks came to an end, this time around, we are sure, for good.

On the occasion of the memorable anniversary of the February popular revolt, HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN has published the memoirs and the appeals made to the people by Simon Vratsyan, Garegin Nzhdeh, Brigadier Martiros, and others.

Armenian Report Shows Sharp Decline in Economy

PM1402110791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Sergey Bablumyan under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Year of Lost Opportunities. Armenian State Committee for Statistics Has Summed Up Results of Work of Republic's National Economy in 1990"]

[Text] Yerevan—The phrases most often used to describe the state of Armenia's economy at the beginning of this year in this document are: "The situation has deteriorated..."; "we have lost control..."; "pledges were not fulfilled"; and "losses totalled..."

However, every inhabitant of the republic can feel for himself the sharp deterioration in the activity of the national economic complex today even without looking at the statistics department's final report. The empty counters, the fact that new housing is not being built, the shortage of power, the problems in transport, and stifling prices—this is what people are coming up against every day. Explanations such as "Things are no better elsewhere" are not very reassuring.

The gross national product decreased by 5.5 percent compared with the year before, the national income produced decreased by 6.9 percent, while social labor productivity dropped by 8.4 percent. And in addition: A total of 766.5 million rubles of output was not delivered to consumers.

And now something about the regions in Armenia where the faltering economic mechanism has had the most biting effect. In the disaster area as a whole, contract obligations for the delivery of output were only 94.4 percent fulfilled. Another figure: In two years only 68 percent of industrial potential has been restored in the area. Using state capital investments, only 39 percent of the annual plan has been fulfilled as regards housing.

North Ossetia Remembers 'Tragic Events' in South

LD1602160791 Moscow TASS in English 1311 GMT 16 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz February 16 TASS—Victims of the tragic events in South Ossetia in 1989-1991 were remembered in North Ossetia, the Caucasus, today. Rallies in memory of the deceased had been held earlier all over the republic. A minute of silence was observed in memory of the victims of inter-ethnic conflics.

A rally of many thousands of North Ossetian people culminated the day. It was attended by leaders of party and government bodies of neighbouring republics, representatives of north Caucasian, Russian and All-Union public, political and national movements.

Fresh flowers were placed at stands with the photographs of the deceased. Candles were lit. Speakers at the commemoration rally said that the situation in South Ossetia went beyond the framework of a local ethnic conflict and assumes the form of genocide with regard to the Ossetian people.

Terror was unleashed when the South Ossetian people refused to back Georgian secessionists' idea of withdrawing from the USSR. The economic blockade and the cutting of electricity, barbarous lootings, killings and indignities to which Georgian commandoes subject women, children and old people in Ossetian villages have the purpose to stirring up a civil war in the region, speakers said.

The rally adopted addresses to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. They demand effective and urgent measures to restore law and order in South Ossetia.

Georgia Develops 'Critical' Energy Situation

LD1602001391 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 15 Feb 91

[Report by correspondent A. Fedorovich from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A critical energy situation has developed in Transcaucasia.

[Fedorovich] We are reporting from the main control center of the united energy system of our country. The system is being managed from here. All the information on how our energy industry breathes also comes from here.

There are a lot uf unusual things here. The switchboard looks like a giant map of our country. The system itself resembles the circulatory system, with large arteries and a multitude of capillaries. The controllers are busy working on the united system of Transcaucasia. It has developed some sort of thrombosis, in other words, failures.

[Unidentified speaker] The situation of the energy supply to the national economy in Georgia could be described as critical. The shortages in the electricity supplies are estimated at nearly 44 percent. Some 24 percent of the shortages are covered by the electricity supplied from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the USSR united system.

[Fedorovich] We can add to this that the majority of the industrial enterprises have stopped in Georgia. The reasons vary. There is not enough fuel, and the allocated funds have been frozen.

[Unidentified speaker] In the first half of January, and the end of January to the beginning of February, the same critical situation has developed in Armenia. It has been caused by the undersupply of fuel oil.

[Fedorovich] We note that the fuel the population has in its possession is not sufficient. That is why more than 50 percent of all the energy supplies are used for heating of residential buildings. The average for the country as a whole is 10-12 percent.

[Unidentified speaker] There is no problem with the energy system of Azerbaijan. At the moment the system is stable.

[Fedorovich] [video shows interview with E.I. Petryayev, deputy minister of energy and electrification] Can you tell us what measures your ministry is taking for stabilization of the energy supplies to the Transcaucasia republics?

[Petryayev] Our main attention is concentrated on increasing the capacities and ensuring the stable working of the electric power stations in Transcaucasia. Decisions have been taken to supply not less than 9,000 tonnes of fuel oil daily to the Georgian electric power stations and 11,000 tonnes to the electric power stations of Armenia. Instructions were also given to the Gasprom concern to increase supplies of gas to the electric power stations by as much as the capacities of the pipelines will allow.

Central Asia

Kazakhstan Issues Appeal on Union Treaty

PM1902160391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by unidentified TASS correspondent: "Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet Appeal"]

[Text] The Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet has called on the Supreme Soviets of all USSR republics to display "political wisdom, restraint, and farsightedness and to do everything possible to avert the impending catastrophe—the disintegration of our great union state."

This appeal was adopted 11 February at the Kazakh legislature session. "We must not close our eyes to the reality of such a tragic outcome of events in conditions when destructive forces, promoting personal or group ambitions and narrow mercenary interests, are exploiting the idea of the peoples' free national development and subjecting interethnic friendship, which has been sealed by the sweat and blood of many generations, to very grave trials," the document states. "In our joint history there are undoubtedly serious reasons for mutual grievances, disappointments, and doubts. They have been occasioned by decades of supremacy by the administrative edict system which usurped power in our common home and appropriated the right to speak and act in the name of the peoples. Only together, only by pooling efforts can we put an end to the totalitarian past."

The Kazakh people and all the republic's peoples, the appeal stresses, cannot conceive of themselves outside our unified homeland, whose preservation accords with both the political and the economic interests of multinational Kazakhstan. "The disintegration of the Union will inevitably entail the total collapse of the republics' economies and a sharp deterioration in the lives of millions of people. It will thrust us all back by whole decades and will do irreparable harm to cooperation with the countries of the world community. We have no alternative but to renew the Union on the basis of concluding the Union treaty between sovereign, equal republics.

"At the same time we are clearly aware that we cannot build the new federation while rejecting the healthy statewide foundations and ignoring the constitutional power which operates in accordance with the expression of the entire Soviet people's will. It is dangerous to turn the contradictions between the republics and the center, which are natural in the process of perestroyka, into a 'war of laws' fraught with an unpredictable civic confrontation, and it is still more dangerous to try and create a 'parallel center'—which will inevitably lead to the destabilization of the political situation in the country."

The deputies believe that a barrier must be erected against destructive centrifugal forces. "A special mission in this matter belongs to Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputies, since it is precisely the peoples of Russia, who have experienced in full measure the yoke of the administrative command system, that can and must play an important constructive role in shaping the renewed Union."

The exacerbated political situation does not allow us to wait for all the republics to define their attitude to the Union treaty. "It is necessary to begin a dialogue without delay with those who favor the preservation of the country's unity, leaving the other republics with the right to join whenever they make the final choice. Basing ourselves on the adopted declarations of state sovereignty, we are obliged to give clear answers to the fundamental questions: what our Union is to be like, and what the new center is to be like. This is especially important now that central departments have shown a clear desire to ignore the republics' sovereign rights."

The appeal states: "We advocate the sovereign republics' strong unity and the further deepening of the democratization and humanization of society, ensuring political, social, and economic freedoms and guarantees for everyone regardless of nationality. We want to be part of the renewed Union together with all the other republics of our multinational country."

Kirghizia Statement Appeals to Iraq

LD1502203591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1323 GMT 15 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Boris Maynayev]

[Text] Frunze, 15 Feb (TASS)—"Kirghizia cannot remain neutral in the conflict in the Persian Gulf, which is threatening to escalate," it says in a statement published here today by the republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Taking into account the close historical and cultural links and the common religious orientation of the peoples of this region and of Kirghizia, the republic cannot help but take account of the negative effect the war is having on the development of its bilateral links with the sides involved in the conflict in all spheres, the document notes.

The republic's leadership shares the alarm expressed in the statement by the president of the USSR on the subject of the dangerous consequences of the conflict, especially the involvement in it by other countries in the capacity of warring sides. Kirghizia approves the USSR's loyalty, confirmed in its statement, to the principles of the settlement of the conflict set out in the UN Security Council resolution. Kirghizia appeals to the Iraqi leadership that it heed the voice of common sense and, understanding its responsibility for the destinies of the people's of Iraq and the whole region, carry out the UN resolution.

Tajik Party Plenum Favors Preserving USSR

LD1802184591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1702 GMT 18 Feb 91

[Text] Dushanbe, 18 Feb (TADZHIKTA-TASS)—Participants at a plenum of the republican Communist Party Central Committee, held today in the capital of Tajikistan, spoke in favor of preserving a united USSR.

In his report, K. Makhkamov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Tajikstan Communist Party Central Committee called on communists to resolutely repulse the destructive forces which, by their actions, are placing in doubt the existence of the USSR. He called for a retreat from socialism and the sowing of interethnic strife.

A resolution adopted at the plenum opposes the bloodshed and the deaths of civilians in the Persian Gulf military conflict. The plenum favors resolving this problem only by political means. The plenum also adopted a clause concerning the Party Control Commission of the Tajik Communist Party, ratified the budget, and considered a number of other issues.

Tajikistan Cabinet of Ministers Deputy Named

LD1402201691 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 0005 GMT 14 Feb 91

[Text] Kakhar Makhkamov, president of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], has issued a decree on the appointment of Otakhon Latifi as deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR.

Uzbek Supreme Soviet Discusses Referendum

LD1402214591 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 14 Feb 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] An extraordinary fourth session of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation began its work in Tashkent today.

[Correspondent Sh. Ganiyeva] The main issues which were tabled today for discussion at the extraordinary fourth session of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet were devoted to the republic's state budget for 1991 and the principle of price regulation. In his speech the republic's President Karimov said that today, when the country is going through a most serious economic and political crisis, and when inflation is occurring everywhere with the transition to market relations, one of legislature's most important duties is the adoption of all possible measures to protect the interests of the people.

It was stated from the platform of the supreme body of state power in Uzbekistan that in any economic situation, taking into account the special needs of the republic, prices for bread and flour would not be increased.

In his speech, the president of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic also spoke about the real need to hold a referendum and to conclude a Union treaty, taking into account the republics' current situation.

At the morning session, the Uzbek legislature adopted two appeals to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the president of the country, in which it expressed full support for the initiatives set out in Gorbachev's statement in connection with the international conflict in the Persian Gulf region. In the other appeal the deputies of the republic expressed their anxiety at the unstable political situation in the country, resolutely condemning the use of force, and in particular military force, to settle conflicts between opposing groups.

The session then continued its work according to the agenda, in which a number of draft laws which are interconnected, and which are most important for the republic, were discussed.

Uzbekistan Appeals for Baltic, Gulf Peace

PM1902151591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Andrey Orlov under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Voice of the Uzbek Legislature"]

[Text] Tashkent—At an extraordinary session of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, deputies adopted an appeal on the events in Lithuania and Latvia and also on the escalation of the conflict in the Persian Gulf.

The tragic events in Lithuania and Latvia in January this year which led to casualties deeply worry and concern the working people of multinational Uzbekistan. People are concerned at the fact that the negative processes occurring in one republic or the other are doing irreparable harm to democracy and are affecting the formation of our rule-of-law state, the Uzbek SSR people's deputies' appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet and USSR President M.S. Gorbachev says. Deputies called for everything to be done to ensure peace and calm in each region and to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens.

In an address to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, U.S. President George Bush, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, and all the peoples of the world, the Uzbek people's deputies noted that "since time immemorial Syria and Iraq and Mecca and Medina have been holy places for our fathers and grandfathers. We are linked with the Arab peoples by ancient cultural, religious, and educational relations which are rooted in antiquity. The wailing and moaning being heard in that region cause pain in our hearts. By ancient custom, on the day of Navruz, the approaching holiday of the peoples of the East, wars ended and even sworn enemies made peace. The deputies urged that this fine tradition be revived, the war ended, and the conflict resolved by peaceful means.